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Where the clear stream of reason 
has not lost its way 
into the dreary desert sand of dead habit 
Where the mind is led forward by thee 
into everwidening thoiight and action 
Into that heaven of freedom, my Father, 
let HQr country awake. 
Rabindranath Tagore. 
X 
CHAPTER 1; INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations report on progress in land reform states that "the 
land reform meastires recently enacted in India are quantitively by far the 
most important"X of the countries which they surveyed. 
All the states of India have passed, since 1947i at least some legis­
lation affecting the interrelationship between men in their use and occu­
pancy of land. Much of this legislation has been subject to revision and 
many new enactments anticipate solutions to agrarian problems. But unless 
continuous, critical analysis is made, reform measures may become politi­
cal platitudes and the enactments will bear little relationship to the 
conditions they were intended to ameliorate. This study is an attempt to 
interpret and analyze the Bombay Tenancy and AgriculttireG. Lands Act of 
1948^> one of the significant land reform enactments passed in India since 
Independence in 1947• Primary attention is devoted to the economic 
effects, in terms of criteria specified later, but because of the nature 
of the Act and its objectives certain other aspects are considered. The 
^United Nations Department of Economic Affairs. Progress in land 
reform. New York, United Nations. 1954- P» 20. 
%he Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 194^ (Bombay Act No. 
LX7II, 28th December 1948), adapted and modified 1:^ the Adaptation of 
Laws Order, 1950, and amended: 
Bom. 12 of 1951, 
Bom. 34 of 1951, 
Bom. 45 of 195X, 
Bom, 33 of 1952, 
Bom. 60 of 1953, 
Hereinafter cited as Bom. 67 of 1948, as entered in; Bombay. Code, 
1950. 3:2749-2782C. 1950. 
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analysis ia intended to indicate the effects of the various provisions on 
the specified objectives of the Act and so form the basis for recommenda­
tions to improve the legislation. 
The Bombay Tenancy Act of 194S was by no means the beginning or the 
end of tenancy legislation in that state, but it stands as one of the land­
mark enactments in the program of land reform in the Indian Union. The 
problems it soxight to alleviate had pressed upon the people for centuries 
and this was to be one step in the new nation's efforts toward welfare im­
provement. Time will bear out the actual success or failure of the Act. 
It remains, therefore, the task of the analysis to anticipate the short­
comings and attempt to point out the necessary changes. 
Agrarian Reform in Economic Developnent 
The land refom problem for purposes of analysis may be viewed at two 
levels s 
(1) The overall problem of economic underdevelopment and the relation­
ship of agrarian reform to a general program of development. 
(2) The relationship of a specific enactment or group of enactments 
to the objectives which they seek to accomplish. 
Although this study is concerned with the second type of problem it 
must be oriented to the overall problems and programs if it is to fit into 
the context of economic development. The extraction and specification of 
the problem of tenancy out of the general problejais of underdevelopment, and 
the body of agrarian reform enactments created to meet the problems, is the 
purpose of Chapter 2 so consideration will be made here only of basic 
policy goals and the role of government in land reform. 
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Basic policy goals 
In discussing tixe impact of land reform on economic development, 
Barlowe emphasizes the ne^ for establishing the importance of economic 
development as a goal, stating that, "if "Uae architects of land reform are 
concerned only with the attainment of distributive justice or some 
political objectives, their programs may have only an incidental impact on 
economic development".^ As the basic document for India's development 
policy, the Five-Year Plan makes clear ihe great importance attached to 
the economic goal* It does not, however, fail to recognize the distribu­
tive aspects of policy. 
The first Five-Xear Plan, designed for the period 1951 to 1956, 
places primary emphasis on developuent of agrictalture, irrigation and 
power. As a consequence, the Plan devotes attention to agrarian problems 
in general and land tenure problems in particular. Although the priority 
in development policy itself is a subject for analysis, •ttie scope of this 
study will be limited to acceptance of the priority of the plan as an 
assumption. Perhaps most significant is that the priority of agriculture 
is only in the short run, forming only part of a long-range balanced 
growth policy.^ In this respect it may be noted that the rate of capital 
accumulation is not expected to be great in the early states of develop­
ment but to accelerate after a period of 10 to 15 years (1961 to 1966),3 
^Ralei^ Barlowe. Land refom and econc^nic development. Jour, of 
Farm Econ. 35s173-187. 1953. p. 180. 
2lndia Planning Commission, First Five-Year Plan. New Delhi, 
Planning Commission. 1952. p. 44-
p. 16, 17, 
u 
DiiriJig this initial period, consi<ierable importance is attached to matters 
of equity and social justice. This carries over into the reform program. 
The Five-Year Plan states that although "increase of agricultural produc­
tion represents the highest priority in the next few years, a land policy 
must reduce disparities in income and in other ways reduce inequalities be­
tween individuals"^ These basic policy assumptions pervade the a^arian 
reform programs in the various states. 
Role of government in land reform 
Although the central government is a vital force in the development 
of reform programs, it is the individual states which are responsible for 
the passage of the reform acts and for their implementation. The central 
government has laid down the main policy guidelines through the Congress 
Agrarian Reforms Committeej research and recommendations emanate from the 
Delhi Planning Ccanmissionj and through the Five-Year Plan the states re­
ceive assistance.^ 
One of the principal elements that make the recent legislation of 
India of a truly refom nature, i.e., a change in basic philosophy, is 
that it is reoriented toward the wealth and welfare of the people and 
^Ibid., p. 184, 
%ost of the assistance from the central government is of an advisory 
nattire. For this ptirpose a Central Committee for Land Reforms was 
organized consisting of the Chairman (Prime Minister) and members of the 
Planning Commission, Minister of Home Affairs and States, and Minister of 
Food and Agriculture. 
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reverses the ;jxiridical basa^ of the tenure system. Government's interest 
in the agrarian struQtiire now goes beyond the maximization of land re­
venue. Responsibilities of government eactend into all major industries 
concerned with the economic development of the Indian Union, As stated 
the United Nations' Measures for Economic Development, "economic progress 
depends to a large extent upon the adoption by governments of appropriate 
administrative and legislative action, both in the public and private 
sectors."^ 
The Planning Commission also acknowledged the role of the state in 
economic development: 
It is clear that in the transformation of the economy that 
is called for, the state will have to play a crucial role. 
Whether one thinks of the problems of capital formation or of 
the introduction of new techniques or of the extension of social 
services or of the over-all realignment of the productive forces 
and the class relationships within society, one comes inevitably 
to the conclusion that a rapid expansion of the economic and 
social responsibilities of the state will alone be capable of 
satisfying the legitimate expectations of the people.^ 
^However, it would be incorrect to ascribe this reorientation 
entirely to Independence since some of the elements of the welfare con­
cept of government are seen in the British regime, particularly in the 
last decade. For example, the Bombay Tenancy Acts of 1939 and 194-6. 
For discussion see: S. Thirumalai. Post-War agricultural problems and 
policies in India. Bombay, Vora and Co. 1954- P- 125. 
%nited Nations Department of Economic Affairs. Measures for the 
economic development of under-developed countries. New York, United 
Nations. 1951. p. 17• 
^India Five-Year Plan, op.cit.. p. 31, 32. 
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Since land reform is concerned primarily with the ownership of, or 
claims to the ret\irns of factors of production, government is the central 
figure in making and enforcing adjustments. Therefore, government may 
strongly influence the combination of resources and as a consequence, 
total production. The role of government is to enhance the wealth of the 
Individual in India with the minimxim digression from a private property 
system. Government, with the responsibility of economic development op­
erating within the modified free enterprise system, must guide but not 
force, being always accountable under democratic processes. 
Selection and Scope of the Study Area 
Confinement of the study to Bombay 
In view of the vast amount of legislation passed since Independence^ 
and the limited time and finsuicial resovirces available for this study, a 
detailed analysis of the type attempted here for all the legislation was 
not possible. Fvirthermore, many studies have been devoted to overall 
surveys covering the land tenure problems of India than have been concen­
trated on detailed analyses. Such organizations as the United Nations or 
central and state governments are far better equipped to make a general 
survey study. The main lines of policy have already been drawn so it 
appeared that the greater need lay in the area of detailed analysis of 
individual components—the separate acts and particular problems. 
This problem was chosen after a consideration of several types of 
land reform legislation in Bombay State. The Bombay Tenancy and 
^An outline of reform acts of various states is given in Chapter 2, 
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Agricultural Lands Aet was chosen because of its relative importance both 
from the standpoint of Bombay and of the Indian Union. According to 
Srinivasan "Bombay leads the field with its Tenancy and Agricultural Lands 
•I 
Act,"-^ The preeminence of the Bombay tenancy legislation in India is 
acknowledged by G. D. Patel in his Agrarian Reforms in Bombay; 
This Bombay tenancy legislation has been acknowledged to be 
one of the most progressive legislations in the country. Other 
state governments have adopted certain important features of the 
Bombay legislation in their tenancy legislations. Even the recent 
report of the Congress Agrarian Committee adopted salient features 
of the legislation in its suggested reforms of the agricultural 
economy of India,* 
The selection of the particular reform act in Bombay was made on what 
appeared to be its relative importance in that state. Abolition of 
zamindari tenure might rank first in importance in Uttar Pradesh but over­
lord tenures in Bombay, although great in number, accounted for a rel­
atively small area and few cultivators. The ryotwari tenure, which is 
most closely euoalogous to fee simple ownership in the Anglo-American world, 
is the dominant form of tenure in Bombay* 
For statewide information, reliance was made on secondary so\irces. 
Therefore, the matter of availability of information was also taken into 
consideration in the selection of the problem.^ It was found that, in 
^M. Srinivasan. A critical review of land reform legislation since 
1945 ixi various states. Indian Jour. Agr. Econ. 8, no. 1:119-127. 
March, 1953. p. 121. 
D. Patel. Agrarian refoms in Bombay. Bombay, G. D. Patel. 
1950. p. 17. 
%he loiral population of Bombay is well over 25 million, distributed 
in over 34.>000 villages, with great diversity in geography, language, and 
tenure conditions. A svirvey of primary sources upon which inferences covild 
be developed for the state wovild have been of a magnitude beyond the re­
sources available. 
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Bombay, the matter of tenancy was somewhat better equipped in this respect 
than some of the other facets of the agrarian problem. 
Tenancy ^  ^  Es£2m Program 
The United Nations' report on the progress of land reform drew 
attention to the wide divergencies in the teniirial conditions between the 
various states of India.^ The reform measxires encompass tenancy regu­
lations, overlord tenure abolition, prevention of fragmentation, regu­
lation of money lending, agricTalt\iral development and production, village 
administration, and cooperatives. Under these circumstances, sweeping 
generalizations in the analyses of the Indian land reform program are 
hazardous and limited in their usefiilness for improvement in the specific 
acts. Detailed analyses of specific enactments are required so that the 
respective components will make a maximum contribution to the overall 
reform program. 
An adjustment of the legal relations between landlords and tenants 
represents only one segment of the Indian agrarian reform program. The 
contribution of the Tenancy Act will depend upon the way in which it is 
integrated with other measures as well as upon the conditions of tenancy 
it seeks to ameliorate. 
The Tenancy Act is part of a more general group of measures designed 
to affect the relation of man to the land resource. These legislative 
enactments—designated here as land reform—are directly concerned with 
land ownership, tenancy, consolidation and prevention of fragmentation, 
reclamation and agricultural development. A still more inclusive 
^United Nations, Progress, op.cit.. p. 20. 
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category—agrarian reform—woxild include the land reform legislation plus 
other measiores closely connected with agriculture such as money lending 
and tagai, agricultural labor, cooperatives, and rural cominunity develop­
ment. 
The importance of developing an integrated program of reform measures 
to accoinp3J.sh the purposes of economic development might be illustrated 
by reference to the problem of capital accumulation. In many areas the 
capital market, due, for example, to lack of knowledge or uncertainty, is 
such that income available for capital has only an alternative between 
agrictilture or consvunption. If, say, one enactment of reform legislation 
forbids the mortgage of land (as is the case in the Bombay Tenancy Act) 
and another enactment (Moneylenders Act) restricts interest rates to a 
low level so that unsecured loans cannot be covered by a higher interest 
rate surpluses available for capital formation will tend to revert to 
consumption. The consequence is a restriction on capital accumulation. 
Other examples refork measures that, within a range at least, operate 
at cross-purposes are those concerned with the redistribution of land and 
those aimed at increasing the size of cultivating units. 
Notwithstanding reform measures that are competitive there are also 
measures which, because they are complementary, require simultaneous 
development in order to ensure success. This is often the case of reforms 
which involve the need for credit, education or technical assistance. 
The Tenancy Act cannot be a cure for all the difficulties arising 
out of tenancy arran^ments in an tmderdeveloped country. It should be 
so constructed as not to interfere with a solution of the root problem of 
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economic landerdevelopraent. A tenancy act cannot itself increase the 
supply of capital nor the quantity of land. Alone it will not increase 
the productivity of labor. It will not improve marketing, production 
techniques, or education. It can, however, form part of the institutional 
framework necessary to promote economic development* 
Just as tenancy reform is but a segment of the agrarian reform pro­
gram so is the agrarian reform program itself only a means toward economic 
development and still more ultimate objectives. 
It slwuld be made clear, particularly in this study which attempts 
to deal primarily with the economic aspects, that land reform legislation 
is not devoted entirely to propositions directly affecting the efficiency 
of resources in agricultural production. Matters of equity and social 
justice, for example, are also included in the objectives of the Acts. 
One important task of an analysis of a land reform enactment is to sepa­
rate and specify these main elements. This is done in Chapter 3. The 
essential purpose of a land reform program reduces to a change in the 
institution^ structure to permit and encourage (1) a reallocation of 
productive resotirces to create a greater totsd product, and/or (2) a re­
distribution of the ownership of, or claims to the returns of the various 
resources. These are the stated objectives of the All India Five-Year 
Plan:^ 
(i) the provision of increased employment and production by the most 
efficient utilization of the resovirces of the country; and 
(ii) the achievement of the largest measure of social justice 
possible. 
^India Planning Commission. Progress of the plan. New Delhi, 
Planning Commission. 1954* P« 1* 
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Objectives of the Study-
As stated above, this study is an attempt to analyze one land reform 
Act in one state. The objectives of the study are as follows: 
(1) To test, conceptually, the provisions of the Act in terns of 
their ability to satisfy the conditions which are necessary for 
a movement toward the objectives of the Act. 
(2) To provide hypotheses concerning the ability of the Tenancy Act 
to induce a movement tox^ard the objectives vdiich may be tested 
empirically as the required data become observable and available. 
(3) Where possible, to sliggest improvements in the Act on the basis 
of the conceptual analysis. These suggestions ttiay then be 
accepted or rejected as empirical verification or rejection of 
the hypotheses upon which they ar6 based is made. 
Through the course of specifying the objectives of the Act and 
analyzing various sections it will be seen that, within a range at least, 
objectives become competitive. One of the intended by-products of the 
study is to show hov/ these objectives substitute for one another thus 
pointing up the nature of decisions to be made by the lawmaJcers. 
Procedure of the Study 
The analysis is concerned with the stated objectives of the law~ 
makers (as interpreted) and provisions of the Tenancy Act as means to 
attain the objectives. Some of the problems involved in tenancy are a 
nat\iral incident to the problem to be analyzed but are not dealt with as 
such. That is, the study is not directly concerned with the moral 
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justification of tenancy in the land system or a comparison of the effects 
of various tenancy systems on efficiency. Rather than deal with the rela­
tive merits or demerits of tenai!icy per se. more fundamental objectives are 
sought and the Act analyzed in terms of them. It is hoped that by removing 
some of the links in the means-ends chain a more fundamental approach could 
be made to the subject and some of the pitfalls of subjectivity avoided. 
Before specifying the objectives some attention will be devoted to 
the backgroxmd underlying the passage of the Act. 
Backgroimd of the analysis 
For p\irposes of an exercise in logic applied to economic phenomena 
it woiild be sufficient to specify any relevant objectives and utilize 
these in their author-interpreted forms as the assxamptions of the analysis. 
However, if it is assumed that the whole analysis is oriented toward 
guiding policy in the actual world it is necessary that these objectives 
bear as closely to the actual situation as possible. The Preamble, State­
ment of Objects and Reasons, and statements during the debates are not so 
baldly stated that they require no interpretation or, what is perhaps 
more important analytically, simplification. The process of simplifi­
cation requires selection and emphasis, i^e., weights on relative impor­
tance. In order to minimize the errors stanraiing from singular interpret­
ation, the central thesis will be preceded by svifficient background so 
that not only the logic of the analysis but also the assumptions upon 
which the analysis is based may be criticized. 
This background material presented in the first part of Chapter 2 
gives rise to important factors concerning the land reform program: 
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(l) the new conception of government in its positive role in a welfare 
state and (2) the accompanying difficulties arising out of ancient in­
stitutions and the problems of underdevelopment. Within this climate the 
land reform program has emerged. The Goals and Objectives of the Bombay 
Tenancy Act culminating in several significant statements are a product 
of all these varied forces. The measuire of reality that may be attached 
to the interpretations of these statements of pxu-pose will depend upon 
the grasp of the overall intention of those responsible for the Act's 
passage and the forces v/hich influenced their judgment. 
Ob.iectives and principal provisions of the Tenancy Act 
In Chapter 3 the objectives of the Act are derived from (l) the 
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill, (2) the Preamble, (3) Con­
gress Party declarations and programs, and (4-) the Legislative Assembly 
debates preceding passage of the Act, The objectives are developed as 
far as possible in accordance vrLth the letter and the spirit of the 
declarations of the lav/makers, and the analysis made in terms of those 
specified objectives. The objectives of economic efficiency and growth 
and of distributive equitability, appear to be explicit in the statements 
of the lavmakers but the possibility of a third basic objective is also 
speculated. These objectives form the norms "fe which the actual situation 
may be compared. In another sense, the objectives form some of the basic 
assumptions of the analysis, i.e., that the situation existing at the 
u 
time of the passage of the Act was less than optimvim and that reform 
legislation was an acceptable means of altering tenancy relationships. 1-
The means to move toward ihe objectives were the provisions of the 
Tenancy Act, Its principal features were (1) the specification of maxi-
mtun rental paym<^t with administrative discretion to lower the maximum, 
(2) specification of a minimum lease period of 10 years with automatic 
renewal, (3) various tenant purchase rights and priorities, (4-) coii^en~ 
sation payments, and (?) state management of agricultitral lands. 
^ ^^lysj-s 
Within the objectives arise certain criteria or conditions against 
which the provisions of the Act may be tested. For example, the economic 
objective gives rise to conditions of efficiency with respect to factor 
parents, uncertainty and mobility. If the Act is to induce a fulfill­
ment or a mov^ent toward t^is objective, these conditions must be met. 
Analysis will consist of examining the various provisions, with available 
empirical information, in terms of these conditions. These conditions 
will be specified, in terms of each of the objectives, in Chapter 4. 
^Friedman attributes three positive roles to the assumptions of a 
theory: (a) they are often an economical mode of describing or present­
ing a theory; (b) they sometimes facilitate an indirect test of the 
hypothesis by its implications; and (c) th^ are sometimes a convenient 
means of specifying the conditions under which the theory is expected to 
be valid. The objectives of the Act are used as assunqptions in the lat-ber 
sense in this study. Milton Friedman. Essays in positive economics. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 1953. p. 23« 
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The Act has certain sections which may be called "principal sections", 
that is, of primary significance with respect to the goal, the remaining 
sections dealing v/ith matters ancillary to the principal section. Each of 
these sections can be expected to have effect on the respective criteria— 
either positive, neutral, or negative. Analytical simplification requires 
that only the primary effect be dealt with, although reference to certain 
special secondary effects may be made. 
Supporting facts are of such limited extent that they can only be 
used for speculation, i.e., hypothesis formation, concerning the possible 
relationship between a section of the Act and its criterion. It will 
therefore be possible to deal only vdth qualitative relationships rather 
than quantitative tests of hypotheses. The analysis is essentially de­
ductive. It may be possible, for example, to say that Section 5 is so 
constructed that it can satisfy A and B criteria of efficiency but it will 
not be possible to conclude to what extent the condition of efficiency has 
actually been fulfilled. Most of the information pertaining to the oper­
ation of the Tenancy Act comes from (1) the files of the Revenue Depart­
ment and Bureau of Economics and Statistics, Bombay Government and (2) case 
studies of three villages specially chosen because of their known diver­
gencies in the implementation of the Act. 
Limitations of the analysis 
Two not xjholly independent types of limitations affected the scope 
of this study: (1) The self-imposed restrictions of problem delimitation 
in which the breadth of study of land reform in India was narrowed so that 
the particular problem might be examined in greater detail, and (2) the 
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exogenous restrictions imposed by limitations of time and finance, with 
the additional difficiilties of language and limited basic information. 
The conclusions or final result of the analysis will be, from the 
standpoint of the actual working of the Act, only l^otheses. Although 
studies planned by the Indian Society of Agricultural Economics and the 
Gokhale Institute may shed some empirical light upon these hypotheses 
vdthin the next year or two, the real test of the Bombay Tenancy Act will 
be its effect on the agrarian economy in the coming years. 
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CHAPTER 2; LAND TENURE IN INDIA—PROBLEMS Ai® PROGRAMS 
Unlike the growth of the tenure system in the United States, which 
began in the East, largely on an English jixridical base, and was implanted 
in new regions by successive waves of settlers, the tenure system of India 
was the product of centuries of growth in isolated pockets with a minimum 
of centralization, even by rulers of princely states. A knowledge of the 
principal features of this growth and development is necessary for an 
understanding of the present efforts of the central government to create 
a unified land policy and of the state governments to develop a program 
of land reform legislation that will meet the standards of efficiency and 
equitability required in India's quest for economic development. A con­
tributor to the Sixth International Conference of Agricultural Economists 
stated: 
. . .each country has through a process of time evolved its ovm 
system of tenure suitable for its own systems of agriculture. 
The system of tenure is moxilded in each case by the character and 
the social habits of the people, by the position which agriculture 
holds in the national economy, and by the country's constitution, 
laws, and institutions.^ 
The tenure system of India is extremely complex and those who en­
vision a uniform tenure structure to aid in the accomplishment of 
economic development must necessarily take into account the diversity 
of conditions within which the reform program operates. 
^D. Whitney. Land use, credit and capital use, discussion. Pro­
ceedings Sixth International Conference of Agricultural Economists. 
1947; 73. 1948. p. 73. 
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The first part of the chapter deald with the tenure system, its 
development and the emerging agrarian pi*oblems on an All-India basis. 
This brief review is intended to show the general problematic area of the 
study from which was delimited the particular Act in one state. 
Following the review of the Indian land problem are the reform 
measures, one group of which is tenancy legislation. Thus, the study of 
the Bombay Tenancy Act is shown to be a product of a two-way delimitation 
process from the standpoint of other states in the Indian Union and other 
land refonn enactments. 
In the context of these general problems, the second part of the 
chapter is devoted to specification of the situation in Bombay which the 
Bombay Tenancy Act sought to improve. 
Problems of Agrarian Reform in India 
The ancient institutions of India, when subjected to the influences 
of western colonialism, formed obstacles to economic advancement rather 
than means for social and cultural security. The village and the tenure 
system no longer provided a shelter for the cultivator but instead were 
forces against his progress. Economic underdevelopment is the product of 
many forces but the land tenvire system played an important role. 
Development of the tenure system^ 
The basic characteristic of the early land tenure structure is to 
be found in communal land oxmership. The essential feature of the land 
^Since it is impossible to attribute the exposition of historical 
material to one author, the following are submitted as the (continued) 
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settlement was the village. The village itself was preceded by tribal 
conumines which did not recognize individual rights in land vdthin the 
clan. When the clan eventually outgrew the borders of kinship, the village 
began to develop elements of individual interest in property, chiefly with 
respect to the arable land. The degree and form of commiinal interest 
varied; for example, in some cases, the right to cxativation of a plot 
was heritable, whereas, other arrangements provided for the rotation of 
cultivators on the land so that some operators wotild not be disadvantaged 
by differences in grades of land. 
Pre British era. During the Hindu period (approximately 1500 
(Continued) reference sotirces upon which the section is based. Direct 
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India. London, Swan Soiinenschein and Co. 1899* 
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B.C.^ to 1200 A.D.), the land was not considered as property of the King. 
Property rights rested vdth the village. Payment of tax in kind was made 
to the King hy the villages. The amotmt of the tax was usuedly about one-
sixth of the crop but at times went as high as one-fourth for emergencies. 
Most noteworthy are the vestiges of the concept of joint or commxmal owner­
ship that are found in the present-day tenure structure. 
It has long been held that land is the property of all men 
equally and cannot become the property of an individual to be used 
and to be disposed of as his own interests dictate. It is the gift 
of natixre. Jaimini has said, 'The king cannot give away the Earth 
because it is not his exclusive property but is common to all beings 
enjoying the fruits of their own labour on it. It belongs to all 
alike.' The old Sanskrit texts thus deny even the king's right to 
exclusive property in land.^ 
It is through the mediiim of tho village that it is possible to see 
the close connection of the revenue system and the tenure system. The 
Indian State derived m0st of its reveiMae from the land and hence the 
village became the agency of collection. Durii^^ the Hindu period, the 
village leader was directly responsible for the collection aiui payment of 
the King's share of the produce and for maintaining an equitable relation­
ship between the cultivators; there were no intermediaries. Later it will 
be seen how thisi system gave rise to the layers of intermediaries between 
the cultivator and the state. 
^Fiiteen hundred B.C. is the approximate date given to the Aryan in­
vasion of India. The Dravids were driven mostly to the south where they 
formed isolated pockets that were subject to little influence from Delhi. 
It was in the Dravidian areas where tribal customs were more tightly pre­
served with a consequent effect on the tenure structure of the area. 
%nited Provinces, oo.cit.. p. 59« Jaimini was a Hindu sage, a 
disciple of Vyasa, and the foxinder of the Purvamimsmsa philosophy. 
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Wasteland, range, and meadow were in joint ownership and were managed 
through the village panchayat. The element of private property in land 
xjas quite limited and there was a strong implication of stewardship in the 
land. The Code of Manu^ provided for very severe fines for irresponsible 
cultivation. 
The village has remained important in the relationship of the Indian 
cultivator and his land. Despite its setbacks and alteration xmder the 
British, the village still preserves its primacy and recently has been 
given additional attention as a means for economic development.^ 
It can be said that, in general, the Muslim rule had comparatively 
little influence on the status of proprietary rights in the land. The 
most notable changes were the increases in taxes and the more systematic 
treatment of assessments beginning with Sher Shah (15-40-45) vho intro­
duced a method of land measurement and classification. The settlement was 
made specifically in terms of the individual ryots recognizing no inter­
ests between the government and the cultivator, even when the revenue was 
collected through a village headman or zaminder. 
^Tha Code of Manu is a law book attributed to Sv/ayan-bhuva Manu, the 
first of fotarteen mythological progenitors of mankind, who existed thirty 
million years ago. The book actually is the work of many persons and 
appears to have been composed about the fifth cent-ury B.C. out of the 
traditions existing before that time. John Dowson. Classical dictionary 
of Hindu mythology and religion, geography, history and literature. 
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. 1950. p. 199-202. 
^See M. S. Randhawa. Developing village India. Bombay, Orient Long­
mans Ltd. Rev. ed. 1951. 
22 
The Muslim, as the Hindu had done before, treated wasteland indiffer­
ently; that is, whoever was instrumental in bringing the land into culti­
vation received the primary proprietary interest. 
Thus, for over 3000 years the village retained its position of primacy 
as the source of proprietary rights. The decline of the Muslim and the 
ascendency of the Mahratta dviring the late 17th and early 18th century had 
very little effect on the tenure structure except that in this period of 
political upheaval the weakening of the central government permitted some 
encroachments on the rights of the ryot. In this respect, it can be said 
that there was some measure of virtue to the orderly treatment of property 
accorded to the British. 
British arule. Near the end of the year 1600, Queen Elizabeth char­
tered the British East India Company. From that time until the company 
became directly responsible to the Crown in 1784., India e3q)erienced a 
dramatic upheaval in its institutions. Nor did imperialism end with the 
passage of Pitt's India Act; legislation aimed at the welfare of the 
people did not appear tmtil the 1930's. Dutt states that: 
^Cord Clive'^ endeavoxurs to introduce reforms both in the civil 
and military administration deserve all the praise that has been 
bestowed upon them by historians; but when we examine the essential 
features of his scheme, we find that it was framed—as so many 
schemes have since been framed in India—mainly in the interest of 
the British rulers, and not in the interests of the people.^ 
From the standpoint of chronological orientation it is useful to view 
early British nile in three periods. Within these three periods Britain 
established the basic tenets of her land tenure policy in India. First, 
there was the era of expansion and conflict in which England vied with 
%omesh Dutt, Early British rule, op.cit.. p. 39. ^rackets om^ 
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Pranc© for supremacy in the East as well as the New World. The military 
e3q>loits of Clive and the administration of Hastings mark this period as 
the rise of English preeminence in India. The second period began \^th 
the passage of Pitt's India Act of 1784 and the impeachment of Hastings; 
it was an era of administrative development initiated and highlighted by 
iord Cornwallis. During Comwallis' administration the system of Perman­
ent Settlement was established. It was a time of severe exploitation. 
The third period (1800-1947) bore the seeds of enlightened policy toward 
the people of India (seeds which lx)re frxiit a century and a half later). 
Outstanding were the names of Bentinck, Munro in Madras, and Elphinstone 
in Bombay. In 1813 the East India Company lost its trade monopoly but 
continued as the British administrative agency in India. In 1858 Lord 
Canning announced the transfer of the government from the East India 
Company to the Crown. In spite of the urgings of many of the British 
leaders in India no genuine cognizance^ or at least admission, was made of 
the rural land problem until the 1930*sj even in the report of the Royal 
Commission on AgricuHiure,^ there is a conspicuous absence of any refer­
ence to land policy. 
A most important feature of the tenure developnent in India is its 
relationship to the revenue system. Whether tinder the rule of the East 
India Company or the Crown, the fundamental objective of revenue maximiza­
tion remained the samej in the former case, it was for the benefit of the 
subscribers of the Company, in the latter, the British jmblic. Two con-
taapts are necessary to an explanation of the British India revenue 
^Royal Commission on Agriculture in India. Report. Bombay, Govt. 
Central Press. 1928. 
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system, 1) the permanently settled estate and 2) the temporarily settled 
estate. The first means that revenue settlements were made in perpetuity. 
Its pvirported attributes v/ere sec\jrity of the government vdth respect to 
revenues and the ability of the cultivator to secure the advantage of his 
own improvement. The temporary or periodical settlement had the advantage 
of enhanced revenues where production rose. The system of permanent 
settlements developed vinder the administration of Lord Cornvrallis (1784) 
in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa after the attempts at an effective method of 
temporary settlements by Warren Hastings had failed.^ The East India 
Company in its attempts to follow the line of least resistance adapted its 
own variations on the Hindu-Moghul theme of tax-exaction. Revenue collec­
tions v/ere farmed out to local headmen or "zamindars" v;ho received a 
portion of the revenue, usually about l/ll. Under the Muslim regime these 
zemindars were held strictly to the position of revenue-collectors; how­
ever, in keeping vdth landed estate system in England, the British ad­
vanced the zamindar to the rank of landlord over the land for v;hich he v/as 
responsible in revenue-collection. The end result v;as a substantial 
diminution of the rights of the cultivators or ryots. 
The permanently settled system is not synonymous with the zamindari 
tenure system, but the two are generally associated with the same geograph­
ical area, Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and the United Provinces. The Malguzars 
of Central Provinces, as em exception, were revenue farmers whom the 
^Discussions concerning the equitability of land revenue settlements 
had begun as early as 1776 in Calcutta. At that time, Phillip Francis, 
a member of the Governor General's Council, proposed that the land revenue 
should be permanently fixed. 
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British recognized as ovniers (\mder the Peshwas the Malguzars had no pro­
prietary rights). They were analogous to the zamindars of Bengal but 
settlements were temporary. 
Later on, as the British territories in India expanded, the permanent 
settlement scheme fell into disfavor, Partictilar opposition arose when a 
settlement for Punjab was anticipated; it was felt by the Government of 
Pvinjab that a permanent settlement at the time would resxilt in a great 
loss of potential revenue inasmuch as the country had not developed. 
The other principal revenue syst«fl was the temporary settlement. 
Warren Hastings had made an unsuccessful attempt at temporary settlements 
previous to the Cornwallis administration. But even the Cornwallis re­
forms had fallen into disrepute and ideas of a permanent settlement for 
the north India provinces had been abandoned in 1821. The classi^cation 
of lands, "proprietsu:y estates temporarily settled" sprang into prominence 
in Regulation VII of 1322, which provided for complete reassessment as 
well as pericKiic resettlements 
. . .this law (Regulation VII) instead of proceeding to an esti,-
mated Itimp-sum settlement without survey or inquiry into details, 
easpressly directed a survey and an inquiry into the rights in 
every village and field, which s«is to be followed by a valuation 
of the "net produce" of land. . 
From the period 1792 to 1802, the East India Company acquired most of 
what is now Madras and Andhra States and ryotwari settlement came into 
prominence. Under the leadership of Thomas Munro the ryotwari system was 
developed. Mxmro favored the establishment of a permanent ryotwari 
system but he was overruled and the temporary ryotwari system was 
^Baden-Powell, Land systems, op.cit.. p, 450. 
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introduced in the vinsettled tracts of Madras in 1820. The settlements in 
Madras were also oppressive to the cultivator because very little account 
was taken of the tax-bearing capacity of various grades of land. Later 
(1855) a survey and resettlement were made in an effort to produce a more 
equitable system but in practice, this too, proved unsatisfactory. 
Thirty-year settlements v;ere introduced in Bombay in 1835 after the 
unsuccessful attempts at temporary settlements by Pringle between 1824-28. 
There v/as a general survey of lands v;hich were classified into nine grades 
according to their productive ability. Settlements were made directly with 
the ryots. Difficulties were also encountered in Bombay; taxes became very 
oppressive on the peasantry and the government was forced to make re­
visions.^ The revenue system was again revised londer the Bombay Revenue 
Code of 1879 which provided for assessments based on the contract rents 
rather than a calculated value. 
This fom of revenue system is generally connected with the ryotwari 
tenure because the settlement is not only temporary but made directly with 
1". . .the Bombay Government organized a Survey Department, which, 
after mapping and measuring each holding, proceeded to classify fields 
according to the depth and quality of soil, situation, and natural defects, 
placing each field in a class corresponding to a certain 'anna valuation' 
or fractional share of the maximiom rate calc\ilated in sixteenths. Sub­
sequently, villages were grouped into blocks on the basis of their pro­
pinquity to markets and high roads and other economic conditions, the max­
imum rates for each block being fixed in relation to these conditions and 
to average prices. . .The survey department, \ifhich was established in I835j 
imposed at the outset assessments that were too high and caused much dis­
tress, They were therefore reduced and a fxirther inquiry was set on foot, 
which resulted in the formulation by the department in 1847 of the prin­
ciples which still form the basis of the Bombay land-revenue system." 
Cambridge History, op.cit.. p. 256. 
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the ryot or cultivator who ass\ames an ovnaer position. In the ryotwari 
arrangement, no intermediary exists between the government and the land­
holder. It is a so-called "occupancy tenure" thereby permitting the ryot 
to inherit, transfer, and otherwise alienate. Unless the revenues are 
paid the land will revert to the custody of the government. Although this 
tenure is generally regarded as a "peasant proprietarship", there is 
nothing inherent in the ryotwari to prevent tenancy. 
In a third type of revenue system, the government dealt with a 
village community, leaving collection to the village leader. This system 
was rejected in Madras but the same principle—village collectibn~vrais 
employed in the mahalwari system of northern and northwestern India. 
The mahalwari (village) system was first developed in what is now 
Uttar Pradesh in Regtalation VII of 1822 and Regulation IX of 1833. In 
this system revenue was collected from the village. The individual cul­
tivators were generally responsible for a certain share of the revenue 
but, in the last resort, all the villagers were responsible, jointly and 
severally. Payment was usually made through a village headman. A 
notable variation from that of the Uttar Pradesh region came about in the 
revenue system of Punjab i^ere the share of the revenue from each land­
holder was separable so that the system was virtually ryotwari in nature. 
Thus the mahalwari settlements were an important innovation in the 
revenue system- The recognition of a more subtle foim of property right 
than the absolute ovmership concept in the British Isles was in itself 
notable. 
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And what of the effect of the British revenue system on the village? 
In one instance, for example, the early ryotwari settlements in Madras, 
the village was disregarded and in another case, the north India settle­
ments, the revenue settlements were made directly with the village. This 
is an evidence of the British policy of utilizing existing institutions 
wherever possible. As indicated above, the communal or joint-village form 
of land holding prevailed in the Northwest Provinces, Pxmjab, and United 
Provinces area. Various forms of individual holding were found in the 
remainder of India. 
The village, to a large extent, governed itself, that is, it assuraed 
a great deal of autonoDQr with respect to the central or regional govern-
ments* The govemament of the village was either multi-headed, as in the 
case of the panchayat, or single-headed. Leadership was partially 
hereditary, more by virtue of circumstance than blood. An interesting 
case of the single-headed village leaders were the Polygars who were 
local military headmen. "Lord Wellesley's government foimd a large part 
of the Karnatic under the power of the Polygars, and virtually rooted 
them out in order to bring the people \inder its direct control."^ Such 
abrupt changes in the social institutions frequently had serious effects 
on the ryots. 
A very significant factor in the weakening of the village institu­
tion was the development of a market economy. Prior to the "peaceful 
trade missions" of the British, the cultivator was insulated from the 
world market and lived in a semi-barter or subsistence economy. In this 
^Dutt, Early British rule, op.cit. <> p. 133. 
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localized economy the village performed a very important fxmctionj it was 
through the village panchayat that payment was made (in Isind) for the ser­
vices of the artisans, holdings were regulated, common lands were utilized 
and other legal and social meastires were performed. Under tl;® British ad­
ministration payment of land revenue was demanded in money.^ As cottage 
industries declined and commercial crops were developed, money became more 
important. The cultivator became subject not only to the vagaries of the 
weather but of the market. "He came into contact with the world market 
through the agency of his grain dealer and trader, who, in thlB unique 
setup, happened to be the moneylender too,"^ 
Historically, the village had fomed a protection for the c\iltivator 
within which he co\ild operate with a reasonable degree of security. The 
decay of the village system which accompanied British imperialism removed 
this protection. The English con<3ept of absolute ownership was neither 
assimilated nor understood by the ordinary cultivator. The end restilt was 
that the ryot was victimized both by landlords, moneylenders and by the 
impersonal forces of the market. 
What is even more important for the purpose here is to recognize the 
tenuous claim to ownership rights held by the present landholders. The 
autonomy and isolation of the village community, the system of joint 
^Originally taxes were fisced at the value of about one-half to one-
third the crop at the prevailing price of the preceding year. Subsequent­
ly, changes were made in the intensity and method of calculation. 
J. Patel. Agricultural labourers in modern India and Pakistan. 
Bombay, Current Book HoTose. 1952. p. 55. 
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ovmership, the distant relationship with the central government are a few 
of the historical factors of Indian tenure that might cloud the titles of 
the present-day landholders, at least from a Western standpoint. 
Tenancy and early tenancy law. In the foregoing paragraphs the 
effect of the British revenue system on teniire was discussed. The re­
mainder of this section will be devoted to an examination of those ele­
ments which have affected the status of tenancy in India, At the coming 
of the British, various classes of rights were in different stages of 
change. Therefore, any statements of generality about the nature of ten­
ancy are open to exception. For example, some of the "tenancies" were so 
bestowed with rights that the tenants were virtual proprietors, at the 
other end of the scale were the tenants who were, as Baden-Powell des­
cribed, in a position worse than that of agricultiaral laborers. Thus the 
following comments aim only at exposing a few general characteristics of 
the tenancy situation. 
Proprietorship may be broken down into four grades;^ 1) government 
ownership, 2) non-intermediary, 3) one landlord, A) overlord types. In 
the first grade the government is the owner and no other rights are in­
volved, for example, wastelands not leased, Khas (government managed) 
estates, escheats, forfeitures. The second category connotes an absence 
of anyone who may be called a proprietor between the occupant and the 
government, e.g., ryotwari villages in Madras, Bombay, etc. In the third 
group there exists one landlord over the soil cultivator or occupant, e.g., 
^This is the breakdown used by Baden-Powell in his Land systems of 
British India. A more complete description can be found in volume I of 
this work. 
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the Bengal zamindar, Oudh taluqdar, joint body ovming a village, revenue 
farmers who have become ^  facto owners. The fourth category refers to 
an overlord such as a Raja whose interest may be represented by a rent 
charge or a share of rent or by some other co-sharer. 
Under the zamindari system the British instituted laws for the pro­
tection of tenants by forbidding surcharges and reducing uncertainty by 
making written leases compulsory. The tenants, however, would not enter 
into these lease arrangements because it meant admittance of an inferior 
position and made binding on them the payment of rent according to terms 
which they could neither read or understand. Furthermore these laws re­
ferred only to a small class of tenants who already had fixity of pos­
session and a permanent rate of rent. At the other end of the tenant 
ladder were those cultivators who worked the zamindar's private lands. 
In between these two grades was the large class of "khud-kasht" tenants 
who were permanent resident cultivators and who had held the land for 
generations. Since the state retained the right to revise revenue pay­
ments on their land, the law coxild not prohibit the zamindar from doing 
likewise. "Meanwhile, the necessities of punctual revenue-collection and 
the inevitable resxilt of the introduction of the European idea of 'land­
lord' and 'tenant' both worked directly against the old 'khud-kasht' 
tenant, though of coxarse not designedly."^ 
If the zamindars defaulted in payment of revenue, the state imme­
diately put up the estate for sale. When these estates were sold, they 
^Baden-Powell, Land systems, op.cit.. p. 209. 
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necessarily had to be free from incumbrances, one of which was existing 
contracts on rental. The resvilt was an enhancement of the rents of the 
old resident cultivators. Furthermore, the Regulations of 1799 and 1812 
were so framed that they placed the burden of proof on the tenant that 
the rent was improper—thus the cultivator was placed at a further dis­
advantage . 
A result of the obscure tenure histories of the zamindari areas was 
the difficulty of classifying tenancies. To secure a measure of justice 
for the tenants, the "twelve-year's rxile" was devised in 1859, which held 
that a tenant who occupied land in the village for twelve years is an 
occupancy-tenant and entitled to the rights accorded thereto. The occu­
pancy tenant was protected against rental enhancement and ejectment. Fur­
ther laws dealt with the form and payment of rents, granting of receipts, 
and compensation for improvements. 
When the ryotwari system of tenure became fully developed, ryots be­
gan to sub-let their l&nds and live on the difference. Tenancy in these 
areas was of a slightly different nature because of the different rela­
tionship between the landlord and the state. Under the ryotwari system 
every registered holder of land was recognized as its proprietor, and 
thus could sub-let or transfer it. He was assured of permanent tenure 
as long as he paid his taxes. Most of the tenancies of the ryotwari area 
were made with the cultivator as a tenant-at-will with rent payments 
either in cash or in kind. 
Relatively little concern was shown over the matter of tenancy in the 
ryotwari area until the present century. Most discussions of tenancy in 
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these areas were generally associated with other forms of tenure that 
were not strictly of the peasant-proprietorship types, for example, the 
taluqdari and khoti of Bombay or zamindari of Madras. 
The British administration was not without tenancy reform, most of 
which was in the order of security against eviction and excess rents. It 
aimed at classifying different tenancies into various grades of rights and 
providing each with its own measure of protection. 
The first tenancy laws operated to the detriment of the tenants, 
however. The Bengal Distraint Act of 1799 gave landlords almost xinre-
stricted power to seiae the property of tenants and even to arrest the 
tenants without court proceedings in event that rent payments were in 
arrears. Regulation V of 1812 somewhat modified the earlier law but still 
permitted distraint. These acts were cause for much discussion and de­
bate and a reaction to them is partially responsible for the more liberal 
rent acts of the mid-1800's. 
The Bengal Rent Act of 1859 divided the settled cultivators of Ben­
gal into three classes, l) those who held lands at the same rents since 
1793• For them the rental was permanently fixed; 2) those who held the 
land for twenty years were assumed to have held it since 1793 xmless 
proved to the contrary; 3) cultivators who had held the land for twelve 
years were conceded the right of occupancy. Landlords were circumventing 
the law, there was fxirther agitation among the lawmakers and another Ten­
ancy Act was passed in 1885. Still another act was passed in 1928, mak­
ing occupancy holdings transferable under certain conditions. 
Acts concerned with tenancy were also passed in other provinces. Two 
examples are the acts of Oudh and Punjab, The first Gudh Rent Act was 
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passed in 1868. The Oudh Act gave fixity of tenure to certain classes of 
tenants, and prohibited the enhancement of rents. The Punjab Tenant Act 
of 1868 provided for the occupancy rights of tenants, allowed them to 
alienate these rights, and provided for compensation for improvements* 
Some of the enactments passed in the final years of the British 
rule^ contained many of the features of today's tenancy legislation. 
Common characteristics of these acts were restriction of rent enhancement, 
illegality of surcharges in addition to reg\ilar rent (abwabs, veths, 
cesses, etc.) and non-compensated services, by the tenant, protection 
against eviction, and limitation on interest charges on rent arrears. 
The problems of tenancy were manifest in the British period as well 
as today. There is aa^jle evidence that, however rightly or wrongly they 
were analyzed, these problems were not without cognizance by the British 
rulers. A critical review of their efforts should be an essential part 
of the knowledge of today's lavanakers. 
From the brief review of the period of British administration above 
at least five factors may be viewed as significant in their effects on 
India's tenure structxire and land problems at the time of Independence. 
^Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act of 1938. 
Bihar Tenancy Amendment Acts of 1937, 1938, 1940. 
Chhota Nagpur Tenancy Amendment Acts of 1938, 1940* 
Central Provinces Tenancy Amendment Acts of 1938, 1939* 
Bombay Small Holders Relief Act of 1938. 
Bombay Tenancy Act of 1939. 
These tenancy enactments are discussed in detail in M. B. Nanavati 
and Anjaria. The Indian riiral problem. Bombay, Vora and Go. 4th ed. 
1951. p. 153-161. 
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(1) Zemindar acquisition of property rights; Under the British, the 
one who had been strictly a revenue-collector under the Moghul became the 
proprietor, and accorded rights and privileges comparable to an English 
landlord. The result was a decline in the rights of the cxiltivator and an 
opening for maxiraum rent expropriation by the landlord. 
(2) Nature of the revenue system; Another aspect of the British fis­
cal system in India was that it was not organized for the benefit of the 
Indian people. T^ftiether under administration of the Company or the Crown, 
the land was viewed, in a very short term sense, purely as a source of 
treastiry enhancement. In the early stages of British rule at least, much 
of this revenue was in fact used for the costs of conquest and adminis­
tration. Furthermore, under the British, all revenue payments were made 
in cash. The moneylender was freed from the bonds of custca^ and the c\al-
tivators' position was reduced still fiirther, ' 
(3) Impact of the market edonomy: The cultivator became exposed to 
a market economy with which he was ill-prepared and ill-advised to cope. 
He was subjected, then, not only to the vicissitudes of nattire but to the 
variations of a price economy. Tiftiereas custom and tradition had, in a 
sense protected him in the past, it now stood as a major obstacle to his 
improvement. British industry discouraged the manufacturers and encour­
aged the primary industries; resources were directed into agriculture. 
Heavy pressure of population on the land increased with the introduction 
of health measures and failure to industrialize. The effects of general 
tmderdevelopment fell upon agriculture. 
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(4-) Decay of the village: Finally there was the decay of the village 
coinmunity. As one of the institutions that served the cultivator econom­
ically, politically and socially, it formed the nexus of the agrarian 
structure. Even where the village was recognized in the revenue system 
(as in the mahalwari settlements) it was allowed to deteriorate. Other 
revenue systems displaced it forthrightly. The village's demise meant a 
relocation of property rights in favor of the landlords and the state. 
(5) Land reform measures: Near the close of the British era, reforms 
in the tenure system began to make their appearance. Measures attempting 
to restore greater sec\irity of tenure, confer occupancy rights on long-
term tenants, reduce rents in periods of crop failtire, reduce interest and 
principal parents on rent in arrears, represent examples of the govern­
ment's efforts to reduce hardship on the ryots. Although the measures 
were usually local, veak, ani unaccompanied by svifficient complementary 
programs, they did represent an acknowledgement of land tenure problems 
and provided the basis for some of India's present reform measures. 
Agrarian reform measures 
In the section above, some indication was given of land reform legis­
lation that had began in the late 1930's. The abtmdance of state legisla­
tion that followed Independence was not without precedents—some dating 
back to the late l8th century, for example, the Bengal Tenan<^ Act. Some 
of the enactments, e.g., the Bombay Tenancy Acts of 1939 and 194-^ are 
quite closely related, at least from the standpoint of objectives. Follow­










The principal areas of reform that have directly affected the 
agrarian sector of the econon^ are land tenure, credit, fragmentation and 
consolidation of holdings, production and land utilization. Most of the 
states have passed some legislation pertaining to land utilization, land 
reclamation, improved practices, irrigation and crop protection.^ The 
legislation affecting moneylending is aimed at the control, not domination 
of the moneylender. Provisions of the moneylending acts involve licensing 
and registration, maintenance of accounts, receipts, maximiim rates, and 
protection of the borrower from intimidation.^ 
Land reform legislation has followed at least four main patterns; 
namely, l) abolition of intermediaries, 2) tenancy reform, 3) limitations 
on holdings and 4) administrative reorganization. 
Abolition of intermediaries. The abolition of various overlord ten­
ure forms has taken place largely toy the acquisition of the estates by the 
government and the payment of compensation. All of the Part A and Part B 
3 
states having the zamindari system have passed laws for its abolition.-^ 
The relative area under the zamindari temore in the various states can be 
^India Ministry of Agriculttire. Agric\iltural legislation in India. 
Vol. 3. Delhi, Goverronent of India Press. 1952. 
%ndia Ministry of Agrictilture. Agricultural legislation in India. 
Vol. 1^ Delhi, Government of India Press. 1950. 
^India Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Agricultural legislation 
in India. Vol. 4-. Land reforms. Delhi, Government of India Press. 1953. 
Part A States; Madras, Bombay, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, 
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Assam and Orissa. 
Part B States; Saurashtra, Madhya Bharat, PEPSU, Rajasthan, 
Hyderabad, Jammu and Kash^r. 
Part C States; Vindya Pradesh. 
Mysore and Travancore-Cochin do not have the zamindari system. 
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seen in Table 1. From this table it may bo seen that although the ryot-
wari tenure was more important from the standpoint of acreage in India as 
a whole, in some states, notably Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Madhya 
Pradesh, the zamindari was the dominant tenure. 
The abolition of tenure enactments provide for the retention by the 
landlord of sir and khudkasht lands, i.e., lands under the personal CTII-
tivation of the landlord. All the states have a provision dealing with 
these lands but only Assam sets an absolute maximum (132 acres) 
In all states provision is made for compensation of the landlords 
but both the methods and the rates differ widely. Compensation may be 
paid in 1-ump sums or installments, in cash or bonds or both cash and 
bonds. Compensation is usually based either on the amount of land revenue 
paid or some income basis. 
All i^sponsibility for land reform, eventually resides in the states. 
The rule of the Cen-fcral government is purely advisory or, at most, supple­
mentary. In the matter of compensation the states have been left to their 
own resources. 
Most of the tenants already had stable occupancy rights in the landj 
the abolition of the intermediaries will simply bring the ct^tivator into 
direct illation with the government and compensation will be partially 
paid out of the enhanced revenues accruing to the reform. The lands 
which remain in the hands of the former zamindars as sir land will Tpe 
settled directly with the government. 
^The 132 acre ceiling is relaxed in the case of cooperatives or 
large-scale mechanized farms. 
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Table 1. Area xinder important tenures in different states® 
(in thousands of acres) 
Zaiaindari 
State Ryot-wari Temporary Permanent Misc. Total 
settled settled tenures 
Assam 30,212 1,486^ 1,702 J 33,400^ 
Bihar (1946-47) .... 4,575- ... 39,752^ 44,327 
Bombay (1945-4-6) 46,878 3,965^ ... ... • 50,843 
Madya Pradesh 12,560 50,277^ ... 20,267 83,104 
Madres (1948-49) 59,555 —. 21,241 80,796 
Orissa (1946-47) 3,930 6,341 9,849 22 20,142 
Punjab 23,208 ... ... 23,208 
Uttar Pradesh 59,520® 9,101 ... 68,621® 
West Bengal 5,840„ —^ 14,329 20,169 
Hyderabad (1945-46) 52,927^ ... 52,927 
Jammu & Kashmir 5,799? ... .— 5,799 
Madhya Bharat 27,625^ ... 27,625 
Mysore 18,852 18,852 
PEPSU mmwmmm 6,371 — 6,371 
Rajasthan 76,608 5,703 ... 82,311, 
Saurashtra mmmmtm ... ... 6,626 6,626^ 
Trav^—Cochin 5,346 ... ... ... 5,346 
Ajmer 784 777 ... 1,561 
Bhopal .— 4,406 
Bilaspur 285 ... .— 285 
Coorg 1,012 ... ... 1,012 
Delhi 366 —- 366 
Himaehal 1,956® ... 1,956 
Pradesh ... 
Kutch 5,003 ... 5,003 
TripTira 2,634 —. 2,634 
Vindya Pradesh 14,356 • 14,356 
^Source: India Ministry of Food and Agricxilture, Agricviltural legis­
lation j op« cit^. p. xxvri-xxvii. 
figure is for zamindari and village communities* 
^Excludes 7,880,960 acres (2,364.,l60 acres in Khasi and Jaintia hills 
and 5,516,800 acres in Manipur) for Indian states and also excludes 
844j800 acres relating to Tirap Frontier Tract for which details are not 
available. 
Zamindari (permanently settled) and miscellaneous tenures combined. 
®Excludes 277,000 acres for hill tracts and Nainital District. 
Excludes non-government area of State generally. 
SRyotwari and zamindari. 
'^Incomplete. 
a 
In the courts, the zamindars have frequently challenged the constitu­
tional validity of these land reform meas\ires by seeking refuge in Article 
31 of the Constitution.^ Eventually, Parliament found it necessary to 
amend the Constitution so as to provide for the legality of land acquisi­
tion by the States. In May, 1952, the Supreme Court declared that all the 
Acts met the requirements of the amended Constitution and thus eaqjedited 
the process of land reform. 
Size of holdings. Since Independence, the matter of consolidation 
and prevention of fragmentation and sub-division has occupied considerable 
amounts of the time of legislators. Most of the principal states of India 
2 have enacted and are implementing such Acts. 
As a measure of small holdings in India Table 2 shows holdings below 
5 acres for several of the Indian states upon which comparable data were 
available. These data are only rough measures of "small" holdings because 
they do not indicate the economic capability of the land. These figures 
are for the period prior to the First Five-Year Plan (1951-56). 
^Article 31 of the Indian Constitution is comparable to the 5th 
Amendment's "due process" clause of the United States Constitution. 
^India Ministry of Agriculture. Agricultxxral legislation in India. 
Vol. 2. Delhi, Govermment of India Press. 1950. In 1950, the states of 
Madya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Jammi and Kashmir, Bombay, Punjab, Delhi 
and Pepsu had passed consolidation lavs. Since 1950, Hyderabad, Himachal 
Pradesh, Vindya Pradesh and Madya Bharat have also passed such laws. 
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Table 2. Small hol^dings in India in several states^ 
(figures in thousands") 
State No. small Percent of Area in Percent holdings all holdings acres of area 
Uttar Pradesh*^ 9,973. 81.2 16,024. 38.8 
Bombay'^ 1,313 52.3 3,672 I4..O 
Madhya Pradesh® i,296 51.5 2,856 10.0 
Orissa U.A. ^  74.. 2 N,A. 30.1 
Bihar H.A. 83.3 N.A. N.A. 
Assam^ N«A. 66.1 N.A. 26.0 
Mysore 820 66,2 2,061 25.3 
Travancore-Co chin 1,541 9^.1 1,322 44..O 
Pepsu 239 45.4 518 8.2 
Himachal Pradesh® 69 95.0 83 71.0 
Coorg 42 76.0 128 30.0 
Madras" 5,906 82.2 11,356 41.2 
^Adapted from; India Planning Commission, Five-Year Plan, op.oit., 
p. 199-202. 
Madras is based on number of holdings assessed at less than Rs. 10 
or less. All other states are holdings of 5 acres or less. 
^90 percent presently occupied airea. 
*^Entire pre-merger ryotwari area. 
®77 percent of total occupied area of the state. 
f* 
^Sample only. 
SChamba district only. 
^82 percent of total area only. 
^N.A. a not available. 
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That an improveinent in the small holding situation can be made is 
seen in Table 3 which shows the result of consolidation efforts by several 
states. It should be noted that these data do not imply a completion of 
consolidation but represent only a beginning for some states, e.g., Bombay 
and Madras. 
Many states now prescribe minimum holding limits. In Uttar Pradesh 
the minimum is 6|- acres, in Madhya Bharat the limit is 5 acres for irri­
gated and 15 for vinirrigated land, and in Assam the minimum may be 12 
bighas upon the decision of the panchayat. Bombay^, Punjab and Pepsu 
also have legislation which permits the restriction of fragmentation. 
Most progress in consolidation has been made by Madhya Pradesh, Uttar 
Pradesh, Punjab, Pepsu and Delhi. Limitation on further fragmentation and 
subdivision and the consolidation of what are presently small holdings are 
frequently the objectives of correlative legislation such as tenancy re­
form and land utilization acts. An interesting observation has been made 
by Kaushik concerning the relation of tenure to size of holding: 
. . .it is in areas where ownership and exploitation are in the 
same hands and where a greater measure of stability in agricultural 
conditions could have been expected, that parcellized holdings cause 
the greatest harm. Tenancy has a mitigating tendency generally, be­
cause it often happens that a tenant would endeavour to secure a 
compact tinit of cultivation out of lands held by sevei*al landlords.^ 
^The Bombay Act provides that no land may be transferred or parti­
tioned so as to create a fragment, A "fragment" is any parcel of land 
less than a "standard area". A "standard area" is specified by government 
for each class of land in each village by official notice in the Official 
Gazette. 
'-Kaushik, op. cit., p. 24B. 
Table 3. Consolidation of holdings in 5 States®^ 
Numb®:* of nlots 
Average size of cultivation unit 
in acres 














Bcanbay 163,954 79,481 3.9 8.0 4.1 
Madhya Pradesh 4,943*808 908,109 4,035,690 0,5 2.5 2.0 
Pepsu — — — Nearly 1.5 
to 5 bi^ias 
Nearly 24 to 
50 bi^as 
— 
Delhi 98,469° 28,763° 69,706 — — — 
Madras 86 69 17 — — — 
^Adapted from: R. N. Kaushik. Consolidation of holdings in India. Agricultural situation in 
India. 8, no. 4:2^8-255. July, 1953. p. 252. 
V 
Operations cofimenced at different times in different states: Bombs^, 194.8; Punjab, 1^; 
Madhya Pradesh, 1928; U. P., 1924-; Pepsu, 1951; Delhi, 1949; Madras, 1950. 
^Cultivating units. 
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When it becomes important to think not merely of legal, political or 
moral values but of the problems of production, suggestions such as those 
of Mr. Kaushik take on added significance. In the words of Sachin Sen, 
"The mere expression, landlord, should not frighten ovir land-reformers. . 
. .Landlord is to supply permanent capital, tenant is to provide working 
capital. . .agricultural efficiency rests on conscientious landlords and 
efficient tenants."^ 
Administrative reoraanization. It was noted above that one of the 
res\ilts of the British rule in India was a diminution of the importance of 
the village governing body as the prime administrative body. Since Inde­
pendence there has been a press for its revival and enactments have been 
passed in several states to encourage the growth of panchayats. S^d the 
Planning Commission in the First Five-Year Plan: 
We consider that the general direction of policy shoiild be to en­
courage them, the panchayats, and assist them in assuming respon­
sibility for as large a portion of the administrative and social 
services within their areas as possible.^ 
To fill the administrative gap left by the abolition of the zamindars, 
there have been organized land management committees known a& "Gaon Samaj" 
(so-called in Uttar Pradesh). The Gaon S^aj is a corporate body having 
perpetual succession and consisting of all the adults in its jurisdiction. 
It will hold the land acquired from zamindars and may collect revenue. In 
Bihar also the village executive is utilized by placing the estates of the 
^Sachin Sen. The tenure of agricultural land , Calcutta,. The Poli­
tics Club. 1937. p. 14, 15. 
%ndia Planning Commiasion, First Five-Year Plan, op. cit.. p. 139-
6^ 
goverximent under the control of the gram panchayats. The panchayat is 
also used in other states in various forms. 
Where the State does not utilize a panchayat or a cooperative society 
it usually operates directly through its own district officers. 
Tenancy reform. The Bombay Tenancy and Agrictiltural Lands Act, 19A^8, 
is perhaps the landmark of tenancy legislation in India today. Neverthe­
less, other states have devoted much of their energy to tenancy reform 
efforts. Some general features of these efforts will be reviewed here. 
The legislation for the protection of tenants has a much 
wider application, because the issue is germane both to the 
zamindari and the ryotwari tenures. Rents everywhere are ex­
cessive, a rate of 50 percent of the gross produce being most 
common, though in several cases is as much as 75 percent. It 
should be remembered that the landlord in India merely provides 
the bare land aj^Ld does not share in the cost of cultivationj in 
fact, he takes little interest in it. Where rents cannot be 
legally enhanced, he imposes unauthorized charges (abwabs), the 
most common being the nazarana (tribute) collected with every 
change of tenant, A large number of tenants have no security of 
tenure and can be evicted at the will of the landlord.^ 
In general, the stated objectives of Indian tenancy legislation re­
veal a distrust of tenancy as a meajis for resource combination in agri­
culture. This has come about largely because, historically, tenancy has 
resulted in an "undesirable" income distribution, i.e., one which favored 
the landlord. The result is an emphasis on the goal of owner-operatorship 
with tenancy assuming the status of a necessary evil, one which could best 
be tolerated if it were strictly confined within legislative bounds. Most 
states have Some legislation regulating tenancy.^ 
L. Dantwala. Land reforms in India. Int. Lab. Rev. 66;A19-A^3. 
1952. p. 4A3. 
^he assam Adhiars Protection and Regtilation Act, 194-8. 
Bihar Tenancy Amendment Act of 1949. (continued) 
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The principal elements of tenancy legislation since Independence 
cover rent regtilation, seciirity of tenure, regialation of land resvaaption 
by the landlord, tenant piirchase, prevention of sub-letting, compensa­
tion for improvements, and provisions concerning rights in common lands 
such as grazing land and forests. 
Almost all of the states which have legislation for the regulation 
of tenancy have some provision for the level of rent, usually the speci­
fication of its upper limit. The leading tenancy enactment in the 
ryotwari areas, the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultioral Lands Act of 1948, 
originally specified a maxii^uum rent of one-fourth of the crop for irri­
gated and one-third of the crop of other land. Recently the rent limit in 
Bombay has been lowered to one-sixth Executive Rule. The Hyderabad Act 
has provisions for a one-third shar^ limit on irrigated and one-fourth 
(Continued) Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. 
Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Rayats and Tenants (Acquisition of 
Privileges) Act, 1950. 
Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947. 
The Malabar Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1951. 
Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Agricioltxiral Laborer Protection 
Act, 1952. 
Orissa Tenants Protection Act, 1948. 
Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act, 1953. 
Uttar Pradesh Abolition of Zamindari and Land Reform Act, 1951. 
Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. 
Pepsu Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952. 
Pepsu Tenancy and Agric\iltural Lands Bill, 1952. 
V/est Bengal Bargadars (Crop-Sharers) Act, 1950. 
Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952. 
Rajasthan Produce Rents Regvilating Act, 1951. 
Rajasthan Rents Control Act, 1952. 
Rajasthan Tenancy Bill, 1952. 
Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951. 
Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, 1950. 
Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and 
Tenancy Act, 1950. 
share limit on dry land.^ In the Tanjore district of Madras, the land­
lord is restricted to 60 percent of the gross product remaining after the 
payment of harvest expenses. In the Assam, if the landlord furnishes the 
draft animals, he is entitled to a maximum of one-third of the crop. If 
the tenant supplies the bullocks, the maximtim is one-fourth. Seed grains 
are also returned to the landlord if he has supplied them. Uttar Pradesh, 
a leading state in reform legislation of the zamindari area, has speci­
fied different classes of tenure. The payment of rent by the asami and 
adhivasi classes is usually fixed but where it is not already so, the act 
fixes the rent maximum at 133 1/3 percent of the hereditary rates appli­
cable to the land ("fair rents" are usually fixed at the time of -tdie 
revenue settlement). In Orissa, the r6nt limit for non-occupancy tenants 
is two-fifths of the gross produce and for occupancy tenants it is one-
third the gross product in the Cuttack, Puri, and Balasore districts and 
one-sixth of the gross product in Ganjam and Korapat districts. 
Within the various limitations fixed by law the rental level is left 
to the agreement of the parties but in case no agreement can be reached, 
a settlement is arrived at by the Mamlatdar or soine other district 
official. West Bengal in the Bargadars Act specifies that if no agreement 
^At the time of this writing a Bill was under consideration to 
change the maxinnjm to multiples of the land revenue. 
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between landlord and tenant is made, the total product, after the return 
of the seed to the party supplying it, is divided into thirds, one-third 
to tenant, one-third to landlord, and the remaining third to be divided 
in proportion to the contributions to the cost of production (current 
expenses). Saurashtra has a similar arrangement. 
Where there has been adverse sentiment toward the crop share system, 
legislation has been passed to have crop share rents commuted to cash. 
Provision for the converting of crop share into cash can be seen for ex­
ample in the Acts of Rajasthan, Bombay, Hyderabad and Bihar. Ajmer pro­
vides for the commutation of rents either from share to cash or cash to 
share. 
The other major elements in the tenant protection enactments of the 
various States are the restrictions on ejectment of tenants and the 
limitation on the resumption of lands by the landlords. Security of ten-
lire is necessary if rent regxilation is to be effective, and vice versa. 
For if the tenant can be evicted at any time, the level of rent is unen­
forceable; similarly, if rents can be unreservedly enhanced, then secvirity 
is of no consequence, Bombay and Hyderabad provide for security of tenure 
for 10 years. Bombay limits the landlord's privilege for resumption for 
private cultivation to 50 acres, and Hyderabad limits the acreage to 100. 
The Punjab gives security against ejectment for 5 years as does the 
Tanjore Act of Madras. In Madya Pradesh all the tenants are protected 
from eviction. In Bihar protection is given to tenants-in-chief and under-
ryots >ri.th 12 years possession of the land. Tenants can be evicted upon 
expiry of their lease in Orissa but crop sharers cannot be evicted unless 
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they were holding from a ryot who had less than 33 acres. In Rajasthan, 
persons in possession before April, 194.8, are exempted from eviction. 
Landlords may resume a limited amount of land for personal cialtiva-
tion. In Saurashtra, this limit was set at 80 acres and in Ajmer land­
lords can claim as private land that which they have cultivated since 
June, 1948. In the Uttar Pradesh a sirdar or asami who fails to culti­
vate the land for 2 years may be ejected. According to the Punjab Act, 
landlords can resume up to ICQ "standard" acres or 200 ordinary acres 
whichever is the lesser. In the Assam as in most states the landlord can 
resume the land for his personal use only, the privilege of sub-letting 
being confined to widows, orphans, and physically, mentally defective. 
In many cases the Acts do, or are being adapted to, provide for variations 
in local conditions. This, of course, is very essential in all matters 
where the size of holding is involved. 
In later legislation limitations were placed on sub-letting in order 
to prevent further alienation and a renewal of the chain of subinfeud­
ation. Bombay and Hyderabad have written such provisions into their 
Acts, qualified by allowances for sub-letting by widows, minors, persons 
physically or mentally disabled and monbers of the armed forces. Uttar 
Pradesh also has similar legislation. The laws of Assam and Madhya 
Pradesh are so written that the persons who sub-let their land are liable 
to loss of their occupancy rights. One of the difficulties of early 
legislation was a failure to include provisions restricting sub-lettingj 
such was the case with the Bihar Act. A consequence was a relapse of the 
subinfeudation problem. 
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Other elements in the tenancy legislation deal with inheritance and 
transferability of rights, compensation for (and tenants' rights to make) 
improvements, and rights in common lands. The ownership of grazing and 
wasteland and forest land is vested in the State and rights to utilize 
these properties is usually left subject to the option of the panchayat 
or district official. Many Acts such as those of Bombay, Hyderabad, 
Bihar, and Pepsu provide for the payment of compensation for imexpired 
improvements made by the tenant. The rights in inheriteuace and transfer 
vary greatly between States but, in general, all the higher grades of ten­
ants have both these privileges. For example, the Bihar Act grants these 
rights to occupancy tenants (ryots) and to under-ryots a limited right of 
occupancy is conferred, i.e., tinder-ryots with 12 years continuous 
possession have the right of succession but not of transfer or mortgage. 
Rajasthan Tenants who do not already have heritable and transferable 
rights (such as, Khatedars, Pattedars, Khadamhars) may purchase th©n by 
payment of ten times the annual rent. 
Althovigh considerable progress has been made on tenancy reform since 
Independence, a great deal of work remains to be done. An indication of 
the lines upon which this work will proceed may be seen in the following 
recomn^ndations by the CJongress Agrarian Reforms Committee:^ 
1). . .in future no letting and sub-letting of land should be 
allowed except in the case of minors, vd.dows, and disabled per­
sons, but the lands which are already under lease require separate 
treatment. • . 
2) We, therefore, recommend that a tenant continuously cultivat­
ing a holding or a part of a holding for six years should 
^Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee, op.cit., p. 4^-4.9. 
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automatically get the rights of occupancy over it unless the 
owner proves before the proper authority his disability to 
cultivate the land personally. . . 
3) We recommend that determination of fair rent and commutation 
of crop share into cash rent for the tenants who would acquire 
occupancy rights should be on the basis of the provisions of the 
Bombay Tenancy Act. . • 
4) We recommend that in case of wholesale remission or suspension 
of land revenue the benefit shoxild be given by the landlord to the 
tenant. 
5) The tenancy would not terminate if the tenant fails to pay in 
any year within a reasonable period from the date fixed for the 
payment of the last installment of revenue, but the landlord may 
sue the tenant. . . 
6) The tenancy would also terminate if the tenant does any act 
destructive or permanently injurious to the land. . . 
7) Resumption should be made only for the purpose of cultivation 
by the owner the Committee specified the maximum of resumption 
at three "economic holdings" subject to certain conditions. . . 
8) The protected tenant will have the right to purchase land by 
paying a consideration to the owner. 
Study of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act in the next 
chapter will indicate its "model" nature from the standpoint of the 
Agrarian Reforms Committee recommendations. By forming policy guide­
lines these recommendations will be influential in the shaping of a 
uniform tenancy reform policy throughout the Indian Union. From this 
standpoint perhaps a test of the efficacy of the Bombay Tenancy Act in 
meeting its objectives may have implications beyond the borders of the 
state. 
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The Tenancy Situation in Bombay 
The previous sections were devoted to developing the problems in­
volved in the Indian tenure system with the main emphasis on tehancy. The 
outline of the problems and programs on an All-India basis supplied the 
environment out of which the tenancy problem in Bombay ia developed. The 
problem is thus delimited from two directions, first, in terms of one 
state and, second, in terms of one phase of the land problem, tenancy. 
The purpose of the remainder of the chapter is to develop the Bombay 
tenancy situation at the time of the passage of the Tenancy Act in terms 
of 1) the institutional framework and 2) the land problems associated with 
economic underdevelopment. Having presented the actual situation facing 
the legislators at the time of the Act, and then having indicated in 
Chapter 3 the objectives toward which the provisions of the Tenancy Act 
hoped to move the actual situation, the conceptual analysis may proceed 
in Chapter -4, 
Institutional aspects of tenure development in Bombay 
Revenue system and tenxn'e conseouences. In Bombay, as in the rest of 
India, the tenure structure is mainly a function of the revenue system. 
The principal purpose of establishing various rights in land was for im­
plementing the collection of revenues. Even today it is the Revenue 
Department which is responsible for the implementation of most of the 
land reform program.^ 
^A brief outline of the chain of administration will be useful for 
later use; The chief officers of the 28 districts of Bombay (including 
B.S.D.) are known as Collectors. The Collector is assisted by the prant 
officer. The districts are, in t\irn, divided into talukas. (continued) 
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Bombay came luader British administration in 1818. When the system of 
revenue settlement (hence tenure system) was to be decided upon for Bombay 
there still was no definitely established form of revenue administration 
that coiold be said to be superior for Bombay, and dxiring the first decade 
the revenue system was on m<jre or less of an ^  hoc basis, the settlements 
being made with village leaders or district heads. Although the first ex­
periments at settlement werd a failure (1824.-1828) the temporary-ryotwari 
system was revised eventually established, in use in Bombay today. The 
assessment was made plotwise on the basis of the type — 1) unirrigated or 
jirayat, 2) paddy land, 3) baghayat or garden land--and quality of the 
land, Pot-kharab (uncultujrable) land was left unassessed. The Government 
dealt directly with ryot having the occupancy right in the particxilar 
plot.^ Settlements were made every thirty years and the revenue rates 
remained constant within that period,^ 
(Continued) Chief officer of the taluka is known as the Mamlatdar and 
is assisted by an aval karkun. Administratively the talukas may be divi­
ded directly into the villages or, the villages may be grouped into 
mahals. The revenue official in the mahal is called mahalkari and in the 
village may be called either "talati" or "village accountant". 
^The different classes of land are thus ranked and the tax to be paid 
determined as a portion of the fiall (l6 anna) rate, e*g,, land that is 
supposedly one-half as productive as class 1 land woiold pay 8 annas to the 
rupee of the per acre rate on class 1 land. These settlements are made 
for periods of 20 or 30 years. Annually on the basis of crop-cutting ex­
periments, the Mamlatdeu:' determines the level of the crop in teims of annas 
pfer rupee, e.g., l6 anna crop is a fxill crop, 8 anna is a half crop, and 4-
anna or below is considered a famine. The crop cutting is supposed to be 
representative of the area. If the crop is very small, the Collector may 
recommend declaration of a famine in the Gazelle for the specified area 
which will automatically imply suspension or remission of revenue. Under 
the Tenancy Act this also requires suspension or remission of rent payment. 
^"Alienated lands" (inami types) are granted a lower rate called 
"jodi". 
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The land system was essentially ryotwari. V/ith the exception of the 
khoti, taluqdari, and some other special tenures (now abolished), there 
was no intermediary between the landholder and the State. 
Tenxire structure. The tenure structtire of Bombay contained both 
ryotwari and non-ryotwari types. Following Baden-Powell's division,^ the 
latter may be fxirther divided into: 
1) Survivals of joint or landlord village types (e.g., faarwadari 
and bhaghdari). 
2) Double or overlord tenures (e.g., taluqdari and khoti). 
3) Alienated or inami lands. 
Nearly a score of these non-ryotwari tenures existed before the 
present program of abolition was begun in order to put the whole state on 
a ryotwari basis. Since most of the non-ryotwari tenures differ little 
within their respective types, their basic features can be represented by 
an example or two from each category. 
1) Joint village tenure—baghdari;^ Land was divided into mox-bhag 
and gam majmur. The gam majmvir was common village land on which no revenue 
was paid. The mox-bhag was divided into peta-bhags upon which assessment 
was levied. The responsibility of payment rested on the mox-bhagdar. 
Within the villages the bhagdars and petadars were Jointly and severally 
responsible for the payment of Government revenue. Bhagdars were the 
^Baden-Powell, Land systems, op.cit.. p. 250. 
D. Patel, Agrarian reforms, op.cit.. p. 25-32. These tenures 
also discussed in Baden-Powell, Land systems, op.cit.; India Ministry of 
Agriculture, Agricultural Legislation, op.cit.. Bombay Bxireau of Economics 
and Statistics. Statistical Atlas of Bombay State. Rev. ed. Bombay 
Bureau of Economics and Statistics. 1950; and R. G. Gordon. Svirvey and 
settlement manual. 2nd ed. Bombay Govt. Central Press. 1951. 
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occupants and other ciiltivators were either tenauts-at-will or customary-
tenants. In bhagdari villages the assessment was on individual plots but 
in narwadari the revenue was simply a lump s\jm for the village. 
2) Overlord tenures—taluqdari^ and khoti:^ The taluqdars acquired 
their interest in land primarily by means of adverse possession. They de­
rived their rights as local headmen and fixed their possession dirring the 
disturbances of Maratha period. The taluqdar was a lord from the stand­
point of administration as well as c\iltivation. Some land (ghar-khed) 
was retained for personal cultivation and that which was rented out was 
usually on the batai (crop-share) system. There were also a ntamber of 
additional cesses usually not very strictly enforced. This tenure was 
quite important from the standpoint of area covered. 
The khoti tenure is found in Ratnagiri and Kolaba districts. Because 
of the terrain revenue collection was very diffictilt and the government 
made use of revenue farmers called "khots". The khots were acknowledged 
superior holders. They held these rights by virtue of a payment of a 
lump assessment. The inferior right holders are of four types; l) dhare-
karis having heritable and transferable rights, 2) quasi-dharekaris pay­
ing a higher rent, 3) occupancy tenants having heritable but not trans­
ferable right and 4) tenants-at-will. 
3) Inam ("alienated") tenures:^ These tenures were settled under the 
Survey Settlement Act of 1863. The origin of the inami tenures was in 
^Ibid. p. 84-37. 
%bid. p. 106-128. 
Bombay Bureau of Econ. and Stat., Atlas, op.cit., p. 55. 
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grants of land which were given by Governments to individuals or institu­
tions as gifts for some past service. They usually are free from, or sub­
ject to a reduced, assessment. Inams are of four types: 
a) Personal (Jat) inams given to individuals. They are heritable 
and transferable. 
b) Devasthan inams given in support of Mosques or temples. They are 
permanent. 
c) Political, jagirs, and saranjams were granted for civil or mili­
tary service to the State and for the maintenance of certain nobles 
and high officials. 
d) Service inams given to district officers—desais, deshmiikhs, etc., 
and village officers, patels, village accoiintants, etc., which meant 
either a holding of land or the right to payment or levy a fee in re­
turn for the performance of certain duties. 
The ryotwari tenure. The ryotwari or "survey tenure" is of most im­
portance for the purposes here since the several reform Acts have abol­
ished most of the non-ryotwari tenures.^  In pre-merger Bombay, 24^ ,494-,963 
^Bhagdari and Narwadari Tenures Abolition Act, 1949 
Maleki Tenure Abolition Act, 194-9 
Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949 
Panch Mahals Mehvassi Tenure Abolition Act, 1949 
Khoti Abolition Act, 1949 
Paragana and Kulkarni Watans (abolition) Act, 1950 
Watwan Vazifdari Rights Abolition Act, 1950 
Salsette Estates (Land Revenue Exemption Abolition) Act, 1951. 
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acres of the occupied, assessed land were held under ryotwari tenure, 
whereas only 7,843# 169 acres (24, percent) were held linder all non-ryotwari 
types combined,^ The principal feature of th^ ryotwari tenure is that the 
assessment is placed not on the village as a whole but on the separate 
plots. The individual who is holding it must pay the revenue. 
The settlement of the assessment shall be made with the occu­
pant of the land. The cultivator, when the land is held by him 
direct from the Government is to be considered the occupant; and 
when it is not so held, the person having the highest right or hold­
ing recognized by the custom of the co\intry or resting on specific 
grant, which inte^enes between Government and the ciiltivator, is 
to be considered.^ 
The ryotwari tenure came about partially as the result of the decay 
of the village community. The British administration and revenue system 
required the identification of the persons whom it could hold responsible 
for the payment of revenue. In order to do this they had to establish 
rights and responsibilities in a manner that wovild be defensible from the 
British juridical viewpoint. Many of the rights in land held by the occu­
pants were obscure and entangled with rights and responsibilities to the 
community, local raj, and perhaps remotely to the ruling power of the 
time. Rights were derived primarily out of the custom of the community 
and the only connection with the state the cultivator had was the payment 
of revenue. In the pre-British Maratha rtile, the state was more the 
plunderer than the protector or regulator. 
^Bombay Bureau of Econ, and Stat., Atlas, op.cit., p. 54- The dis­
parity between this figure and that given in Ta^e 1 is due to difference 
in classification, i.e., this figxire shows all assessed occupied area 
whereas the table shows all land under ryotwari but only the ssamindari of 
the non-ryotwari type. The failure to mention the other non-ryotwari ten­
ures, e.g., khoti and inami in the table was not accounted for. 
%ordon, Manuel., op.cit.. p, 184e 
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At the same time that the British 3r\ile began to crystallize rights 
in land, it reduced some of the social barriers tliat formerly protected 
the ryot from encroachment on his rights. Thus, there was considerable 
turmoil at the inception of British revenue administration and even though 
some efforts were made to soften the rigid exaction of revenue they were 
not always adequate to relieve oppressive acts and even violence, e.g., 
the Deccan Riots of 1875* 
The dominant form of ryotwari tenure in Bombay State was known as 
"survey tenure". This was the tenure which applied to the ordinary land­
holders who had not been accorded any special grant or title. It con­
ferred the right of "occupancy" which was heritable, transferable, and 
permanent and was subject to forfeiture for non-payment of the revenue. 
It was not as unrestricted as fee simple inasmuch as the land could not 
be diverted from agrictilture without the permission of the Collector and 
did not include rights to mines or minerals. Rights in trees are also 
restricted.^ 
The "new tenure" or restricted tenure came into being in 1901.^ It 
is generally applied to backward classes and may be imposed on new lands 
as are surveyed. This land can be transferred only with the permission 
of the Collector. The area held -under this modification is a relatively 
small portion (about 1/20) of the total ryotwari area. 
^Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879. (Bombay Act no, V, 17th Jxily 
1879), sec. 4-0• 
^Ibid.. sec, 73. 
61 
Tenancy under the ryotwari. In contrast to the complicated, and many 
times obscure, inferior rights in the zamindari areas, tenancy under the 
ryotwari system is quite simple. The tenant's right is presiimed to be co­
extensive with the superior right holder unless there is agre^nent to the 
contrary. Relationships are governed by agreement with the superior right 
holder (occupancy right holder in the case of first order tenants) and 
superior tenants in the case of sub-tenants). Thus, tenancy laws are re­
strictive rather than permissive. They regulate the terms of agreement by 
setting limits of action. The tenancy relationship is a function, firstly, 
of the agreement, secondly of custom or local usage and only finally of 
laws and ordinances. 
Before the passage of the Bombay Tenancy Act of 1939, landlord-ten­
ant relationships were regulated exclusively by the Land Revenue Code of 
1879. Under the Revenue Code, rents were determined by agreement, local 
usage, or a "just" or "reasonable" basis, in that order. Nothing in the 
Code was to affect the right of the landlord to enhance the rent or ser­
vices payable by the tenant or to prevent the landlord from evicting the 
tenant. 
The Bombay Tenancy Act of 194S is built upon many of the provisions 
of the 1939 Tenancy Act. Some of the Sections of the 1939 Act were trans­
posed with only slight modification to the '4B Act, i.e.. Sees. 33-A and 
4. The Act of 1939 sought to provide security of temare by restricting 
eviction and setting limits on rents. The "protected tenant" was defined 
in Section 3. Other sections included the remission and suspension of 
rent, commutation of crop-share to cash, and rights to trees. The real 
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importance in the Act of 1939 was that it represented the first efforts 
at real tenancy reform. The problems it sought to ramedy and the objec­
tives it meant to accomplish were basically the same as those of the Bombay 
Tenancy Act of 194S» The 1939 Act was limited to only a few districts and 
in 194.6 substantially amended to include the whole of the province. 
The tenancy problem 
The tenancy problem as it existed in Bombay at the time of the Ten­
ancy Act was part of the over-all problems of population pi^esSure, low 
rate of capital accxamulation, tonderemployment, low income and the deter­
ioration of resotirces. These probleans were not unique to Bombay, they 
were problems faced by all states of the Indian Union at the time of In­
dependence and partition. Tl^ remainder of this chapter will attempt to 
de^velop the tenancy problem in Bombay in tiiis frame of reference» 
After the taf^itment of the tenancy problem, the final paragraphs will 
be devoted to an outline the main featxares of tenancy system to indi­
cate its diverse nature and to provide some of the factual background for 
the analysis in Chapter- 4 • 
Popxjlatloa. and land. The popxilation of Bombay has grown more than any 
other Part A state. In the decade 1941-51, the popvilation of irrfaat is 
presently Bcwnbay State increased 23.2 percent. Density has risen from 201 
persons per sqtmne mile in 1921 to 323 in 1951. Part of this increase is 
due to immigration but, as in the rest of India, most of it is due to the 
excess of births over deaths.^ 
^India Census: 1951. Report, part I-A, 1. 1953. p. 2. Bombay 
State, in the 1951 Census of India recorded a population of 35,956,150 
or roughly 10 percent of the people of India. The 1951 Census (continued) 
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Heavy rates of popialation increase prevail in the rtiral areas. 
According to livelihood classes, 6l percent of Bombay's population is 
agriciiltural.^ During the decade 1941-51 some relief from this pressure 
was found in emigration to the tirban areas (in 1951, 72 percent of Bombay-
ites were born outside the city). However, recent years have indicated 
a recession in xirban employment possibilities with the consequent impact 
on the rural economy. The per capita area of cultivation was steadily 
decreasing. The possibility for expansion on the extensive margin is 
limited for much of the land now regarded as cxaltivable waste is, for 
present purposes, unusable. Famine is still a threat in most of the 
Deccan and in the Gujarat. Irrigation constitutes only about 3»8 percent 
of the land and future possibilities are costly and difficvilt. To add to 
the problems of persistent population increases are the limitations for 
employing new techniques, capital shortages, extremely low income, and a 
literacy rate in the agricultural classes of 16 percent. 
Productivity and returns. The constant increase in population 
pressure on the land without concurrent increase in the productivity of 
(Continued) reported a total population for India of 356,829,^85 but 
"For every thousand persons included in the Census Count 11 other persons 
were probably omitted." India Census; 1951. Sample verification of the 
1951 Census coimt. p, 2. 
^J. B. Bowman. Digest of census for India for Bombay, Saurashtra 
and Kutch. Bombay, Govt. Central Press, p. 
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labor through capital inputs or liaproved techniques^ forced the payment to 
the labor factor down to subsistence. Whenever the cultivator was faced 
with financial reverses, he relied upon his land as a security for 
borrowing. His interest in the land which he forfeited for non-payment 
of debt represented his disinvestment to maintain subsistence. Upon fail-
tire to pay the debt, the title would be transferred to the moneylender who, 
not wishing to cultivate the land himself, would retain the ctiltivator on 
the land as a tenant. A significant part of tenancy in Bombay stemmed 
from a regression on the agrictiltural ladder. 
Where there was strong competition and rapid turnover of the tenants 
uncertainty of tenxire was an obstacle to tenants making resource inputs 
in uses where benefits were slow in maturing. Factor limitations, another 
result of low income, also stood in the way of improvements in land or 
increases in capital goods. Efforts of the cultivators to maximize their 
short-run return also had an unfavorable effect from the standpoint of soil 
conservation, notably in the Deccan and Konkan regions (see footnote 
page 140 ). 
Custom and tradition strongly influenced the lease agreements as well 
as formed obstacles to the adoption of improved production techniques. 
l"So far as the technique of agriculture is concerned, the survival 
of the most primitive methods and tools of agricultxiral operations imtil 
today must be evidence of the absence of considerable change. The wooden 
plough, with only the of iron for the plough-share, and the use of 
the animal power for traction has not changed since thousands of years. 
Weeding, harvesting with a simple scythe, hand-thrashing, winnowing and 
hand-pounding of the rice could all have been practised in the same form 
without much change in efficiency a thousand years ago." Unchanging 
agriculture® Eastern Economist. 17:1017. 1951. p. 1017. 
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Siae of holdings. Holdings became smaller through subdivision and 
fragmentation and cxjltivating units were still further divided through 
sub-letting. This process of subdivision and fragmentation is basically 
a result of the heavy pressure of population brought about through lack 
of alternatives in other indiistries and high rural birth rates. However, 
the Hindu law of succession provided an ideal institutional climate for 
subdivision. 
The Hindu law of succession is concerned with two types of property: 
joint property and individiial property. Inheritance of the individual 
property is much the same as in the U.S.A. except that only male descen­
dants receive rights in the real property. Widows have only an equal life 
estate share as one of the heirs. Joint property is divided equally upon 
partition among all coparceners (male descendants only are considered as 
coparceners). "While the son has a ri^t by birth botdi in his father's 
and in his grandfather's property, a distinction xinder a special text makes 
the right of 44ie son and the father eqtjal in the property of the grand­
father."^ 
Under Mtajcshara law /of the two schools of Hindu law, the dom­
inant in Bombay/ the right to share passes by sxirvivorship among the 
remaining coparceners, subject to the rule that where any deceased 
coparcener leaves male issue, they represent the rights of their 
ancestor to a partition. For instance, suppose A dies, leaving a son 
B, two grandsons E and F, tiiree great-grandsons H, I, and J, and one 
great-great-grandson Z. The last named will take nothing, being be­
yond tJie fourth degree of descent; 
S^. S. Iyengar. I^ yne*s treatise on Hindu law and usage. Jfeidras, 
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dead 
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The share of the ancestor W will pass by survivorship to the 
other brothers B, C, D and their descendants, and enlarge their 
interests accordingly.^ 
In the illustration in the quotation above, B, C, and D would each 
get 1/3. E and F would get 1/6 each, and H, I, and J would get 1/9 each* 
If W had effected a partition with A, then Z. would have received I/4. 
The result of these ph^ysical, economic and institutional factors was 
a diminution in the size of holdings and cultivating units. The small 
size of holding may be seen in Table 
The efficiency of production was fiirther affected by scattering of 
the plots throiighout the village. Then, too, the size of the plots as 
c\iltivating units were still fxirther reduced by sub-letting or division 
by leasing to several tenants. 
The income distribution. The relatively low return to labor also re­
sulted in wide disparities in the distribution of income between owners of 
the scarce capital and land and those who contributed only labor in the 
leasing agreement. 
^Ibid.. p. 53i+-535. /Brackets own7 
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Table 4,. Size of holdings and fragmentation in Bombay' .a 
Area covered Average Average Average 
No. of No. of (in acres size of no. of size of 
Divisions holdings fragments and gunthas) holdings fragments a frag­
(in acres) per hold­ ment (in 
ing acres) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Gujarat 6,193 25,24a 56,242-19 9.08 4.08 2.23 
Deccan 28,402 119,903 427,818-39 15.06 4.22 3.57 
Karnatak 18,884. 46,772 291,836-6 15.45 2.48 6.24 
Konkan 7,413 41,061 31,348-21 4.23 5.54 0.76 
Bombay 60,892 232,977 807,246-5 13.26 3.83 3.46 
Province 
®^Reproduced from: Bombay Bureau of Economics and Statistics. A 
sample survey of agricultural holdings and extent of fragmentation in Bom­
bay Province. Bull, of Bur. of Econ, and Stat. 2, no. 3:4.0. Jan., 194-9. 
p. » 
The relative ret^irns to land, labor and capital are not available in 
a form that permits conclusive comparison with one of the so-called 
developed countries. However, some rough approximation of relative re­
turns to labor and land may be seen from the following tables of wages 
and land rents. 
A comparison of itfage payments to rents from Table 5 indicates that 
the highest wage-rent ratio would call for 3 1/2 days of labor to be 
equivalent to the rent on 1 acre of land in Poona. The lowest wage-rent 
ratio given in the table above (Thana) reqixires 18 1/2 days of labor to 
equal the rental payment on 1 acre of land. Table 7 shows a rent per 
acre in Kolhapur district of Rs. 64 per acre. Using the wage rate of 
neighboring Bijapur, the rental payment on 1 acre would be equivalent 
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Table 5. Daily agriciiltural labor wages and rents in 5 districts 
in Bombay^ 
















^India Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Daily agricultural wages, 
1953. Agrictiltural situation in India. 8, no. 4-t302. July 1953. p.302. 
^Selected from Table 7. 
to 64. days labor. The counterpart ratio for the United States (Table 6) 
shows the reqiiironent 1/2 of one day's labor to equal the rental payment 
on 1 acre. These comparisons, even if perfectly comparable would show 
the differences, not the reasons for the differences, in the relative 
payments to labor and land in the United States and Bombay, 
Inefficiency and obstacles to capital accumulation. Since expansion 
on the extensive margin of land cannot be looked to as an important remedy, 
the production problem must be met by greater inputs of capital and labor 
accompanied by a reorganization of resource use. However, there are 
obstacles to internal capital accxmilation in agriculture. The most 
obvious is the low level of living generally found in the rural economy. 
Savings are rather seriously limited in a population living at subsis­
tence or below. Secondly, the productivity of the Indian laborer is low 
(^lale field labor without meals. 
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Table 6. Daily agrlculttiral wages and cash rente in the United States 
(Figures in dollars) 
State Wage per day®- Rent per acre 
United States 5.30 2.88^  
Iowa 9.10 8.51° 
Mississippi 3.75 
New York 7.80 4.82® 
®U.S» Agricult\iral Marketing Service. Crops and markets, voliaie 30. 
Wash., D. C., U.S. Govt. Print. Off* 1953. p. 125. 
%.S, 17th Census: 1950. Agric\ilture, 2, chapter 5. 1952. p. 333. 
°Ibid.. 1, part % p. 20. 
%bid., 1, part 22, p. 34-* 
®Ibid.. 1, part 2, p. 22. 
because of the maiajer in which his labor is combined with the other 
factors. The manner in which tenancy can result in such inefficiencies 
will be indicated in the introductory section of Chapter 4^ . 
Imperfect competition in the factor market. Another point of pro­
blem speculation concerns the factor market when the ownership of certain 
very scarce factors is concentrated in the hands of a few. As can be 
seen in the next section this was perhaps not as important as the re^ 
formers who emphasized "es^loitation" elements appear to have believed. 
However, it appears not unreasonable, in view of the large quantities of 
labor and relatively small quantities of arable land and capital, tha^ 
elements of imperfect competition could have been involved in the factor 
market at least in localized areas. Especially might this be true in the 
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case of moneylender-cutn-landlord who had control not only of available 
land within the tenants' transfer horizon but of short-term credit for 
constomption and productive pizrposes. 
The pattern of tenancy 
Extent and growth of tenancy. In the foregoing section it was seen 
that the non-ryotwari tenure accounted for perhaps 24. percent of the land. 
Virtually all of the tenures such as the taluqdari and khoti were ten­
anted and the iromediate effect of their abolition will probably be an in­
crease in peasant-proprietors. In the ryotwari area the 25 percent of 
the land that was held by non-agric\Jlt\irists^ was almost entirely rented 
out. In addition were the agriculturists who rented out part or all of 
their lands. Information from the Bombay Revenue Department in Table 7 
indicates that 41"A percent of the cultivators are tenants and 32.1 per-
c^t of the land is tenanted. The percentage of tenants to owner-culti­
vators is greater than the percentage of tenant-cultivated land to owners-
cultivated land for all districts except Amreli and Kaira,^ indicating 
that the cultivating units of tenants are probably smaller than those of 
owners. 
It has been held that tenancy has continued to increase rapidly be­
fore the Tenancy Act. Without the necessary information it appears 
^Bombay Bureau of Stat, and Econ., Atlas, op.cit.. p. 59. 
^It shovild be made clear that usefulness of the data is quite limited. 
For example. Table 7' does not account for tenants who are protected with 
respect to one plot and not another, therefore, protected tenants will te 
oyerstated. Similar limitations exist between tenants and owners. The 
d^ta are presented here to indicate the general nattire of tenancy because 
they are the best available not because they are considered to be adequate. 
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difficult to support this statement except in certain local cases such as 
those suggested by Barmeda.^ Beyond such local situations, the fact that 
non-cultivating landlords have remained stable in their share of the area 
held (Table 8) would draw into question statements that the tenancy was 
growing rapidly before the passage of the Tenancy Act, 
For the period after the passage of the Act the information supplied 
by the Revenue Department gives a somewhat better picture of the change in 
the amount of tenants and tenanted land, A comparison of the 19^48-49 and 
1951~52 percentages shows in Table 7 a decrease in the ratio of tenants 
to all cultivators in districts. Only the districts of Ahmedablid, Kolaba 
and Ratnagiri showed an increase in the percentage of tenants diiring the 
first 3 years of the Tenancy Act of 1948. Some districts, e.g,, Hasik, 
Broach and Kaira showed a market decline in the percentage of tenants. 
In most cases, however, the change was relatively small, 
Desai's statement that the owner-cultivator is losing ground to non-
agriculturists^ appears not to be supported at least on the basis of the 
l6 years preceding the passage of the Tenancy Act,^ Class C holders 
Ij. N. Barmeda. Agricultural tenancy in the Gujarat^  Unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, Bombay, India, School of Economics and Sociology Library. 
1950. p. 128. He cited cases of rapid tenancy growth in Anand and Borsad 
talukas in Kaira district. It miy be noted in Table 7 that the percentage 
of tenants to all cioltivators in Kaira has decreased from 74-»9 to 52 since 
the passage of the Act. 
M^. B. Desai. The rural economy of Gujarat. Bombay, Geoffery 
Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1948. p. 118. 
3lt is interesting to note that the same data used in Table 8 have 
been used with alarm to show the trend toward non-cultivator ownership 
(e.g., Socialist Party. Reforms in agriculture. Bombay, Madhu Limaye, 
1951. p. 5.) The figures given by the Bureau of Economics and Statistics 
reveal the percentage of holdings held by "non-agricvilturists" (continued) 
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Table 7, Tenants as a percentage of all cultivators, and 1951-52; 
percent of land cxiltivated by tenants and average rent per acre, 
1951-52^  
Percent Percent Percent of Average 
tenants tenants land culti­ rent pe 
District"^ of all of all Change vated by acre 
cxiltivators cultivators tenants 
1948-49 1951-52 1951-52 
1. Banaskantha 64.2 21.8 3/0 
2. Sabarkantha 22.9 IIIMKI 1 13.6 6/7 
3. Mehsana 26.4 24.8 7/14 
4. Amreli 30.6 32.8 2/4 
5. Baroda 39.1 25.3 25/14 
6. Dangs — 
7. Ahmedabad 41.1 58.1 A7.0 57.7 5/14 
8. Kairs 74.9 52.0 -22.9 75.9 12/11 
9. Panch Mahals 54.4 36.8 -17.6 26.8 3/3 
10. Broach 63.8 41.0 -27.8 34.0 13/0 
11. Surat 48.8 43.7 - 5.1 35.0 12/12 
12. Thana 57.9 52.1 - 5.8 51.3 37/1 
13. Ahmednagar 41.1 35.8 - 5.3 22.4 3/12 
1^ . East Khandesh 32.8 23.1 - 9.7 19.5 16/14 
15- West Khandesh 37.8 20.2 -17.6 16.4 12/1 
16. Nasik 88.1 37.3 -50.8 23.4 8/4 
17. Poona 51.6 39.1 -12.5 35.7 5/4 
18. Satara Worth 53.0 38.7 -14.3 31.7 4/14 
19. Sholapxu* 41.9 32.9 - 9.0 33.0 6/6 
20. Kolaba 57.8 61.7 / 3.9 58.5 51/12 
21. Ratnagiri 45.9 47.8 / 1.9 39.1 12/12 
22. Satara South 41.7 33.9 23/8 
23. Kolhapur 39.5 35.6 64/ 4 
24. Belgaum 45.8 42.5 - 3.3 35.6 17/15 
25. Bijapur 41.2 36.8 — 4.4 35.4 8/14 
districts of Sabarkantha, Banaskantha, Mehsana, Amreli, Baroda, 
Dangs, South Satara, and Kolhapur not included in pre-merger Bombay. 
Merger was completed in 194.9. (Continued) 
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Table 7. (Continued) 
Percent Percent Percent of Average 
District^ 
tenants tenants land ctalti- rent per 
of all of all Change vated by acre 
cultivators cultivators tenants 
1948-49 1951-52 1951-52 
26. Dharwar 49.1 44*6 - 4.5 38.4 16/15 
27. Kanara 78.3 .^9 —11.4 57.0 48/3 
28. B.S.D. 47.9 56.0 / 8.1 42.6 56/10 




1951-52 42.2 - 5;4 
Percent in whole 
state 1951-52 41.4 32.1 14/0 
^Adapted froms Bombay Revenue Department, Untitled interdepart­
mental report on tenure €md tenancy in Bombay. Revenue Department file 
no. 8515/49 II» 1953. ^mimeoj/ See Tables 16 and 17, Appendix. 
Table 8, Stability in classes of landholders, 1932-48®^ 
Year Percent of Percent of Percent of Percent of Percent of Percent of 
Class A land held Class B land held Class C land held 
holders Class A holders Class B holders by Class C 
holders holders holders 
1932 75.4 63.5 3.5 6.0 21.1 30.5 
1937 74.2 64.2 2.6 4.7 23.2 31.1 
1943 75.2 64.9 2.8 4.6 22.0 30.5 
1948 74.5 66.2 2.9 4.7 22.6 29.1 
^Sources: Bombay Bureau of Econ. and Stat., Atlas, op.cit.. p. 198-
199i and Bombay Bixreau of Economics and Statistics Quinquennial statement 
of holdings in Government lyotwari area in Bombay State for the year 
1947-48. Bull. Bur. Econ. Stat. 6, no. 1:76. July 1950. 
^Holders who cultivate land themselves with or without the help of 
hired labor. 
^Holders who do not cultivate the land but supervise cultivation by 
laborers or farm servants. 
<^Holders who receive rent and do not directly or indirectly take 
part in the cultivation. 
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(those who receive rent and do not cultivate themselves) held about one 
percent less land in 19^ than in 1932. Comparable data were not avail­
able for the period before 1932 so that trends in ovmership over a long 
period cannot be shown. It is possible that the gsrowth of the rentier 
group may have taken place over a longer period of time. Whatever is the 
case, it appears that the number of landholders holding large tracts is 
relatively small. The following is a breakdown of landlords who did not 
cToltivate personally, adapted from Revenue Department data for the year 
1951-52: 
Table 9. Size of holdings owned by non-cultivating landlords® 
Size group Number of landlords 
Holders having up to 5 acres 369,34-5 
Holders having more than 5 acres 
but less than 25 acres 308,352 
Holders having more than 25 acres 
but less than 100 acres 42,559 
Holders having more than 100 acres 
but less than 300 acres 949 
Holders having above 300 acres 89 
Total 721,294 
^Bombay Revenue Department, Landlords who do not cultivate land per­
sonally, by acre groups. Interdepartmental report, 1952, ^^ imeo. repor;^  
(Continued) in 1917, 12,0; 1922, 12,4j 1927, 12,8, This would in­
dicate an increase from 12.0 percent to 29 percent were it not that this 
"increase" really results from a change of definition of non-agriciilturist 
in 1932. The data show, if anything, stability in the relative size of 
holdir^s held by non-agriculturists. 
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Factor inmts by landlords. For ptirposes of analysis later, a dis­
tinction should be made in three types of landlords, that is, the absentee 
landlord and cultivating and non-cultivating in-village Isuadlord. The ab­
sentee landlord will commonly have little to do with the management of the 
firm and will contribute little, if anything, but the land factor. Also 
to meet the difficulties of weighing and measuring involved in the shar­
ing process, the absentee landlord will usually prefer cash or fixed pro­
duce rents. In-village c\altivating landlords will frequently use the share 
lease to utili2se some of the unused portions of their factor tanits, e.g., 
bullocks and plow, in order to maximize the retvirn to their factors. The 
in-village non-cultivating landlord might shade toward either of the other 
two types depending upon his economic status, occupation and e^qjerience. 
The assumption that landlords make no contribution of capital inputs but 
simply rent the land, therefore, is probably the result of thinking in 
terms of the absentee landlord only. Examining Jakhade's list of "major 
items of capital investment by the agricTilturists"^ several it^s may be 
identified as resovirces other than land at least in part by landlords, i.e., 
land reclamation, bunding and other lahd improvements, digging and repair 
of wells, development of other irrigation resoxirces, laying of new orchards 
and plantations, construction of farm houses, and other farm building^. 
Information concerning the extent of the contributions by landlords, how­
ever, is not available. 
^V. M. Jakhade. Capital formation in agriculttire, a note on ij^ethods. 
Indian Jour, of Agr. Econ, 9, no. 1:95-111. March, 1954-. p. 98* 
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Lease type. All major lease types are found in Bombay State. There 
are, however, no statistics available which show the amount of each lease 
type in the different regions.^ According to the Bombay Statistical 
Atlas, "... crop share rents prevail over greater part of the Bombay 
P r o v i n c e  n o w  S t a t e  ,  a n d  t h e  u s u a l  p r o p o r t i o n  i s  h a l f  t o  h a l f I n  
addition to share rents are 1) cash, 2) fixed produce and 3) service rent. 
Each of these lease types, or combinations of them, is found in the all 
principal regions. With respect to the major crop of the respective 
regions, however, the proportion of share-type lease increases as rainfall 
decreases and becomes more Toncertain. 
Some indication of the variation in lease types is apparent from 
several studies of socio-economic conditions in Bombay. For example, 
M. B. Desai in an inquiry in the Gujarat, indicated that about 32 percent 
of the tenants were on crop share, 49 on cash rent and 19 on a combination 
of the two. In the middle Gujarat of Broach, Baroda and Panch Mahals 
districts he fo\md that part-owners cultivated about 36 percent of the 
rented land on cash lease and about 53 percent on crop share, the remain­
ing 11 percent being combinations.^ In a sxirvey of Bardoli taluka of 
^Village form VII-A does show "mode of cultivation". Modes 1 and 2 
are owner-c\altivation, 3 is cash tenantgr^ 4 crop share tenancy, 5 fixed 
produce tenancy and 6 is mixed type^ This information is often not filled 
out by tallatis and the Revenue Department, to this writing, has made no 
effort to collect it. For sample village forms see F. G. H. Anderson. 
Manual of revenue accounts. 5th ed. Bombay, Govt. Central Press. 1951. 
p. 117. 
^Bombay Bureau of Econ. and Stat., Atlas, op.cit.. p. 59 /Brackets 
owr^ 
B. Desai, op.cit.. p. 123. 
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Stirat district, however, cash rent was "more or less laniversal"^ and a 
sixrvey of one of the tal\ikas of Kaira revealed only 7 percent crop share.^ 
Vimal Shah in an intensive study of a village of Baroda indicated 
that nearly one-half (4,9 percent) of the land was tenanted and indicated 
some labor-share, crop share, and fixed produce rent; 
i) The owner himself cultivates the land but engages a servant to 
do all the manual labour including the watching of crops In return 
for these services, the latter receives one-fourth of the crop. 
ii) The o\mer gives the land to a farmer for cultivation on a crop-
sharing basis. The former pays the land revenue, bears the cost of 
manuring and permanent improvements in the landj the latter bears 
the costs of cultivation. The crop is equally shared by the two. 
In irrigated areas, the expenses of irrigating the land are borne 
by the tenant, while those of manuring the land are borne by the 
owner, iii) In this case, the tensint pays the owner a fixed 
amount instead of a share in the cindp. The owner pays the land 
revenue and bears the e^qjenses of cultivation; all the remaining 
expenses are borne by the tenant. 
Shah indicated that the second category prevailed over the village 
and that variations from the above were made to ifit individual circ\im-
stances.^ 
Farther south in the Konkan fixed produce rents and cash rents 
appear to be more popular. Hate in a survey of 100 tenants in Thana 
District found that 77.-4. percent of the rented land was under fixed 
^J. M. Mehta. A study of the rural economy of the Gujarat. Baroda, 
Baroda State Press. 1930. p. 39. 
%. D. Pa tel. Indian agricultural economics. Bombay, D. B. 
Taraporevala Sons. 1937. p. 189. 
%imal Shah* Bhuvel-, socio-economic survey of a village. Bombay, 
Vora and Co. p. 39-
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produce rent, 4^2 under crop share, 3*6 percent under cash rent and 14.8 
under mixed rent.^ This is consistent with the predominance of fixed-
produce type rent found in Badlapur. 
Shivamaggi estimated that in the Karnatak about 45 percent of the 
tenants were on a crop share basis and about 30 percent were on a cash 
rent basis.^ 
Crop share rents appear to be most common type of tenancy with 
backward and aboringinal tribes, e.g., in Bhil tract of Khandesh. Cash 
rents tend to be preferred by absentee landlords whereas crop share and 
fixed produce rents are more in use by the landlord residing in the 
village. 
Over the state as a whole, the proportion of land under crop share 
is probably greater for dry crops than for irrigated crops. 
Terms of lease. Generalization about the terms of leases in the 
face of limited information and wide diversity in leasing conditions i« 
difficTilt. Therefore, the following lease features are only suggestive 
of some of the more common conditions without the relative importance of 
each, 
1) Length of lease: The most common lease period was for one year 
although many of such tenancies had been renewed for generations and the 
expectations of both landlord euid tenants could be assumed to be much 
the same as a long term lease. Most leases were on an indefinite status 
^M. V. Hate, Farm ownership and teneincy. Unpublished M.S^ thesis, 
Bombay,, India, Bombay University Library. 1949. p* 263. 
B. Shivamaggi, Bombay, Indjja^ Tenancy conditions in the 
Karnatak. ^Private communication^ 1954. 
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from the standpoint of length, i.e., a tenancy-at-wlll. 
When some special conditions were to be fulfilled the lease was 
usually on a somewhat more formal basis, even to the extent of being in 
writing. Tenants in Madhbari, for example, usually had a minimum tenure 
lease of 5 to 20 years for eradication of the Hariali grass. 
2) Rents: Rental equivalents may be seen in Table 7 which indicate, 
to some extent, the wide variation in rents. The table does not show the 
differences due to lease type, A comparison of rents by lease type in 
Thana District was presented by Hate: 
Table 10. Rents paid by lease type^ 
Type of lease 
Average yield per 
acre of cropped area 
Average rent per acre 
of cropped area. 
Maunds of 
paddy" 
Rupees'^ Maunds of 
paddy 
Rupees 
Fixed produce rent 15.4 — 7.3 
Crop share 12.9 —_ 6.4. 
Cash rent 8.5 123.9 53.3 
Mixed rent 11.8 10.1 5.2 14.2 
^'Adapted from; Hate, op.cit.. p. 263. 
^aund s 82.3 pounds. 
*^Non-paddy crops were in rupee equivalents. Government paddy 
prices were about Rs, 12 but market prices were perhaps closer to 
Rs. 20 to 25• 
The most common crop share was 50-50. The range of I/4, to 3/4- share 
wovild include most of the crop share rentals. Reference to leases with 
different shares for different crops are found in the literatiire as, for 
example, ", . .3/5 share was taken from the wheat crop only, cotton. 
8£) 
jowar and others being equally shared. . .if the wheat crop was irrigated 
the landlords took only one-fourth share.The more common arrangement, 
however, was to share all crops on the same basis. 
3) Expenses and e;jctra services: Under the cash rent system, esgsen-
ses of cultivation were usually borne by the tenant. The contributions 
to ea^jenses by the parties to a share type lease were varied. The share 
of manure contribution appears to be a question more of convenience and 
availability than \inifonn practice. Tenemts without owned lands wotild 
apply manure that they had available and the landlords would apply manure 
if they did not cioltivate other land personally. ¥here fertilizer was 
purchased, the cost was usually borne in proportion to return. Seed was 
frequently returned to the contributor "out of the heiap" but was also a 
cost to the tenant in some areas. Labor costs in bunding were most fre­
quently shared in the case of temporary of field bunds but boundary bunds, 
representing an improvement, were the expense of the landlord. Two 
systems, one in Surat-Broach and the other in Thana show the divergence 
in methods of expense sharing: 
In the Surat-Broach cotton region the crop sharing system was 
found to assume greater simplicity, though at a cost to the ten­
ant. Here all the expenses, except the assessment were to be borne 
by the tenant. . 
At Bassein (Thana), . .the landlord bears half the expenses 
of cultivation for seed, manure, bunding, hired laboiar, etc., and 
after harvesting or marketing, the yield or the money value of 
the crop is shared equally between the two, the landlord and the 
tenant,^ 
^Barmeda, op.cit.. p. 205. 
^Barmeda, op.cit., p. 206. 
%ate, op.cit.. p. 269. 
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It was customary in many leasing arrangements for the tenant to per­
form additional services for the landlord such as transporting the land­
lord* s produce and working on the landlord's buildings and grounds. 
4) Other: Very few leases are written although all leases for more 
than one year in order to be legally valid must be in writing (Transfer 
of Property Act 1882). "In case where the leases are written, the 
written lease papers generally are kept by the landlords and the tenants 
do not normally insist to have copies. ¥ery few land leases are regis­
tered."^ 
The rettirns to livestock go entirely to the owner. Livestock share 
leases are very uncommon. Most livestock is cared for on communal pas­
turage and on the border areas of fields. The leasing agreement usually 
covers the use of fodder from uncultivable areas about the fields. Ab­
sentee landlords will usually not care for the fodder, but in-village 
landlords generally provide for a share, particularly if they own live­
stock themselves. 
Custom, caste, and family in the leasing agreement. Customary rental 
rates and types of lease strongly influence the nature of the lease 
throughout Bombay. "Ordinarily the predominant share in a village or tfee 
parti cellar share in a s\arvey number remains constant over a long period 
of years, due to custom.Rents tended to be sticky having increased 
slowly over time with various reanissions or postponements during periods 
of famine or other distress. 
^Shivamaggi, op.cit. 
^Barmeda, op.cit.« p. 152. 
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There appears to be no evidence that the level or type of rent has any 
direct relation to caste. Such relationships would be hard to separate 
from differences in grades of land and lease type. For example, adhivasis 
and other backward classes tend to cultivate the poorer grades of land. 
They also tend toward crop share type leases. 
With respect to family arrangements, however, there appeared to be 
some effect on the leasing arrangements. Barmeda states that ". . .there 
are a large number of leases which are either family or friendly arrange­
ments in which rents may be high or low irrespective of the economic 
factors." The lease frequently becomes a means for income transfer to a 
dependent member of the family. In this way the leasing arrangement be­
comes a part of the indigenous social secxirity system of the Indian family 
structure. 
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CHAPTER 3: OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF THE BOMBAY 
TENANCY AND AGRICULTURAL LANDS ACT 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold; First, to develop the 
objectives of the Tenancy Act and second, to outline the main features of 
the Tenancy Act. The objectives represent the ideeOL toward which the 
actual situation, indicated in Chapter 2, was to move. The principal 
provisions of the Tenancy Act were to be the means by which the movement 
was to be effected. 
Objectives of the Tenancy Act 
The two purposes of this (the objectives) part of the chapter are to 
1) determine the nature of the objectives toward which the government 
sought to move hy means of the Tenancy Act and 2) state the objectives 
so that they may be used analytically. To do this, the objectives of the 
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill and the Preamble of the Act 
are first set in the context of the over-all policy of which the Tenancy 
Act is a part and, secondly, these statements are given specific defin­
itions. In giving specific definitions, the many statements of the ob­
jectives are reduced to their common elements in order to have the ob­
jectives stated in a form subject to analysis. 
The specification of an objective of the Tenancy Act also implies 
criteria by which the means can be tested. For each principal objective 
there will be some criterion or criteria against which the various 
sections of the Tenancy Act may be analyzed. 
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The economic ob.iactive 
One of the inost commonly expressed purposes of various land reform 
enactments is concerned vdth the enhancement of productive efficiency and 
growths. Beginning at the national level the primacy of the economic goals 
may be illustrated by the following statement from the First Five-Year 
Plan: 
It follows from all this that the problem is not merely one 
of msdcing the existing economic institutions work more efficiently, 
or making small adjustments to them. What is needed is a trans­
formation of the system so as to obtain greater efficiency as 
well as equality and justice. The central objective of planning 
is to create conditions in which living standards are reasonably 
high and all citizens, men and women, have full and equal oppor­
tunity for growth and service.1 
With direct reference to land policy the plan states: 
The future of land ownership and cultivation constitutes 
perhaps the most fundamental issue in national development, . . 
1) increase of agricultiiral production represents the highest 
priority in planning over the next few years; and 2) the agri-
cultioral economy has to be diversified and brought to a much 
higher level of efficiency.^ 
The Congress party formed the government at the time of the passage 
of the Act, The following statement from the Congress Agrarian Reforms 
Committee Report is submitted to indicate the importance attached to the 
economic objective in agrarian reforms: 
The Conanittee has. . ,kept before itself some of the main 
principles which should govern the agrarian policy of the 
country, . . 
i) The agrarian economy should provide an opportunity 
for the develojanent of the farmer's personality 
^India Five-Year Plan, op,cit,. p, 29. 
Sibid.. p. 184.. 
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ii) There shoiild be no scope for exploitation of one 
class by another 
iii) There should be maximijin efficiency of production 
iv) The scheme of reforms should be within the realm 
of practicability.1 
Even in their Minute of Dissent to the Congress Agrarian Reforms 
Committee Report, O.P.R. Reddiar and N. G. Ranga state that| "There 
sho-uld be a maximum of efficiency of production. . 
The importance of the economic objective, this time expressed in 
terms of the whole economy, is indicated in the Election Memifesto of the 
Congress Party as follows: 
The objectives of the Congress, which have been em­
bodied in the Constitution of India, still remain, in a 
large measure, xanrealized. The time has come for our struggle 
for emancipation to enter into its second phase of realizing 
those objectives, without which political freedom can have 
little meaning for us. Economic progress must therefore be 
given first priority, subject only to the maintenance of free­
dom -and integrity of the country.^ 
. . .Increased agricultural production is absolutely 
essential for putting our national economy on a firm basis 
The foregoing statements were used in reference to the whole Indian 
economy or with the agrarian sector including all states. They do not 
refer to any specific enactment. They represent instead expressions of 
the importance of the economic objective by the Congress party programs. 
^Congress Agrarian Reforms Comm., op.cit., p. 8. 
%bid.. p. 185. 
%11-India Congress Committee Election Manifesto. New Delhi, All-
India Congress Committee. 1951. p. 2. 
'^Ibid., p. 3. 
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The goveriuaent of Bombay is so dominantly Congrese^ that the policies may 
well be interpreted as a direct expression of the Party objectives. 
The economic objective is expressed directly in the Preamble to the 
Tenancy Act which is quoted in part as follows: 
Vftiereas it is necessary to amend the law which governs the 
relations of landlords and tenants of agrictiltural lands. * . 
for the purpose of improving the economic and social conditions 
of peasants or ensuring the full and efficient use of land for 
agrictilttire. . 
Upon introduction of the Bombay Tenancy Bill to the Legislative 
A&sembly the Statement of Objects and Reasons was published in the Bombay 
Government Gazette. In this statement it was declared that "the change 
in the political status of the country. . •necessitated the 
shaping of definite policy of agrarian reforms to achieve improved pro­
duction and agricultural efficiency."^ 
The first of the objectives of tlie Bombay Tenancy Act as a land 
reform enactment is to promote a higher level of economic well-being 
through increased production and greater efficiency. 
^Out of a total of 315 seats in the Bombay Legislative Assembly,^ 269 
were Congress in 1951* W. Norman Brown. The United States, India and 
Pakistan, Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 1953. p. 288. (From an 
article by Richard L. Park, Indian election results. Far Eastern Survey. 
7, 1952, Original source not available.) The distribution of seats 
is not available for 194-8 but the proportions woxild be approximately the 
same. 
^Bombay 6? of 1948, Preamble. 
^Statement of objects and reasons, Bombay tenancy and agricultural 
lands bill. Bombay Gazette, Part 5 (Acts). July, 1948. p. 295. 
^^Brackets ownj^ 
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Specification of the economic objectivea. From the above statements 
it can be seen that the pre-Act levels of efficiency and production are 
regarded as unsatisfactory. The Act is intended to be a means for "im­
proved production and agricultural efficiency" but levels of production 
or criteria of efficiency are not specified in the objectives. Therefore, 
there appears to be no clearly defined limit to expectations of the Act 
with respect to production. Likewise, no rate of growth or even an exact 
criterion of economic grovrbh is specified, although from the first cit­
ation from the Five-Year Plan, per capita real income will be inferred 
for use here. 
The economic objective for purposes of analysis is separated into 
l) efficiency and 2) growth. The Act will be tested in terms of its 
ability to satisfy the criteria for efficiency and the criteria for 
growth. 
Efficiency in production. Efficiency will be viewed from the stand­
point of agriciilture as one segment of the toteil economy. To be efficient 
the agricultTiral sector must produce those goods and services which th# 
people want and in the proportions desired, and each of the goods and 
services must be produced with the minimum cost. In order for these 
necessary conditions of efficiency in production to be fulfilled, the 
usual production equilibrium condition is taken that the marginal rates 
of transformation between any two products (actual or potential), the 
marginal rate of substitution between any two factors, and the marginal 
rate of transformation of any factor into a product must be the same for 
all firms producing the product or using the factors. The conditions 
88 
for attaining efficiency as they apply to the area of leasing arrangements 
are developed in the introductory paragraphs of Chapter 4-
Economic growth. Economic development is involved in both the 
efficiency in allocation of resources at any particular time and with 
economic growth of esqsansion. 
The departure from a static system implies at least two additional 
variables, namely, capital accumulation and innovation. As time becomes 
involved there are necessarily the problems of eajjectations and uncer­
tainty. New techniques also demand changes in the allocation of resotorces 
to permit efficiency. With time and change entering into the analysis 
consideration must be taken of the problems of factor mobility. 
The allocation of resources in itself provides some of the bases for 
economic growth. That is, through the maximization of the total product 
the possibility arises for a surplus for capital accxmulation. It is 
also in the realm of allocative decisions to allow for research which, 
in txirn, produces changes in technology. 
Similarly, as the ratio of the various supplies in resotirces change, 
new allocations of resources are required. New techniques require re­
allocations of resources. When the concept of economic growth is intro­
duced the interdependence of the allocation of reso\irces, capital accumu­
lation and technology becomes apparent. It would be desirable perhaps to 
utilize a dynamic model which coiild provide a simultaneous solution to 
all these aspects of the development problem. In this analysis, however, 
the growth aspects of the economic problem will be dealt with in the 
manner of comparative statics. For the purposes of testing the Act the 
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effect of various sections on capital accuimilation will receive primary-
attention. The effect of the Act on the adoption of new techniques will 
also be analyzed. 
The objectives of the Act do not specify a rate of capital accumu­
lation. Therefore the Act will be given a positive effect with respect 
to capital acctimulation if it satisfies the conditions that it induces a 
rate greater than would be the case without the Act, The Act will be 
positive in its effect of technology if conditions for adoption and de­
velopment of new techniques are met. 
The distributive eatiitability ob.iective 
The second category of statements which form the objectives of the 
Tenancy Act is concerned with equitability in the distribution of income. 
Under the heading of Land Policy, the First Five-Year Plan declared: 
From a social aspect, which is not less important than the 
economic, a policy for land may be considered adequate in the 
measure in which, now and in the coming years, it reduces dis­
parities in wealth and income, eliminates exploitation, provides 
security for tenant and worker and, finally promises status and 
opportunity to different sections of the rural population.^ 
Those aspects of exploitation and security which are not covered 
under the economic objective will be included within matters of distribu­
tive equitability. Status and opportunity are included principally in 
the objectives of distributive equitability. Those aspects of status and 
opportunity such as birth and caste that are not a function of income are 
perhaps sufficiently unimportant from the standpoint of a land reform pro­
gram to defer as outside the scope of tenancy reform. 
^India Five-Year Plan, op.cit.. p. IS^,. 
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In their election manifesto the All-India Congress Committee states: 
The achievement of economic equality and social justice 
must proceed side by side with economic progress. . .between 
the upper and lower ranges of fixed incomes, the gap needs to 
be narrowed in terms of the standard of living.^ 
The preamble states that the Tenancy Act has as one of its objectives 
the "purpose of improving the economic and social conditions of the 
peasants"^ and the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Tenancy Bill 
also stated the purpose of "safeguarding the interests" of the ryots and 
the prevention of "rack-renting".^ 
In his speech introducing the Bill, Morarji Desai said; 
The powers that are taken in this Bill, I think, are eqxiit-
able, considering the purpose before us and considering the fact 
that practically all, , .accept the fact that land reform must 
aim at achieving a condition in which there would be no eaqploit-
ation of the cultivator, . 
And at the first reading of the Bill before the Legislative Assembly 
Desai, in defense of the Bill, said: 
, . .it will be seen that this Bill is neither expropria-
tory nor tin just nor inequitable. What is unjust and inequitable 
is the position hereto obtaining. . .and the people's Govern­
ment. . .has got to safeguard the rights of the common people 
and to see that all unjust and inequitable adjustments that might 
be obtaining in society are removed as early as possible. . .We 
are removing the injustice and inequity obtaining in present-day 
society in the matter of land.5 
^All-India Congress Committee, op.cit.. p, 6. 
^Tenancy Bill, Bombay Gazette, op.cit.. p. 295. 
3lbid. 
Morarji Desai. The Bombay tenancy and agricultural lands bill, 
194.8, (A speech introducing the bill.) In Bombay Directorate of Pub­
licity. Bombay laws for common man—1, Bombay, Directorate of Pub­
licity. 1948. p. 62. 
^Ibid.. p. 65,66. 
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It is assumed that the distributive equitability objective does not 
accept the distribution as given and that the distribution should be moved 
in the direction of equality. Although legislative pressure tends toward 
equality of wealth and income there is also some indication that equita­
bility would stop short of complete equality among all persons. As 
equality is approached other criteria may be substituted to specify the 
equitable distribution of income.^ 
When consideration is taken of the wide disparity between high and 
low income groups existing in India it is expected that a reform movement 
will include measures to level the income distribution. This appears to 
be one of the objectives of the Bombay Tenancy Act,^ 
^To be operationally useftil goals or objectives need not be deter­
mined with once-for-all finality. Ba\amol states: ". . .a government or 
an individual must take some ends as given at every moment of time or else 
be doomed either to pointless activity or complete inaction. No doubt 
the ends taken as given must at all times be lander revision, but no more 
than this can be conceded without giving up all activity in hopeless con­
fusion." W. J. Baumol. Welfare economies and the theory of the state. 
London, Longmans, Green and Co. 1952. p. 121. 
^Chief Minister Desai, in an interview with the writer, stated that 
one of the objectives of reform legislation was to narrow the disparity 
between incomes. He said, "No man should have less than Rs^ 150 per 
month under present (1953-54-) conditions." He added that no man should 
need more than Rs. 15CX3* 
Altho\agh income statistics are not available it would not be un­
reasonable to say that a large portion of the working population does not 
receive over Rs. 50 per month. Morarji Desai, Council Hall, Bombay, 
India, Information on the objectives of the Tenancy Act. /Tntervievj? 
March, 1954« 
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Implications of additional ob.iectives 
Land hunger in some of the Asian countries is very acute 
and constitutes a very explosive element in the body politic. 
To ignore this xirge for land, even for the legitimate reason 
of maintaijoing production may be an invitation to social dis­
order,^ 
As suggested by Dantwala above there is the possibility of some other 
objective which is not evidenced directly in the official statements. 
Conclusions based upon the two specified objectives in the foregoing 
sections might thereby be incomplete from the standpoint of the problem 
as a whole. If the Tenancy Act has within it sin element or elements 
which do not meet either the criteria of efficiency or equitability the 
possibility is open for some other objective. For example, suppose the 
rent limitation specifies a ratio of prices for factor services land and 
labor lower than that of the ratio of their respective marginal produc­
tivities and thus do not satisfy a criterion of efficiency. Suppose also 
that tite res\ilting distribution to persons is such that a greater portion 
of the product is used fsa- consumption—capital is reduced. Thus, a 
criterion for growth is not satisfied. Suppose that landlords are poor 
and tenants rich and the resulting distribution of income is less equal 
and is therefore less equitable. If such is the case, either 1) the rent 
minimum is not a proper means to secure optimum production and equitabil­
ity and ought to be changed or, 2) some other objective must be considered. 
If the Act does not satisfy the criteria specified, it may be because 
the expected level of resources (opportunities available) has been limited 
by some other objective not directly attributable to the conditions 
^Dantwala, Land reforms in India, op.cit.. p. 436. 
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immediately stirroiinding the two specified objectives. Such a condition 
might arise in the case of a political motivation of the lawmakers.^ 
Explicit expressions of a political objective are difficult, if not 
impossible, to obtain because the purposes of legislation or other govern­
mental action are usually expressed in terms of equity or general welfare. 
As Williamson has said, "Few politicians, in democratic or totalitarian 
societies alike, admit to any other interest than the general welfare or 
good of the people." 
The Bombay Tenancy Act was conceived in the height of the freedom 
movement in India and was one of the first important tenancy acts passed 
after Independence. As such, it is part of the legislative foundation of 
the Congress Party power in Bombay, The Congress seciires its support 
largely from the proletariate and an acquiescent bourgeoisie who feel 
they would have more to lose undei* any of the important challengers of the 
Congress. Congress gained its ascendancy from the masses, and it must 
look to the masses for maintenance of its power position. 
Whether the Tenancy Act was a fulfillment of a contract with its 
electorate or an enactment calculated to promote support in the future, 
the Tenancy Act is important in success of the Congress party. 
^This appears to be most plausible in 1) a monarchy or 2) a real 
democracy, as in contrast to a "perfect" democracy where the lawmakers are 
purely mechanical substitutes for the represented. A real democracy is 
characterized by power politics and in which it is quite possible to pass 
laws which would not be acceptable to the electorate except by subterfuge 
or propaganda. That is, the electorate is made to find the Act palatable 
ex post whereas ^  ante they wo\ild not have. 
^H. F. Williamson and Buttrick. Economic development principles and 
patterns. New York, Prentice~Hall. 1954» p. 10. 
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Although the Congress position in Bombay is strong, there would be no 
reason for an astute politician to sacrifice support tmless some gain 
could be made toward another objective. Morarji Desai said upon intro­
duction of the Bombay Tenancy Bill; 
Therefore, the pvirpose which is accepted by all is to be 
carried out in a manner which involves the least amount of dis­
turbance and opposition. No measure can be envisaged to which 
there woxild be no opposition whatsoever, and no measxare can be 
envisaged by which there would be absolutely no distxirbance. 
That is impossible. Every change involves some distiorbance and 
every change does involve some opposition. But what we have got 
to see is that consistently with the ideas we hold, the least 
amount of distxirbance and the least amount of opposition is in­
volved, so that there is peace in the province and we act in a 
manner which leads to the happiness of all.l 
If, therefore, the Act should appear to fail to satisfy all the 
criteria necessary to move in the direction of the two specified objec­
tives, there is the possibility that the Act has been directed, in part, 
toward some other objective. 
Plural objectives and the Act as m means to a desired situation 
Concerning the useftilness of policy appraisal when specific measures 
of effectiveness are not available, Schickele strikes an optimistic note 
by stating thati 
The two master ends of public economic policy, greater 
social product and better income distribution, are now before 
us. These goals need not be expressed in absolute quantities. 
It often suffices to determine whether a given policy helps or 
hinders the attainment of these goals in terms of "more or less".^ 
^Desai, Bombay laws for common man, op.cit., p. 63. 
^Rainer Schickele. Agricxiltxiral policy. New York, McGraw-Hill 
Book Co., Inc. 195-4* p* 55. 
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However, unless the various objectives are ordered in a cardinal 
sense, it is not always possible to specify whether the net effect of the 
Act is one of a movement toward or away from a more desired situation. 
What can be done is: 1) indicate, in terms of specified criteria, 
whether a section of the Act allows a movement toward an objective, and 
if a) one of the sections of the Act is positive (permits a movement to­
ward the objective) and the remaining sections are non-negative the Act 
can be said to be desirable from the standpoint of the objective, but if 
b) one of the sections is negative with respect to the criteria, it is 
impossible to say whether the Act as whole encourages a movement toward 
the objective without attaching some weights on the basis of the relative 
importance of the effects by each section. 2) Even though it can be 
shown that all the provisions of the Act do meet the conditions necessary 
to move toward one of the objectives, it cannot be shown that the net 
effect will be a movement toward the over-all desired situation—unless 
the Act has a non-negative effect on the other objectives. 
The analysis deals with areas of complanentarity 1) in satisfying 
the criteria for attaining the objective and 2) in determining the effect 
on balance of the Act toward some desired situation—a situation which is 
a composite of both (or all) the objectives specified above, namely, 
economic efficiency and growth and distributive equitability. These areas 
of complementarity are important in that they specify movements toward an 
objective that can be made without sacrifice in another objective. In 
formulating a law, all complementary relationships can be exploited with­
out the need for making choices between objectives. Beyond the point of 
complementarity, however, an ordering of objectives must be specified. 
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To coBf^lete the analysis of the Act, two types of infonnation are needed: 
1) an indifference system specifying the relative importance of the var­
ious objectives and 2) empirical evidence indicating the relative effects 
of the various sections in a movement toward an objective. 
Principal Provisions of the Tenancy Act 
The remainder of this chapter will deal with the principal pro­
visions of the Bombay Tenancy Act. It will outline the main features 
which relate to Security of tenure (sec. 5 with sees. 14 and 34)J Rent 
regulation (sec. 6 with sees. 7, 8 and 12)j Prohibition of sub-division 
and sub-letting (sec, 27); State management (sees. 44 to 62 and 65); 
Tenant purchase, ownership, and transfer restrictions (sees. 32, 43, 63 
and 64); Compensation (sees. 19 and 41); and Administration (sees. 67 to 
89). The provisions will be analyzed in the foregoing order in Chapter 4 
with the exception of Administration which will be covered in this chapter 
only, 
Secxirity of tenure 
"No tenancy of ai^ land shall be for a period of less than ten 
years.- . This provision applies to all land irrespective of the type 
of rental arrangement existing upon it.. The Act of 1948 did not provide 
67 of 1948, sec, 5. All leases on land and other property over 
one year must be in writing. Chapter 5, section 107, of the Transfer of 
Property Act of 1872 specifies that "A lease of immovable property from 
year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent 
can be madis only by a registered instrument". 
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for renewal at the expiration of the ten-year period and was so amended in 
1952 to permit automatic renewal: 
. . .at the end of the said period and thereafter at the end of 
each period of ten years in succession, the tenancy shall, 
subject to the provisions of sub-sections 2) and 3), be deemed 
to be renewed for a further period of ten years on the same terms 
and conditions notwithstanding axiy agreement to the contrary,^ 
Sub-section 2) qualifies the foregoing by permitting the landlord to 
terminate the tenancy at the end of the ten-year period by giving the ten­
ant one year's notice, in writing, if he bona fide requires the land for 
1) cultivating the land personally or 2) a non-agricultural use for his 
own purpose.^ The tennination of tenancy may then take place effective 
March thirty-first of the last year of the ten-year period. However, 
"notwithstanding any agreement, usage, decree, or order of a Court of 
Law, the tenancy of any land held by a tenant shall not be terminated 
unless such tenant"^ fuils to pay the land rental,^ injures the land, sub­
divides the land,^ fails to cultivate the land personally, or uses the 
land for purposes other than agricult\are. 
Ifiom. 33 of 1952, sec. 2. The original Act said nothing about re­
newal and High Court ^ allikarjun v. Satya Narayan (1952), 55 Bom. L.R. 
80/said that in iihe absence of such requirement in the Act no notice was 
necessary. 
^Bom. 67 of 1948, sec. 34* 
3Bom. 6? of 194.8, sec. 14* 
^Bom. 67 of 1948, sec. I4, sub-sec. l), cl. a); i), ii), iii). 
^Bom. 67 of 1948, see. 27. This section states that sub-division, 
sub-letting or assignment shall make the tenant liable to eviction. 
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A landlord may terminate the tenancy of a protected tenant at any 
time, subject to one year's notice. 
For the purposes <if section 5, sub-section 2, all tenants are re­
garded as protected tenants. Section 34 forbids the landlord from evict­
ing the tenant if; 
a) the landlord has been person€QJ.y ciiltivating over 50 acres, 
b) the tenant is a member of a cooperative farming society, 
c) if the income from such land will not be the landlord's main 
soiirce of income,^ 
Furthermore, the right of eviction by the landlord is subject to the con­
ditions that he 1) may evict the tenant if the landlord holds the equi­
valent to sixteen acres of jirayat or four acres of irrigated land or 
less, 2) must leave the tenant with h^f the area held under lease by him 
if the land held by the landlord is more than the holding specified in 1). 
Nothing in section 5 precludes the tenant from vol\intarily siirren-
dering his interest as a tenant if he wishes. However, the surrender of 
tenancy must be in writing and be verified by the Mamlatdar.^ 
Rent rejgulation 
Notwithstanding any agreement, usage, decree or order of a 
Court or any law, the maximum rent payable by a tenant for the 
lease of any land shall not, in the case of an irrigated land, 
exceed one-fo\irth and in the case of any other land exceed one-
third of the crop of such land or its value as determined in 
the prescribed manner.^ 
^Bom, 67 of 194^, sec, 34-> sub-secs» 2), 2A), 
^Procedure outlined in Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Rules, 
1949, no. 4444/51-11, 13 March 1953. Rule 2A. 
%om. 67 of 1948, sec. 6. 
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The rent maxiuruni stated above is the same as that of the Tenancy Act 
of 1939. In 1951, a provision was added to allow the state goveriment to 
lower this maxiimxm for any particular area or establish the rate on any 
other basis that it feels is fit. The rent maxiraum that is now prevalent 
in most districts is one-sixth. Several districts impose a maximum of 5 
times the revenue asses^ent in the case of land assessed at Rs. U per 
acre or less, and two and one-half times the assessment or Hs« 20 (which­
ever is more) in the case of land assessed at more than Rs. k per acre# 
The only district still retaining the 1/3 - 1/4- limit is Dangs, 
The actual rent, subject to the maximum, is that which is agreed upon 
between the landlord and tenant. If no such agreement is forthcoming then 
the local or customary rate is used, or if such a local rate cannot be 
established, a "reasonable rent"^. A "reasonable rent" is determined by 
the Mamlatdar who is to use the following factors 
a) the rental values of lands used for similar ptirposes in the 
locality} 
b) the profits of agriculture of similar lands in the localityj 
c) the prices of crops and commodities in the locality; 
d) the improvements made in the land by the landlord or tenantj 
e) the assessments payable in respect of the land; and 
f) such other factors as may be prescribed. 
After the Mamlatdar has established the reasonable rent it may not be 
called into question for five years except that he may reduce the rent if 
^Bom. 67 of 1948, sec. 7. 
%om. 67 of 19-48, sec, 12, sub-sec.3). 
100 
the land has deteriorated through no fault of the tenant or if the tenant 
makes improvements, or enhance the rent iT the landlord makes improvements. 
All applications for the determination, reduction, or enhancement of rent 
must be made in writing on the prescribed form. 
The state government may abolish crop-share rents or may commute the 
crop-share rents of an area into cash rent by notification in the Official 
Gazette. The exact rate of commutation may be specified or it may be left 
to the Mamlatd^.^ 
Notwithstanding any agreement, usage, decree or order of the Court 
or any i.aw it is unlawful for a landlord to collect rent in tems of ser­
vice oi' labor. The s^e is also true of any cess, rate, vero, huk, or tax 
or service other than the rent lawfully due in respect of such lando^ 
Whenever the land revenue of it particular piece of land is suspended 
or r^iitted, the landlord must suspend or remit the rent payable to him 
on th& land. If the revenue is reduced, then a proportional reduction 
must be made in the rent. Furthermore, if no revenue is payable on such 
land but the laad revenue of other land in the neighborhood is suspended 
or remitted, the payment o£ rent to the landlord will be proportionately 
or totally reduced.^ 
^Bom. 67 of 195^8, sec. 8, Sub-sees. 1) and 2). The crop-share 
abolition provision has been confined primarily to the northern districts, 
and tiaere only to a limited extent, 
^Bcaa. 67 of 194S, sees. 9, 10, 
-?BOBU 67 of 19 8^J sec. 13. 
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Prohibition of sub-division and sub-letting 
Section 27 provides that sub-division or sub-letting of the land or 
assignment shall make the tenancy liable to teiTHination. 
Nothing in section 27, however, may prejudicially affect the rights 
of permanent tenants or other tenants whose rights are deemed coextensive 
with the superior-right holder tinder section 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue 
Code of 1879.^  
If, however, a tenant dies, his son or sons of predeceased sons 
(called "sharers") may partition and sub-divide the land and, 
1) each sharer holds his share as separate tenant, 
2) the rent is apportioned to the sharers according to the share 
allotted, 
3) the area allotted to any sharer cannot be less minimum speci­
fied by government, 
A) questions of rent are decided by the Mamlatdar.^ 
When the state government decides that because of the neglect of 
the landholder or disputes between him and his tenants that cultivation 
^The Bombay Land Revenue Code states as follows; "And where by 
reason of antiquity of a tenancy, no satisfactory evidence of its commence­
ment is forthcoming, and there is not any evidence of its intended dur­
ation, if any, agreed upon between the landlord and tenant, or those under 
whom they respectively claim title, or any usage of the locality as to 
dxiration of such tenancy, it shall, as against the immediate landlord of 
the tenant, be presxamed to the co-extensive with the duration of the ten­
ure of such landlord and of those who derive title under him." Bombay. 
Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879: A21, 1949. 
2lf on the death of a protected tenant, the heirs do not agree to 
accept the tenancy on the same terms as the deceased, the collector may 
select an heir who is willing to accept the same conditions and award him 
the tenancy. Bom. 67 of 1948, sec. 40* 
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of the estate is impaired or if it is necessary to ensure the fill and 
efficient use of the land, notification of the assumption of management by 
the government will be raade.^ Fxirthermore, if land remains uncultivated 
through default of either the landlord or tenant for a period of two con-
secutive years, the state government may assume management. 
On the publication of the notification under section 44-, 
the state in respect of which the notification has been pub­
lished shall, so long as the management continues vest in the 
State Government. Such management shall be deemed to commence 
from the date on which the notification is published and the 
State Government shall appoint a manager to be in charge of such 
estate.^ 
Upon the assumption of the management of the state no change is made 
in the status of the tenants and they continue to cxiltivate their respec­
tive lands under the same conditions and obligations. The holder of the 
estate, however, is debarred from collecting the rents, mortgaging, leas­
ing, selling or in any way alienating the land. Furthermore, state man­
agement is an automatic stay to proceedings involving the liabilities of 
the state, i.e., all processes, executions and attachments are suspended, 
and no new actions through the Civil Court will be valid as long as state 
management continues. 
The manager receives all rents and profits of the property. He also 
assumes the powers of the Revenue Collector in recovering all land revenue 
due to the government.^ Out of the receipts from the land he pays the 
Ifiom. 67 of 19^8, sec. 4^. 
^Bom. 67 of 19A8, sec. 64. 
^Bom. 67 of 1948, sec. 45. 
^Bom, 67 of 1948, sec. 47. 
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eaqpenses ot oj>«ration, debts and liabilities due the government, costs of 
improvements, an allowance to the holder for his maintenance, and other 
debts and liabilities of the estate. The manager has the ftirther power 
to remove a mortgagee in possession by the end of the current revenue year. 
After having completed the liquidation of encumbrances, the manager has 
the power to "sell or grant on lease all or any part of the estate under 
management" 
When the state government is of the opinion that it is no longer 
necessaiy to continue the management they may terminate It, Further 
. .the management of any estate shall not be continued after the lapse 
of eight years from the date of assumption of the management."^ 
Tenant purchase, ownership, and transfer restrictions 
A protected tenant may at ai^ time purchase from his landlord the 
land held by him as a protected tenant.^ The usual procedure Is that the 
^Bom, 67 of 19-48, sec, 58. 
^Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Rioles, op.clt.. rule 30. 
^Bom. 67 of 1948, sec. 32. Section 31 of the 1948 Act uses the 
definition of "protected tenant" given in sections 3, 3A, and 4 of the 
Bombay Tenancy Act of 1939 as modified, viz., 
3. A tenant shall be deemed to be a protected tenant in respect of 
any land if— 
a) he has held such land continuously for a period of not less 
than six years immediately preceding either— 
i) the first day of January 1938, or 
11) the first day of January 1945j and 
b) he has cultivated such land personally during the aforesaid 
period, . . 
3A, Every tenant shall, from the eighth day of November 1947 be 
deemed to be a protected tenant for the purposes of this Act and 
his rights as such protected tenant shall be recorded (continued) 
10^  
tenant- makes an offer of a price to the landlord in writing. If the land­
lord accepts, the negotiation is completed, but if the landlord does not 
accept within three months, the protected tenant may apply to the Agri­
cultural Lands Tribunal for a determination of a fair price.^ The tenant 
then deposits the price with the Tribunal in a lump sum, or in install­
ments not exceeding ten nor extending over more than fifteen years. 
Sub-section (6) limits the tenant purchase to an amount such that the 
land owned by him will not exceed fifty acres of arable land. Further­
more, the arable land remaining in the ownership of the landlord cannot be 
reduced below fifty acres# The state government may reduce the fifty acre 
limit by notification in the Gazette. 
Protected tenants in the same village may exchange their tenancies 
in respect of the lands which they hold as protected tenants.^ The 
(Continued) in the Record of Rights, unless his landlord has prior to the 
aforesaid date made an application to the Mamlatdar for a declar­
ation that the tenant is not a protected tenant. , . 
4. . • .(a) held any land and cultivate it personally continuously 
for a period of not less than six years immediately preceding 
the first day of April 1937 and was evicted from such land on or 
after such date otherwise than by order of a competent authority 
on any of the grounds specified in section I4. of this Act, or 
(b). . .do, . .first day of April 19AA-* • .do. . . 
^Bombay Tenancy and Agricxiltural Lands Rules, op.cit., rule 14-* 
(1) When an application \inder sub-section (3) of section 32, for the 
determination of the reasonable price of land, is received by the 
Tribxonal, it shall detennine the reasonable price of land after 
taking into consideration the factors in fixing the reasonable 
rent under section 12 and such other additional factors as in its 
opinion are relevant and useful. 
^Bom. 67 of 194S, sec. 33» 
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•tenancies vill be on the same terms as existed on the land before the ex­
change. Such exchanges must be carried out in the prescribed manner 
through the Mamlatdar who will issue certificates of the fact that the ex­
change took place. 
Section 43 states that no land pvirchased by a protected tenant under 
section 32 shall be transferred by sale, gift, exchanges, lease, or mort­
gage or assignment without previous sanction of the Government. 
No sale, gift, exchange or lease and no mortgage of any land in 
which possession of the property is delivered to the mortgage shall be 
valid in favor of a person who is not an agriculturist#^ Land mortgages 
which involve the transfer of possession are not valid. 
When a landlord decides to sell any of his land, he must apply to 
the Tribunal for a detemination of a reasonable price. He then makes 
O 
offers to persons in the following order of priority; 
Agricult'ural land: 
i) tenant in actual possession 
ii) persons cultivating adjacent land 
iii) cooperative farming society 
iv) any other agriculturist 
v) a person with a certificate from the Revenue Collector 
stating that he intends to become an agricxalturist. 
^Bom. 67 of 194.8, sec, 63. Sub-section 3) was added by the Bom. 12 
of 1951, sec. 6, which states that this section does not apply to mort­
gages in favor of cooperative societies. 
^Bom. 67 of 1948, sec. 64* 
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B. Dwelling house not necessary to carry on agricultural operations 
on adjoining land: 
i) the tenant if he does not have a dwelling* 
ii) a person in the village without a dwelling. 
Compensation 
Section 41 provides for the payment of compensation to a protected 
tenant for improvements on the land. "Improvement" is defined as follows: 
. . .any work which adds to the value of the land and which is 
suitable thereto as also consistent with the purpose for which 
it is heldj and includes— 
a) the construction of tanks, wells, water channels, em­
bankments and other works for storage, supply or dis­
tribution of water for agricultural purposes; 
b) the construction of works for the drainage of lands or 
for the protection of land from floods or from erosion 
or other damage from water; 
c) the reclaiming, clearing, enclosing, levelling or 
terracing of land; 
d) the erection of buildings on the land, required for 
the convenient or profitable use of such land for 
agricultural purposes; and 
e) the renewal or reconstruction of any of the foregoing 
works or alterations therein or additions thereto as 
are not of the nature of ordinary repairs; but does not 
include such clearances, embankments, levellings, en­
closures, temporary wells, water channels and other 
works as are commonly made by the tenants, in the 
ordinary course of agricultxire.^ 
The compensation is based on the xineaqjired value of the improvement 
at the time of termination of tenancy. The factors that are considered in 
valuation are a) the amount of the enhancement of value of the land which 
^Bom. 67 of 194B, sec, 2. 
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resiilts from the improvement, b) the present condition of the improvement, 
c) the labor and capital input made by the tenant, d) the reduction of 
rent allowed the tenant in consideration of the improvement. The amount 
of the compensation is determined by the Mamlatdar upon application in the 
prescribed manner. 
Under section 19 a tenant is entitled to compensation for trees 
planted by him on the land leased by him. This, however, does not apply 
in cases where the tenant voluntarily surrenders his tenancy,^ 
Administration 
The program of tenancy reform in Bombay State is implemented through 
the Revenue Department. The F Branch of this department is the prin­
cipal agency in collecting information and supervising the operation of 
the several land reform programs, one of which is the Tenancy Act. To 
the present there is no systematic collection of information about the 
operation of the Tenancy Act, Most of the available information has come 
about through questions submitted to the Revenue Minister by Members of 
the Legislative Assembly and is not on a continuing basis. 
The agricultural tenancy relationships are governed basically by the 
Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act of 194-8 but within the pro­
visions of this Act the state government is empowered to make rules.^ 
These rules provide for such matters as the manner of determining the 
value of crop for setting rent levels in section 6, the manner of 
^Bom. 67 of I94S, sec. 19, sub-sec. 2). 
^Bom. 67 of 194B» sec. 82. 
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committing crop-share into cash rent in section 8, penalties under 
section 10 and manner of determination of reasonable rents and prices 
of land. 
Civil cotirts are barred from dealing with any of the matters arising 
out of the Tenancy Act.^ 
No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide 
or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required 
to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar or Tri­
bunal, a Manager, the Collector or the Bombay Revenue Tribunal 
in appeal or revision or the State Government in exercise of 
their powers of control.^ 
Therefore in matters concerning the implementation of the Tenancy 
Act, the Revenue Department has within its powers of administration, legis­
lation (through rule-making power), and ajudication. The persons or 
bodies concerned with the operation of Act are the Mamlatdar, Agri-
ctiltural Lands Tribimal, Collector, and Bombay Revenue Tribianal. Fur­
thermore, in accordance with an amendment in 1953,^ legal practitioners 
are barred from the proceedings before the Mamlatdar, Tribimal or 
Collector except as specifically allowed by the Mamlatdar, Tribunal or 
Collector, and then only at the cost of party in the suit. 
Section 67 authorizes the state government to constitute an Agri­
cultural Lands Tribunal whose duties shall consist of: 
67 of 194-8, sec. 85. 
^The incompetence of the Civil CoTxrt to recognize suits for the 
possession of the land when the plea of tenancy was made by the defendants 
was shown Dhondi Tukaram Mali v. Dadoo Piraji Adgale (1952) 55 Bom. 
L.11. 663^ 
^Bom. 60 of 1953, sec. 3* 
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a) determining value of a dwelling house site, 
b) decide disputes over land purchase in section 32, 
c) determine "reasonable price" under sections 32 and 64., 
d) perform other fiinctions under the Tenancy Act as directed by the 
state government. 
The Tribunal has the power to secure proof of facts by affidavits, 
svumnoning persons, compelling production of documents, and awarding costs. 
At least one of the three or more members of the Tribunal is to have a rank 
of not lower than Civil Court Judge. 
The original plan was to have at least one Tribunal for every dis­
trict. As yet there are no district Tribunals and their function is per­
formed by the Mamlatdar as authorized under section 67 (3). 
Under section 70, the following are listed as the duties and func-
tions of the Mamlatdar: 
deciding who is an agriculturist; 
deciding who is a tenant and a protected tenant; 
determining the value of crop under section 6; 
detenmiuing rent conanutation from crop-share to cash; 
determining the commutation from services to cash; 
determining compensation under section 10; 
determining reasonable rent; 
determining refund under 13 (5); 
detemining compensation for trees, section 19; 
decide rights in trees, section 20; 
detemining costs in repair of bunds; 
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l) sanction exchange of tenancies; 
ID) determine compensation for improvements j 
n) put tenant or landlord in possession of land or dwelling; 
o) other matters in the Act. 
Appeals from the decisions of the Mamlatdar or Agricultural Lands 
Tribunal are filed with the District Collector. The court of final 
appeals is the Bombay Revenue Tribunal. Only in cases concerning the 
constitutionality of Act or a portion thereof does the High Court have 
jTirisdiction. 
CHA.PTER 4.: ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS 
The Economic Objective 
Introduction 
The objective of "economic efficiency and growth" was indicated in 
the first part of Chapter 3. The Tenancy Act, the essential provisions 
of which were given in the second part of Chapter 3, was intended in part 
to be a means for bringing about greater efficiency. The following para­
graphs develop the conditions of efficiency in production with reference 
to leasing arrangements, that is, where the ownership of the factors of 
production is divided between different individuals. After specifying 
these conditions it will be possible to test the provisions of the Act 
logically to see if these conditions are met. 
A partial approach. First, the analysis is partial because it 
deals with production efficiency only, assuming that the problems of 
consumption and marketing are outside the scope of the Tenancy Act. 
Second, the analysis is partial because it deals primarily with allo­
cations of resources within the agricultiiral sector. Since this analysis 
deals with conditions and does not attempt to develop a final equili­
brium solution, the limitations of partial analysis are perhaps not so 
serious• 
The standard of efficiency is that no movement of a factor of pro­
duction between or within any enterprise, firm, or industry can increase 
the total product, as measured in some standard of value such as money. 
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Efficiency will be approached from a viewpoint of comparative 
statics with capital accumulation and innovation recognized as necessary 
factors for growth in the underdeveloped economy. Although it would be 
desirable to have a trxaly dynamic theory which would include the specific 
problems involved in the allocation of resources in multi-ownership firms, 
the development of such a theory will not be attempted here. 
Multiple-ownership firms and efficiency. The idea that tenancy in 
the land tenure system of India is inherently obstructive to efficient 
use of agricultural resources is not without support. Statements range 
from the categorical pronouncement of G, C. Singh; 
. .it is impossible to discover a satisfactory solution by 
merely trying to find a basis of harmonious relations between 
tenants and landlords. The fixed solution must lie in destroy­
ing tenancy root and branch. 
Even the Congress Agrai^ian Reforms Committee has viewed tenancy in 
an unfavorable light by their much quoted statement, "The Committee is 
strongly of the opinion that in the agrarian economy of India there is 
no place for intermediaries and the land must belong to the tiller. 
V. V. Sayana states that "Farming by owners is per se superior to 
farming by tenants, and there is no question about merits of owner 
farming as against tenant farming."^ However, he appears to qualify 
his earlier statement by later acknowledging that perhaps there might be 
certain economic advantages to a tenancy system: 
^G. C. Singh. Recent trends in agrarian reforms. Delhi, Atma 
Ram and Sons. 1952. p. 4-6. 
^Congress Agrarian Reforms Comm., op.cit.. p. 7. 
%. V. Sayana. Sharing and fixed tenancy systems. Madras, 
Business V/eek Press. 194-9. p. 1, 2. 
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"Apparently when the proposition is worked out according 
to strictly business principles taking into account the interest 
due on the money invested in land there may be some advantage 
to being a tenant,"^ 
The passage of the Bombay Tenancy Act appears to be adequate 
evidence that the legislators e:q)ected tenancy to be a part of the tenure 
system at least in the near futiire. The assumption of this study with 
respect to tenancy is that it will remain for a long enough period, at 
least, to warrant attention of the basic enactment governing landlord-
tenant relationships. 
Tenancy will be viewed, for the purpose of this study, as one form 
of multiple ownership of factors of production in the firm. It differs 
from corporate form of mialtiple-ownership enterprise in that the ovmers 
of a corporation submit claims to the ownership of resources but are not 
directly responsible for seeking a particular type of other resource with 
which to combine their own as is the party to a partnership or lease. A 
party to a multiple-ovmership firm may either l) contribute a claim to 
resources and allow the manager to buy or rent whatever resources woiold 
maximize the return to the firm, or, 2) contribute productive resources 
in a real asset form, the oimer having the particular asset either be­
cause a) his expectations were such that he felt he could make greater 
retiirn by transferring his assets from a liquid to real asset form (his 
return might include consumption elements, e.g., prestige of land owner­
ship) or b) inheritance of the real asset which is institutionally bound 
as in a life estate 
^Ibid.. p. 2 
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Landlord-tenant agreements to combine their resources resvilt basi­
cally because the resources of one party yield less return unless combined 
with those of the other party. (The question of why each party happens to 
have a particialar resource is best deferred to the sections dealing with 
the distribution of income.) Each participant in the lease is interested 
in maximizing the return to his own factors. Whether tenancy will result 
in an equilibriiam commensiirate with that of a firm in which all the 
factors are owned by one person will depend upon the lease and the con­
ditions under which it operates. 
The advantages of leasing arrangements are: First, the lease may 
allow the combination of larger quantities of resources than it may be 
possible for one individual to own. This may give rise to certain advan­
tages from more effective utilization of certain indivisible iinits of 
factor such as management. Second, the parties to the lease may be sub­
ject to more uncertainty as to the returns from their resources than they 
wish to bear alone. Plxoral ownership of the firm can spread the effects 
of uncertainty. 
One of the chief disadvantages of the leasing arrangement from the 
standpoint of an equilibrixan in a landlord-tenant firm is that one of the 
parties may be in an advantageous bargaining position. The effect of im­
perfect competition on leasing arrangements may resialt in an equilibrixan 
which does not satisfy the standard of efficiency stated above. 
Another disadvantage of a leasing system is inherent in the leases. 
Obstacles to an efficient combination of resources may exist in the 
agreements themselves. A leasing arrangement properly constructed 
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from the standpoint of the firm will be one vdiich allows the resowce 
owners to so combine their resources that the maximum net revaaue is 
produced. 
Conditions ^or efficiency. One of the responsibilities of the Tenancy 
Act will be to encourage the reduction of lease~based obstacles to firm 
efficiency,^ However, ^ust as it is possible for parties to a lease, each 
seeking to maximize his own b^efit, to attmpt to secure a resource cosa-
bination that does not maximize the return to the firm, so the firm may 
specify an equilibrium that is inconsistent wiida taie standard of effi-
ci«icy for the econony. For example, inefficiency may result if one firm 
equates the marginal rate of substitution between two of the factors it 
employs to a ratio of prices of the factors different from that of another 
firm. Such a condition mi£^t arise if one of the firms were able to in­
fluence the price of one of the factors it employs. The firm may attain 
an efficient allocation of its resotirces I?/ equating the marginal value 
product of each factor to -Uie price of the factor. Althou^ the Act may 
attempt to reduce the obstacles to attaiianent of efficiency in the firm, 
the responsibility of the Act extends to the v^ole econos^ so a broader 
standard is also required. 
Itoda? the assuir5)tion that the product and factor markets specif^ 
prices consistent with an efficient allocation of resources, a measure of 
^oussaint, in a study of lease-ori«nted obstacles to farm improve­
ments in Iowa, used as a norm of efficiency for leasing fixiss selectM 
owner operators. W. D, Toussaint. Farm rental obstacles to land improve­
ments and stiggested solutions. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. Ames, Iowa, Iowa 
State College Library. 1953. 
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the attaiximent of efficiency woiold be the nearness to equality of the 
value of the marginal product (VMP) and the price of every factor (Pf) 
employed in production. 
The conditions under which these two general standards of efficiency 
are consistent are very restrictive, assuming that the buyers and sellers 
of the factors operate as if they had no influence on price. That is, to 
satisfy the standards of efficiency for the economy, VMP of every factor 
would have to equal its MVP and the MC of every factor would have to 
equal its Pf in every firm, i.e., perfect competition. 
Under the conditions prevailing in agriculture in the U.S.A. the 
assvunptions of pure competition are perhaps not too unrealistic. How­
ever, the iinqualified projection of such assumptions into the situation 
obtaining in Bombay is perhaps not justified.^ 
In constructing the provisions of a tenancy enactment to provide 
the maximum in terms of a social value product it appears that a possi­
bility for a conflict in purposes might exist. That is, measiires which 
provide for the maximization of profits in the individual firms might 
cause no improvement (or a reduction) in efficiency in terms of the stan­
dard for the whole econonQr. Similarly, meas\ires which attempt to deal 
with such matters as the disparity between VMP and MVP, i.e., imperfect 
competition, may cause obstructions to efficient allocations at the firm 
level. Such a question might arise, say, with respect to the reduction 
^An analysis of leasing and tenure systems on the assumptions of per­
fect competition may be found in: Earl 0. Heady. Economics of agricul­
tural production and resoxirce use. New York, Prentice Hall. 1952. 
p. 587 - 621. 
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of rentals from l/2 to l/6 of the crop. Lawmakers faced with these de­
cisions will first want to exploit all areas of complementarity. There­
after, however, a judgment must be made to find a compromise in which 
social benefits are maximized. 
The conditions of efficiency are discussed under 3 headings—factor 
payments, uncertainty and immobility—beginning at the fizro level and 
projecting into inter-firm and inter-industry implications. With recog­
nition of the qualifications just made, the conditions are discussed in 
terns of MVP. The analytical gap, may be bridged by equating VHP and 
MVP and MC to Pf. Each of the efficiency conditions also contains 
intra-temporal and inter-temporal aspects of resoiirce allocation. 
Factor payments. In the case of cash or fixed-produce type rental 
arrangements the i^ntal payment becomes a variable cost only in terms of 
successive lease periods. Regulations which affect the level of a fixed 
rent are, therefore, more significant from the standpoint of factor in­
puts over a longer period of time. The fixed-rental tenant will be will­
ing to increase the amoimt of his contribution to the firm if the rental 
payment going to the landlord is reduced (MC decreases) and/or his return 
is increased (MVP increases). (See Figure 4.,) Conversely, the landlord 
Would be willing to make a smaller contribution if the rents are reduced. 
Under a share lease, rental payment becomes a function of yield and 
therefore is a ftinction of inputs of factor. The incentive for a party to 
a share lease to make an input of factor will depend upon the manner in 
which the costs and returns are divided. 
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The party to a share lease is faced with three choices in the use of 
his resources, 1) the allocation of his reso\irces between different enter­
prises within the firm, 2) the level of input of his resources in the firm 
and 3) the combination of factors to produce a given level of output of 
each product. 
1) Between enterprises; The party to the lease will attempt to 
place his resources in different enterprises so that the total return 
from his resources in all uses will be a maximum. In doing so he will 
tend to favor those crops which increase his return and not necessarily 
that of the firm. For example, the Tenancy Act (before the notification 
of 1953) specified the maximum rent at 1/3 of dry land drops and 1/4 of 
irrigated land crops. Suppose as in Figure 3 the rent is first 1/3 
share of all crops. The curve TR represents the transformation function 
between dry and irrigated crops for the firm. The curve tr then repre­
sents the transformation function for the tenant's share (2/3 share). If 
the Act is enforced the new transformation function for the tenant be­
comes tr' (2/3 and 3/4- share). Under the price ratios for the two pro­
ducts shown by ratios PP and PP' it is seen that the tenant will favor 
the production of irrigated crops as against the original equilibrium in 
a movement from W to Z. The tenant will therefore tend to shift his re-
soiirces into the production of a relatively greater production of irri­
gated crops than the market calls for. 
The resoxirce owner is faced with this type of decisions also between 
firms and between industries. It would only be necessary to construct a 




Figure 3. Product combination shifts due to 






Figure 4., Effect on input of division of 
costs and returns. 
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Figxire 5 , Profit-maximizing factor combination. 
Figure 6 , Output-increasing effect of two industries 
equating substitution ratios to same price 
ratio• 
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in the leasing firm and some alternative firm or industry. Similar shifts 
in product combinations might also be shown as an effect of changes in the 
price ratios for the products (PP and P'P'). But this is perhaps better 
discussed in terms of the second type of choice made by the resource 
owner—level of input of his resources. 
2) Level of input; In maximizing the return to his resources the 
factor-ovmer with unlimited supply of factors will increase inputs in 
every use until the MVP of each factor is equal to its MC. Factor 
limitations and indivisibilities create additional problems, but in 
setting up general conditions these problems may be set aside for a moment. 
As an example of the viewpoint of the tenant toward reso\u?ce use, his 
labor in paddy cultivation may be used. The tenant may visualize his 
marginal value product curve for his own labor as sloping downward to the 
right and intersecting the marginal cost curve for his labor as a point 
specifying his optimum input of labor. 
In Figure U the MC curve may be discontinuous at Ox^, say, because 
of some part time job opport\inity. A lower MC after might be spec­
ified by the value of leisure, thus givir^ two opportunity costs for two 
possible areas of input of labor. If the share to labor for paddy culti­
vation is reduced the effect may be shown by a shift of the marginal 
value product from MVPj^ to MVP2. Under the particular circumstances here 
illustrated the tenant woiald be inclined to devote less time to paddy 
cultivation. 
One of the principal sources of lease-based inefficiencies is the 
dissociation of costs and returns between the parties to the lease. Un­
less the return attributable to the input is divided in the same 
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proportions that costs are shared5 the factor owner will be unwillizig to 
make the same input of the factor as if returns and costs are proportional. 
In Figtire 4- the tenant's reluctance to make inputs can be shown where the 
reduction in marginal value product from to MVP2 will induce a re-
auction of labor from X3 to unless the cost Is shared proportionately 
as shown by the reduction of MCi to MCg. An example of such a shared cost 
was the deep plowing of Hariali grass as undertaken by several ciiltivators 
in Madhbavi village. Tenants were more inclined to make larger outlays 
for deep~plowing when the landlord shared the costs. 
3) Factor combinations: In selecting the profit maximizing combin­
ation of factors to produce any given output, tdie owner of the factors 
will combine them so that the rate of substitution of one factor for the 
other will equal the ratio of the factor prices. As seen in Figtare 5, to 
do otherwise will necessitate a greater total outlay to produce the 
given output (say, SS). The combination of OA of factor X2 and OB of 
factor X]L the combination of OC of X2 and OD of both produce the 
same output (SS) but the former requires a greater total outlay. A 
party to the lease woxild wish to make pxirchases of resources in terms of 
these conditions. The price ratio would be in terms of the effective 
price to the factor purchaser and mi|^t include shares or payments to the 
other party. 
If two firms (say, on© in agriculture and one in industry) allocate 
their reso\xrces in accordance with this principle but each equates his 
substitution ratio (3^3^ sMd SbSjj, respectively for A and B) to a 
different price ratio, obviously their rates of substitution will not be 
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equated and, as in Figure 6, greater output oould be made with the same 
input of factors if both equated to the same price ratio. In Figure 6, B 
might represent a firm in industry with relatively expensive capital, X2, 
and relatively cheap labor, X^, (Pb^b) whereas A represents a firm in 
agriculttire where capital, X^, is relatively cheap compared to labor, Xj^, 
(PaPa)• With a repricing of the resources so that the ratio of prices 
is the s^e for both firms, increases in both products will restilt. This 
increase is shown in terms of higher iso-product curve (S'aS'a) for 'the 
agricultural fim in Figure 6 but also could be drawn to show an increase 
in output of B or both A and B. 
Disproportionality of costs and returns results in a tendency to 
shift to other uses the resources which receive inadequate rettirns. A 
reduction in return to a resource in one firm will restilt in a tendency 
of the resource owner to shift the resource to other firms or to other 
industries. A loss in efficiency results when the return to the factor 
or its cost is not in accordance with the product and factor prices 
specified by the market. If other productive alternatives are not avail­
able, the factor owner will shift his labor into leisure and his capital 
into consumption. For this reason, the limited number of production possi­
bilities in the Indian agricultural firm has tended to aggravate the so-
called incentive and capital consumption problems. 
Althoiigh the Act provides in Section 6 for the reduction of the 
share of costs by the landlord in proportion to the reduction in rental 
share, there appears to be some evidence, for example, in the village of 
Jaska, that landlords have tended to discontinue their contribution 
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entirely. The res^alt is a tendency to reduce resources employed in the 
landlord-tenant firms. 
The general criterion of efficiency as indicated under the objectives 
of Chapter 3 is that each resource is to move where its marginal value 
product is highest. If resources are unlimited with respect to all poss­
ible enterprises in the firms (industries) inputs of factors can profit­
ably be employed until the marginal value product is equal to the marginal 
cost of the factor. Where factor limitations exist, inputs will be ex­
tended as far as possible in uses providing the highest marginal value 
product. An efficient tenancy system is one which allows these resource 
movements to exploit all opportunities for gain. 
Even under conditions of complete certainty returns from a factor may 
be disco\inted because of the preference individuals for the retxirns in 
the present rather than the future. By re-interpreting Figure 4, the 
effect on inputs by discounting for time can be shown as the reduction 
of retiirns from to MVP2. The inverse of the discounting of returns 
is the compoimding of costs, the effect of which might be shown as a'rise 
of marginal cost from MC2 to MC^ in Figure 4. Either method indicates 
how time may be a cause for the reduction of inputs. The longer the per­
iod of time required for the returns of an input to mature, the greater 
will be the expected return needed to offset the discount. 
Leasing arrangements may affect, or be affected by, the nature of 
decisions involved in the use of resoxirces over time. Tenants and land­
lords are concerned with maximizing their respective returns over a cer­
tain time period and conflicts may arise out of the difference in the 
discount rate of each party. One such case might be where the tenancy 
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is terminated before all retiirns from an input have expired. For example, 
the tenant may not be willing to contribute labor to the digging of a 
well and construction of water channels if he knows that he will receive 
a share of the increased returns from irrigation for only one year. Al­
though the returns to the well might be greater in the long run, the ex­
pected return to his labor with one-year tenure on the land might be 
greater in, say, additional weeding in the paddy field. If the tenant 
were assured of compensation for the une3g:>ired value of his contribution 
to the irrigation structures he would have the incentive to make the 
input. 
Leasing arrangements which allow the dissociation of costs and re­
turns over time may also be responsible for the lack of land improvements^ 
and soil erosion.2 Both of these problems were recognized by the legis­
lators upon passage of the Tenancy Act.^ 
Uncertainty. When xmcertainty as to the expected return from an 
input is injected into the decision-making process, the return is dis­
counted (or the cost compounded) at a higher rate than when only time wi'Ui 
certainty is considered. 
^Toussaint showed how lease-oriented obstacles to production 
efficiency were responsible for the failtire of western Iowa landlords 
and tenants to make improvements. Toussaint, op.cit.. p. 154.. 
^Held indicated that leasing arrangements were sometimes an obstacle 
to the employment of soil conservation practices in western Iowa. R. B. 
Held. Overcoming obstacles to soil erosion control in western Iowa. Un­
published Ph.D. thesis. Ames, Iowa, Iowa State College Library, 1953. 
^Statement of Objects and Reasons, op.cit.. p. 295» 
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At least three main sotirces of uncertainty to the tenant are prices, 
production, and length of tenure. All three sources of uncertainty are 
involved in leasing arrangements but the Tenancy Act is directly con­
cerned with only the latter. 
All elements influencing the discount of the tenant or landlord for 
uncertainty will not be outlined here but at least one particular char­
acteristic of the Indian cultivator is particularly significant in his 
approach to decisions. Survival in a large section of the agricultural 
coBaminity is the doininant consideration in resource use. The willingness 
to accept lancertainty is lessened when failvire may erase entirely the 
opportunity to make ar^ return in the future. Cultivator's low accept­
ance of the Japanese method of paddy cultivation, for instance, may be 
due in a large part to the heavy discount for uncertainty. 
Because of uncertainty, tenants, realizing the necessity of making 
rental payments to maintain their tenancy, will tend to employ resources 
in those uses which provide a relatively certain, regular income. Even 
under the protection of the Tenancy Act a tenant is liable to eviction 
for non-payment of rent.^ The returjas from employments that involve re-
txirns at longer periods in the future or with which the cultivator has 
had little experience are discounted more heavily for uncertainty. 
Tenants operating under fixed-payment leases will tend to allocate 
their resources between different enterprises in a manner analogous to 
that of an owner of mortgaged property. The tenant will tend to prefer 
low-risk production and greater diversification in order tTi^t the 
^Bom. 67 of 1948, sec. 14, qualified by sees. 24, 25* 
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sxarvival miniimam, i.e., siifficient to cover rental payments, can be pro­
vided and eviction prevented. Because enterprises which yield retiarns at 
longer periods in the future tend to be discounted more heavily for uncer­
tainty, fixed-payment tenants will be inclined to favor short-term crops. 
Therefore, fixed-payment lease tenants, even with long-term security of ten­
ure, may be subject to the effects of uncertainty of production or prices. 
The share-type lease permits the sharing of uncertainty from pro­
duction and prices. The effects of variation fall upon the contributors 
in a leasing arrangement in proportion to their respective shares of the 
returns. If the tenant has a lease which provides for compensation for 
the unexpired value of tenant inputs or perfect secvirity of tenure, and if 
the tenant shares the uncertainty of production and prices through shares 
in the returns and costs, he will tend to allocate resoiirces in the same 
manner as an owner. The share lease appears to be better adapted to areas 
of high production variation. For example, in the village of Madhbavi 
where famine was not uncommon most of the leasing agreements were on a 
share basis whereas in Badlapur, in a high rainfall tract, leasing arrange­
ments were exclusively of the fixed-payment type. 
Although the Act deals with landlord-tenant relationships it was not 
supposed that the provisions would affect only intra-firm factor combin­
ations. The Act was passed on the assumption that obstacles to efficient 
leasing arrangements directly affected the entire economy. The con­
ditions of efficiency in leasing arrangements should be thought of as 
applicable to the inter-firm and inter-industry allocations as well. 
For example, if a leasing arrangement is for an extremely short term 
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and the tenant is subject to a high degree of lincertainty from tenancy 
termination, he will tend to discount the esspected retxirns from his inputs 
in long-term uses. He may then, at an intra-firm level shift resources to 
short-term uses. However, he may also shift his resources to other firms 
of which he is or intends to be a part. He has also the alternatives of 
leisure for his work time or consumption for his capital. 
Immobility. As the quantities and qualities of factors change, 
innovations are introduced, demands for products vary and other variables 
are altered, new equilibria are specified. Efficiency in a dynamic 
economy necessitates shifts in resource use. Efficiency requires re­
source mobility. Thus the third condition for the Tenancy Act is to re­
duce factor immobilities existing in the tenancy system and create no 
additional obstructions to factor mov^nent. 
Factor immobility may be due to the lack of knowledge of alterna­
tive employments in which the factor owner could engage the re®3»urce. 
The closed economy of the fillage forms a natural barrier to frequent 
outside contact and consequently factor movements beyond the village are 
hampered by the high degree of uncertainty attached to outside employment. 
Immobility may also arise out of what Boxilding has termed specifi­
city^ of factors or production, so called because of their lack of 
versatility for different productive piirposes. An example of a specific 
factor of production is the bund which is useful for only one purpose, 
the retention of water on a specific plot of grotimi. The bund has 
%enneth E. Boulding. Economic analysis. Rev. ed. New York, 
Harper and Brothers. 19-^. p. 204.. 
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specificity both in use and location. Other factors may be specific be­
cause of their specialty in use, in time or location or some combination. 
Of partiCTilar importance in leasing arrangements are those factors which 
are given specificity because of their attachment to the land such as 
terraces, wells, bunds, irrigation facilities, trees, and other improve­
ments. The tenant may be reluctant to make improvements because of the 
iimnobility of the improvement by virtue of attachment to the land. 
Another source of factor immobility on the intra-firm as well as 
inter-firm and inter-industry levels stems from the effects of custom, 
tradition, and other institutional restrictions on production patterns 
and resource payments. The traditional manner for building a cart or 
plowing a field or the customai^ rental payment may not bear any relation 
to the present demands for products or the productivity of the resources 
employed. Laws specifying rates of payment for factor services may be 
regarded as analogous to customary pa;^ents with respect to mobility. 
Even with f\all knowledge of the possibilities for re-employment of 
the reso\irce and a desire to do so the factor owner may be constrained 
by the cost of transference. Land and some forms of capital fliay be 
limited because of the difficulty or impossibility for physicstl re­
location. 
Growth conditions and the tenancy system. The attainment of an 
equilibrium alone does not satisfy the requirements for economic develop­
ment. Even though all the efficiency conditions discussed under factor 
payments above and their counterparts with respect to consumption were 
satisfied, India's level of living might, and probably woiald, be lower 
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than an acceptable miiiiiiiuni. Therefore, as the efficiency conditions are 
met through successive equilibria, the goal of increased per capita in­
come requires that additional conditions for economic growth be met. Two 
requirements for growth that appear to be affected by the tenancy system, 
and consequently the Tenancy Act, are capital acctamilation and the intro­
duction of innovations. 
The Five-Year Plan indicated the need of increased efficiency and 
advanced technology but emphasized that "the key to higher productivity 
and expanding levels of income and employment lies really in the stepping 
up of capital formation" Then referring to agriciilture specifically 
the Plan pointed up the need for more capital by indicating the effects 
of capital limitations in production; 
Because of inadequate financial resoiirces and absence 
of timely credit facilities at reasonable rates, many of the 
farmers, even though otherwise willing, are unable to go in 
for improved seeds and manures or to introduce better methods 
or techniques. Works of minor irrigation like wells ovmed by 
the cultivators either get into disuse or are not fiilly util­
ized for want of capital.2 
In addition to the need for capital is the difficulty of acquiring 
it under conditions of very low income such as those fo\md in India. 
Thus arises the problem to which Ntirkse referred as the "vicious circle" 
of poverty and capital dissipation—they are poor because they have 
little capital because they are poor.^ By increased efficiencies such 
^India, Five-Year Plan, op.cit., p. 12, 13. 
%bid.. p. 234-. 
%urkse based his stiggested solution for breaking the vicious 
circle on the assxamption that the marginal productivity of labor in 
agriculture was zero for a considerable segment of the labor force. (Cont.) 
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as thoae suggested for the tenancy system under the three foregoing head­
ings, a greater product mi^t be produced from which capitsJ. acciMaulation 
could be made. Another means for raising additional capital internally 
is through reduction in consumption. Some landlords and tenants might be 
encouraged to devote more of their income to capital and less to con­
sumption if uncertainty were reduced and full retxirn to their capital in­
puts were assured. Two conditions by which the Tenancy Act may be 
analyzed in its effectiveness for capital accumulation are, therefore: 
1) increased output from which capital might be made available through 
efficient allocation of resources, 2) incentive for parties to the lease 
to use surplus income for capital rather than consumption. 
Economic progress is also dependent upon invention and the adoption 
of the inventions. Therefore, another condition for promotion of econo­
mic growth is that the Tenancy Act provide within the tenancy system a 
climate for the adoption of innovations. The removal of obstacles to 
the acceptance of innovations by landlords and tenants such as dissoci­
ation of costs and returns or lease-induced uncertainty is one means for 
the Tenancy Act to encourage economic development. 
By Leuige's categorization, innovations may be factor-using and 
output-increasing or factor-saving. An example of the former type might 
be the Japanese method of paddy culture in which greater amounts of labor 
(Continued) He proposed that the tinproductive portion of labor to be 
taken to produce capital goods and that the portion of agricultural pro­
duct they had consumed be transferred to maintain them. Thus the remain­
ing agriculturists would be no worse off, agricultural production would be 
maintained and new capital good would be produced with the surplus labor. 
Ragnar Nurkse. Problems of capital formation in underdeveloped countries. 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 1953. p. 38-49. 
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and fertilizer are required. An example of the latter might be the intro­
duction of the scythe for the hand sickle.^ Other examples that would 
fall in one of the two types arej fertilizer, insecticides, new crops, 
new varieties, improved livestock, machinery. 
Factor-saving innovations pose the additional problems of alter­
native employments. Displaced labor in conditions of unemployment might 
only aggravate the problem of economic progress. Labor-using innovations, 
however, could absorb some of the surplus labor upon which Nurkse is de­
pendent for the construction Of capital goods. Problems of general 
underemployment require measures outside the scope of the Tenancy Act, 
and therefore are omitted in this partial analysis. 
Under share leases, incentive for landlord or tenant to introduce 
an innovation would require that costs be shared in proportion to the 
expected return. Where benefits from the innovation such as fertilizer 
extend beyond a single production period, security of tenure or compensa­
tion are required for tenants' incentive to make additional contribution. 
Ihe effects of uncertainty may deter a fixed-payment tenant from adopting 
^here might be also a slight increase in capital in the change frcan 
hand sickle to scythe. The increased cost of capital might be compared 
to the saving in labor to see if it falls in the category of innovation. 
Few innovations do not require a shift in the proportions of different 
factors. It is difficult, in practice for this reason, to delimit from 
increases in other factors a pure innovation in the use of one factor 
wherein the production fxinction is altered so that for at least some level 
of input a greater product resxaltg than before the innovation was intro­
duced. The problems of shifts in combinations are transcended if an inno­
vation is defined as "such changes in the production functions. . .as m^e 
it possible for the firm to increase the discoxmted value of the maximum 
profit attainable under existing market conditions." Quotation from; 
Oscsir Lange. Price flexibility and unemployment. Bloomington, Principia 
Press. 1952, p. 71. 
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an innovation. Short-tem adjustment in reiital payment might be one way 
for the landlord to share in the uncertainty involved in an innovation. 
As in the case of share leases the fixed-payment lease is subject to un­
certainty from tenure termination and long-term contracts or compensation 
would tend to provide incentive for introducing innovations whose benefits 
mature over a long period. 
Security of tenure 
As indicated in Chapter 3, all leases must be for a minimum of 10 
years, and are automatically renewed for another 10 years tmless the 
landlord terminates the tenancy for personal cultivation of the land. 
The tenancy may be terminated at any time if 1) the tenant fails to eiilti-
vate the land personally, use the land for a non-agric\iltviral p\irpose^ or 
fails to pay the rent, injures, sub-divides or sub-lets the land, 2) the 
tenant voluntarily surrenders his tenancy. 
Section 5 was developed on the assumption that leases were of a very 
short-term nature and that tenancies were affected by a large degree of 
uncertainty. In his speech introducing the Bombay Tenancy and Agri­
cultural Lands Bill, the Revenue Minister said: "There was absolutely 
no security for tenants as regards their holdings, because they could be 
ousted at any time by their landlords. . 
Although leases were predominantly of one-year dtiration many ten­
ancies continued for generations on a year to year basis. However, from 
the limited information available, the length of tenancy appears to have 
%orarji Desai, Speech introducing the bill, op.cit.. p. 4S. 
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varied considerably between areas and villages. This variation in length 
of ternire may be illustrated by the follovdng selectionss 
Usually agreements of lease were signed for one year only, , . 
In the Bhal region we found most of the tenants cultivating the 
same land for a number of years. In Dhanduka, proper, however, 
due to the keen competition on the part of the tenants to obtain 
land, the landlord found it to his advantage to change his ten­
ants every second or third year. One landlord in support of this 
practice said that it ensTored efficiency, since a new tenant worked 
to create a good impression.^ 
In Charotar region, very few tenants were found to cultivate 
the same land for more than three years on the average. The 
advent of the Tenancy Act increased the frequency of such changes.^ 
The contract, as a rule, is annual and is normally renewed 
at the end of each year; there ai« cases of tenants cxiltivating 
under such contracts the same land for the last 20 years.^ 
In the backward Mandavi taluka of Surat district, the ten­
ants did not face the problem of eviction to any appreciable 
extent. They were found to be cultivating the same land for a 
number of years, sometiimes since their father's time. Similar 
conditions with some modifications prevailed in the Kanam 
tract of Broach. A few exceptional cases apart, the landlords, 
most of them being non-resident, were content to continue the 
same tenant for a nxanber of years, provided they received their 
rents regularly.4-
In Badlapur 9 tenants replied to the length-of-tenancy question. 
Of the 17 plots which they cultivated the average period of occupancy 
was 17 years for 8 plots and the tenant's father or earlier ancestor on 
^Barmeda, op.cit., p. 208, 209. 
%bid., p. 209. 
^imal Shah, op.cit., p. AO, 
^smneda, oo.cit.. p. 209. 
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the 9 remaining plots. Of the 9 tenants interviewed in Jaska the average 
length of occupancy on the 34 plots was 15.5 years. In Madhbavi the aver­
age period of occupancy vrats 5.7 years on the 31 plots and 15 tenants from 
which replies were obtained. In general long term tenancies in the first 
two villages appeared to he common. Tenancies in Madhbavi tended to 
change more frequently. 
Although it appears that imcertainty due to lease termination might 
have been a significant factor in the decisions of part of the tenant pop­
ulation, short-term leases were not tmiversal and the Revenue Minister's 
declaration that there was "absolutely no sectjrity for the tenants" was 
likely an overstatement. 
Factor payments. In the case of the tenant's factors, labor and 
capital, the alternatives of leisure and consumption always exist even if 
other alternatives do not. This may be considered the problem of "incen­
tive" as visualized in the passage of the security of tenure provisions. 
Section 5 will induce greater tenant input if the tenant is able to 
realize the ftill return from his resources which require longer periods 
to exhaust their full effect on the product. A typical long-term input 
of tenants is the labor expended on the construction of bunds. By treat­
ing annual repair as a current expense, the bund may be considered a 
totally permanent improvement. In such a case the tenant on share rent 
reiBaining even in perpetuity coixld not recover the fiill value of his in­
put in bund-building tinless the shares were altered in his favor. In 
view of the stickijaess of rentals described under section 6, this may 
give additional support to the coimautation of rent provision of section 
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8 wherein the only legal means of collecting rent is on the cash basis.^ 
Under the share rental basis as long as landlord and tenant C'ntribute 
perfectly substitutable factors (say, labor for labor) in the same propor­
tions that the product is divided, each will have adequate incentive to 
make an input of factor consistent with an efficient resource combination. 
This is true as long as the tenant remains on the bunded land. In order 
for the tenant to make the improvement he would have to be certain of re­
ceiving the capitalized value of the return due to his labor input as 
compensation, should he move. The practice in Jaska varied with some 
landlords paying all the costs of permanent bunds and others paying one-
half (one-half share was a coimaon rental in pre-Act condition). Tenants 
in Badlapur, a fisted rent village, paid for field btinds (less permanent) 
although, in some cases, landlords contributed to the cost of permanent 
boundary bunds. Landlords in Madhbavi generally bore the costs of bund­
ing both in long-term cash leases and crop-share leases. 
Many areas of the Giamarat and the Deccan are very stony. Here rock-
picking and the building of rock bunds represent improvements of very 
long-texTn dtu'ation. Terraces, check-dams to prevent erosion, deep 
^Crop share rentals had been commuted in several districts in the 
Gujarat region of Bombay. According to infoiroation sectired from the 
Revenue Department in January 1954 the following villages had been sub­
ject to notification of commutation: 12 villages in Sabarkantha, 4-
talukas in Baroda, 4 talukas in Sxirat, and 208 villages in Ahmedabad. 
Jaska was on© of 35 villages in Dhanduka taluka of Ahmedabad in which 
crop share had become commuted to cash and accounts partly for the state 
of confusion arui \inrest there. The rate of commutation according to 
notification 84.65/4.9 of 29th October, 1953, was 3 times the assessment 
in respect to jirayat lands and 4 times the assessment of irrigated lands. 
In total the area subject to commutation, although exact figures are not 
available, is small relative to the area of the state. 
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plowing, tree-planting, water channel construction, and hedge-planting are 
other long-terra improvements of importance throughout Bombay state. 
Manure is an important input the advantage of which extends over more 
than a one year production period. A common rule of thumb esqjressed by 
m&ay cultivators was "one-half the benefit of mantire is expired in the 
first year and the other half during the succeeding two years". Practice 
of the sharing of manure costs varies from a completely tenant expense, 
to sharing, to a completely landlord eagsense. 
In Sanand taluka the landlord's contribution is confined 
to a share of the cost of viheat seed. • .In Prantij taluka and 
Modassa mahal of the same district, the landlord in many cases 
supplied manure, seed or a part of wages of the labotirers, or 
some or all of these items. . .in parts of Kaira district, the 
landlord paid the whole cost of manuring. . .In Matar and 
Mehmedabad taluka the landlord occasionally supplied manure. . 
The practice of sharing mstnurir^ costs in the same proportion that 
the crop is shared appears to be tincommon. Sharing more often takes the 
form of offsets, for example, if the landlord supplies manure he also 
shares in the boundary grass, fodder and wood and if the tenant supplies 
all the manure the landlord receives only a share of the crop.^ The 
possible deleterious effects on efficiency of such practices are indi­
cated in the second efficiency condition under factor payments in the 
introduction. 
As an intermediate length improvement, manuring is an example of an 
input the G3q>iration of which easily falls within the 10-year" minimum 
^Barmeda, QP,cit,. p, 148, 14.9• 
^A practice common in Borsad taluka. A* D, Patel, op.cit., p. 189. 
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lease period specified under section 5. For tenants-at-will who were 
subject to eviction more frequently than, say, every three years, the 
Tenancy Act would be an incentive to make increased inputs of fertilizer. 
Unless the tenant receives the whole return of his input in terms of 
its product over the entire period which the factor has an effect on the 
product, the tenant will apply less of the factor, either reverting his 
labor into leisixre and capital into consumption or transferring his 
labor and capital into alternative uses. 
From the standpoint of the importance of section 5 it is useful to 
divide the resources into groups according to their period of exhaustion 
relative to the lease period. The security of tenure provision is of 
relatively little importance for resources that are esdaausted in, say, 
a single crop period. On the other hand, security of tenxire may be very 
importsuit if the benefits of an investment eatbend over many years. In 
this respect, the tenant cultivator has two types of resources: 
1) Those expiring in the lease period, e.g., ploughing, plamting, 
and harvesting. 
2) Those extending over a period of years longer than the lease or 
expected tenancy life, e.g., bunding, terracing and other land 
improvements and other capital investments which cannot be 
readily transferred or reverted. 
Section 5, insofar as it actually does lengthen the lease period, 
will induce greater inputs of the tenants' labor ajxd capital into long-
term investments. Althotigh detailed information is not available, the 
first category appears to be more important from the standpoint of 
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non-cons'uinption expendit\ire of tenants than is the second category, 
especially if land improvements alone are considered. However, the second 
type of inputs are not insignificant and, what is more important, in the 
developnent of agriciolture, greater inputs of this type are needed for 
capital increases. 
A second featiare of section 5 is the renewal provision added by a 
1952 amendment. Since the perogative of self-cultivation is open to the 
landlord at the end of each ten years, the ordinary tenant experiences a 
wave~like security with a trough at the end of each lease period and A 
peak at the beginning. The qualifications to the automatic renewal |a?o-
vision, i.e., agreement between landlord and tenant and/or the landlord's 
personal cultivation, are of sufficient importance that they provide for 
an easy termination of the lease at the end of ten years. 
A third important feature of the security of the tenure provision is 
that the "protected" tenant is actually less protected than the "ordinary" 
tenant. Every ordinary tenant who pays his rent, does not misuse the land^ 
and so forth, is entitled to security of tenure for at least ten years. 
Because of the provisions of section 34, however, the "protected" tenant 
is liable to eviction on only one year's notice. The relative numbers of 
protected and ordinary tenants may be seen in Table 17. 
Uncertainty. The primary purpose of section 5 was the reduction of 
uncertainty arising out of tenancy termination. The problem of factor 
payments and incentive discussed above is, from the standpoint of security 
of tenure, a peirt of the process of discounting for \incertainty used by 
the tenant. Since eviction is at the discretion of the landlord, tmcer-
tainty is involved directly with decisions of the tenant only. Because 
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this is a tenancy act only it does not offset uncertainty due to 
' 
1) failure of natural elements such as rain or 2) changes in prices. 
These sources of uncertainty would have to be dealt with through other 
measures. 
The tenant will tend to discotmt the value productivity of his own 
resource inputs for iincertainty and will alter his decisions accordingly. 
In the use of the landlord's factor, land, the tenant will view the rent 
as a fixed share and will wish to expand the use of land to where its mar­
ginal value productivity reaches zero. The tenant realizes, however, that 
certain amounts and types of his inputs can forestall deterioration of the 
land factor over time (e.g., prevention of soil erosion) and therefore 
input in conservation becomes one of his possibilities in production. 
His level of inputs in soil conservation practices will be contingent 
upon his relative returns on soil conservation and other alternatives. 
The shorter the tenure expectancy of the tenant or the greater the uncer­
tainty of continuing on the land, the smaller will be the discounted mar­
ginal value productivity of his own resources in soil conservation or long-
term crops and the less will be his input. 
Soil erosion in parts of Bombay state is a serious problem parti­
cularly in the Deccan and the Konkan. For example, one source states a 
loss of 133 tons of soil per acre in a jowar field in the Deccan.^ 
^Chattirbhuj Mamoria. Problem of soil erosion with particular refer­
ence to India. Rural India. 13, no. 2s68-90. March 1950. p. 78. 
"Recent investigations have shown that in bare fallow fields in the foot­
hills of the Northern India (except properly levelled rice land) a single 
storai leads to loss of soil at the rate of l|- tons per acrej while in the 
Bombay Deccan there is a loss of 133 tons of soil per acre per year from 
a field of jowar. . .Such scouring is specially acute along the Himalayan 
(continued) 
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This erosion is in part due to short-term interest of the cultivator in 
bis land. To the extent that section 5 can reduce the discounting of the 
value productivity of tenant resources it will induce greater inputs by 
tenants in investment suid conservation practices. 
The discounted expected value of products which take longer periods 
to mature, e.g., mangoes, papaya, and plantains, will increase from their 
reduced uncertainty discount and their production would increase relative 
to products with short mat\aring periods, e.g., food grains and fibre crops. 
Reduced uncertainty from tenancy termination would also enhance the ten» 
ant's evaluation of rotational crops such as t\ir and gram. 
The size of the discount by a tenant woxild depend upon a number of 
factors—the individual's own propensity to bear risk, his capital posi­
tion, variability of prices and production, esspectations concerning ten­
ure period and alternative employments, and level of living. About the 
first factor, individual's risk aversion, which includes attitudes of 
morality about taking chances, very little can be said. 
The capital position of the typical Indian cultivator is very low.^ 
(Continued) foot-hills and sloping grovinds throughout Northern India, in 
parts of Madras, the Bombay Deccan, the other provinces including Central 
Provinces, Chhota Hagpur and Central India." 
iThe estimated capital of the tenant cultivators interviewed in 
Badlapur was about Rs. 1400. This capital typically consisted of bull­
ocks, a few cattle and/or buffalo, simple machinery and a cart. None of 
the farmers stated that they had savings and it is doubtful if their 
liquid assets in fact would much more than cover their liabilities. Even 
allowing for inflation since 1937-43 this figure appears very high when 
compared to Gadgil's Rs. 238 non-land investment in Wai talioka. D. R. 
Cladgil and V. R. Gadgil. A survey of farm business in Wai taluka. Poona, 
Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics. 1940. p. 58. 
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Liqiiid assets alKsve cnirrent liabilities upon which the cxiltivator coTold 
depend for financial reverses was very limited. 
Since Independence there has been a general upward trend in prices 
but prices of fai® crops were stabilized through government control. Rice, 
the final food grain to be decontrolled, was subject to free marKet vari­
ation for the first time in 1954- iFurthermore, the effects of price vari­
ability are somewhat slower in areas where much of the agriculture is on 
subsistence basis. More important is the uncertainty resultii:^ from yield 
variation in certain parts of the Bombay State, partic\alarly the famine 
tracts of the Deccan plateau and northern Gujarat. Rainfall is perhaps 
the most important factor although yield variability is also signifi­
cantly affected by locusts, rats and floods.^ 
. . ,it has been observed that the variability, i.e., departure 
of the rainfall in any year from the nomal, is proportional to 
the total rainfall. Places having very high rainfall eaqperience 
low variability and vice versa, failure of rain is practically 
unknown in Konkan and Sahyadries, but it is a frequent esqperience 
in other parts of Bombay Province. This is perhaps the greatest 
element of instability in the agriculture of the eastern and 
northern parts of Bombay Province.^ 
In the absence of detailed info3raiation it is difficult to make an 
appraisal of the relative importance of the various sources of income 
variability. In a low rainfall area such as Jaska where some evidences 
of long tenancies were found, the uncertainty due to tenancy termination 
would be relatively unimportant. In a village, say, of the Konkan area, 
^Ibid.. p» 133-140. 
^Bombay Bureau of Econ. and Stat., Atlas, op.cit.. p. 5. 
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where a high turnover of tenants was experienced (not Badlapvir), a re­
duction in tenant turnover woxald have greater relative importance. 
For the large number of cultivators whose level of living is at or 
near subsistence, uncertainty from any source will give rise to a high 
degree of disco\mt. In such cases a very high premium is placed on current 
consumption. Survival is the first requisite for the realization of the 
benefit of a long-run input. Barmeda states that . .after paying the 
half share and deducting the cost of cultivation hardly enough is left for 
the maintenance of the tenant family."^ The extent of tenancy itself was 
partly an indication of the increased debt inctirred by tenants. 
Recognizing the very limited area of uncertainty covered by section 
5, it is a meastire for reducing some of the lancertainty discount on ten­
ant inputs of long-term production maturity and as such will tend to in­
crease incentive and shift resources to slow maturing crops. Although 
the long-run effect of section 5 appears to be of increasing security of 
tenure, brief acknowledgement should be made of tenure changes made in 
anticipation of the Act. Official reference to such cases is uncommon 
but the following quotation from the Report of the Bombay Legislative 
Assembly Debates mentions the case of Baroda District.^ A member of the 
Legislative Assembly asked: 
1) Whether it is a fact that in some villages of 10 talukas 
of the former Baroda State, as also in some other parts 
of the districts Khatedsurs who were really not the cijlti-
vators of the agricultural lands dispossed their tenants 
and took possession of the land for personal cultivation in 
^Barmeda, op.cit.. p. 2^. 
^Bombay Legislative Assembly. Legislative Assembly debates, 
Official report. 17th August, 1949. 19, part 1:3-5. 194-9. p. 3. 
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anticipation of Government's intention to apply the Tenancy 
Act to these parts; 
2) If so, whether Government proposes to inquire about the 
niamber of such khatedars and the number of tenants so 
dispossessed} 
Government replied: "1) Yes" and 
2) It is reported that there were 18 cases in Baroda dis­
trict wherein landlords had taken possession of lands 
from their tenants for personal ctiltivation. It is, 
however, not known whether landlords' action was actu­
ated by the impending application of the Tenancy Act to 
the Baroda State territory. Government does not propose 
to take any action in the matter. It is for the aggrieved 
person to resort to the provisions of the Tenancy Act, if 
necessary and feasible. 
Cases of pre-Act evictions and shifting of tenants to prevent their 
establishment of "protected" tenant rights were encountered in Jaska and 
Madhbavi. Ordinary tenants, comprising l/4 to 1/5 of the tenants in Bom­
bay, most of whose 10 years of secrored tenure will teiroinate in 1958 and 
1959 might again encoxinter significant adjustments if landlords ^  masse 
begin to seek personal cultivation. Subterfuges, evasions, and landlord 
purchases of tenancies^ will decrease the effect of landlords' efforts 
to recover their land at the end of the 10 year period. 
Tenancy changes are also possible under the Act, i.e., the 10-year 
security of tenure provision is by no means absolute in light of other 
provisions: 
1) Under section 34- the landlord may terminate the tenancy of a 
protected tenant at any time with one year's notice. The 
^Nothing in section 5 precludes the landlord from inducing the ten­
ant with a valuable consideration, from voluntarily giving up his 
tenancy. 
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landlord, however, is restricted in further transfer in that he 
must use the land for 12 years for the purpose by which he was 
granted the right of repossession. 
2) Section 14 provides that any tenant may be evicted for failing to 
pay the rent, injuring the land, sub-divide, sub-let or use the 
land for a non-agriciiltural purpose. 
3) Volxmtary surrender of the tenimcy by the tenant is possible 
•under sub-section (3) of section 5. 
The extent and reasons for tenancy termination are shown in Table 11. 
This table probably understates tenancy transfer because it represents 
only the recorded transfers very few of which were indicated in the 
village records in Badlapur, Jaska and Madhbavi. The "lands taken under 
possession" on other grounds wovild include the reasons given under 
section lA. Lands taken under possession for personal cultivation is as 
yet small (about 1/5) since 10-year tenants had not yet come to the end 
of the first 10-year period. 
Immobility. Insofar as the tenant derives a vested interest in the 
land he cultivates through the action of the security of tenure provision, 
he will be deterred from transferring his resources to alternative uses. 
The ordinary tenant can remain for at least 10 years on the land provided 
he satisfies the limited conditions of section 14. Resource transfer is 
also restricted in the case of protected tenant in that the landlord has 
only two alternatives, i.e., allow the protected tenant to continue or 
\indertake personal ciiltivation for at least 12 years. 
Table 11, Tenants dispossessed under the Taiancy Acts of 1939 and 1943 and reasons for 
dispossession® 
District 
Total lands from 
vhich tenants were 
dispossessed^ 








by 10-year tenants 
(acres) (acres) (cercent) (acres) (percent) (acres) (percent) 
Banaskantha 244 27 23.4 0 0 187 76.6 
Sabarkantha 1,711 106 6.2 1,484 86.7 121 7.1 
Mdiasana 205 — 0 157 76.6 48 23.4 
ibureli 517 0 0 517 100.0 
Baroda 948 15 1.6 588 62.0 345 36.4 
Dangs — — — -— 
Shmedabad 16,100 8,273 51.4 4,201 26.1 >,626 22.5 
Kaira 3,849 776 20.2 1,688 43.8 1,385 36.0 
Fanch Kahals 1,378 229 16.6 759 55.1 390 28.3 
Broach 31,645 13,856 43.8 8,244 26.0 9,545 30.2 
Surat 27,612 16,223 58.8 1,501 5.4 9,888 35.8 
Thana 5,393 1,451 26.9 3,592 66.6 350 6,5 
B.S,D, 61 3 4.9 2 3.3 56 91.8 
i\hmednagar 18,839 2,259 12.0 1,955 10.4 14,625 77.6 
£, ^landesh 67,305 10,426 15.5 31,843 47.3 25,036 37.2 
^Original source did not separate dispossessions under the 1939 and 1948 Acts. Data for 
dispossessions since 1951 were not available. 
Table 11, (Continued) 
District 
Total lands from 
which tenants were 
dispossessed^. 
(acres) 










(acres) (percent) (acres) (percent) 
Nasik 14,855 4,539 30.5 3,189 21.5 7,127 48.0 
Poona 17,169 6,064 35.2 5,174 30,1 5,931 34.6 
Sholapur 81,002 20,524 25,3 19,688 24.3 40,790 50.4 
K. Satara 795 32.1 1,183 47.8 498 20.1 
Kolaba 5,142 456 8.9 4,263 82.9 423 8.2 
Belgaum 39,836 2,688 6.7 U,380 36.1 22,768 57.2 
Bijapur 82,759 9,082 11.0 54,321 65.6 19,356 23.4 
Dharwar 62,630 5,661 9.0 40,450 64.6 16,519 26,4 
Kanara 4,649 1,865 40.1 1,700 36.6 1,084 23.3 
Ratnagiri 1,568 446 28.4 779 49.7 343 21.9 
S, Satara 5,907 1,404 23.8 621 10.5 3,882 65.7 
Kohapur 1,587 3 2 263 16,6 1,321 83.2 
Total Bombay 513,541 111,360 21.7 205,890 40.1 196,291 38.2 
Source: Bombay Legislative Assembly. Legislative Assembly debates, official report. 
14 March, 1951. I8sl542, 1543. 1951. p. 1542, 1543. 
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The provisos of section 34 place fiorther restrictions on the ability 
of maxxy landlords to terminate the tenancy of a protected tenant, viz.^ the 
landlord cannot terminate the tenancy if: 
1) the landlord is ciiltivating more than fifty acres personally at 
the time of application 
2) the tenant is a member of a cooperative farming society 
3) unless the cultivation of the land will be the main source of 
income to the landlord. 
The landlord may teiminate the tenancy on the whole of the land of 
the protected tenant if the area is less than or equal to one "agricxil-
tural holding"^ or, if it is more than one agricultiiral holding, will 
leave the tenant with one-half the area. The resulting cultivating units 
must be in accordance also with the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation 
and Consolidation of Holdings Act. Tennination of tenancy even of pro­
tected tenants is more difficult to accomplish legally than merely giving 
one year's notice# 
If the landlord ceases to use the land for the purpose which he 
stated in order to assume personal use, the landlord must restore 
possession to the tenant and pay compensation. The landlord must use the 
property for the purpose stated in the notice. For example, if he assiames 
the land for the purpose of self-cultivation he may not build a house on 
it»2 This was a change from the Bombay Tenancy Act of 1939 which per­
mitted the use of land for any piirpose mentioned in the section. 
^"Agric\ilt\iral holding" as of January, 1954» was 16 acres of jirayat 
(dry) land or 4- acres of paddy land. 
^Bom» 67 of 1948, sec. 37. 
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From the standpoint of resource transfer, section 5 will tend to have 
a detrimental effect on efficiency by holding factors in less than their 
highest use.^ Concerning the mobility of resources, Jacoby said: 
Though security of tenancy has esctremely favorable effects 
on agricultural development it may also have the less desirable 
consequences of keeping an inefficient farmer on the land ty 
eliminating the normal competition between farmers. A tenancy 
law which does not recognize this wotild abuse the concept of 
security of tenure and actually reward the mismanagement of 
land.^ 
It appears that competition between tenants (if that is what Jacoby 
meant by farmers) is not the only necessary condition for efficiency. 
Efficiency from the standpoint of a farmer appears to be best defined in 
terms of maximum retxirn to his inputs and this being the case makes it 
quite possible for the farmer to employ his resovirces efficiently (from 
his own viewpoint) and not contribute optimally to agricultioral develop­
ment, or efficiency from a social standpoint. 
By interpreting him liberally, however, Jacoby does indicate a 
realistic observation concerning the mobility of tenant resoiirces. 
^In an enquiry into the working of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act of 
1950, Iyengar states: "The act ignores cases of marginal and sub-
marginal tenants who might not care to stay on the land, and this is the 
cause of the anomolous predicament of tenants leaving while the law in­
tends their staying." 3. K. Iyengar. An enquiry into the conditions of 
the tensmtry in the agrarian economy of Hyderabad with special reference 
to the I^derabad Tenancy and Agriculttxral Lands Act of 1950, Hyderabad, 
Hyderabad Economic Association. 1952. p. 30. 
^Erick Jacoby. Interrelationship between agrarian reform and agri-
c\Alt\iral development. Rome, United Nations Food and Agricultural Organ­
ization. 1953. p. 35. 
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Capital accixmulation. Section 5 in reducing one of the sotirces of 
uncertainty would tend to induce an increase in the discounted retvirn ex­
pected by the tenant for inputs of his capital, A resultant increase in 
the marginal efficiency of his capital, other things being equal, will 
res\alt in the transfer of surpluses over costs into capital investment 
rather than idle balances or consumption. 
The landlord with reduced ability to change tenants, on the other 
hand, will find the marginal efficiency of his capital reduced and will 
tend to retract capital from his tenanted land and divert it to alter­
native uses, one use being consumption. The net effect on capital accxjm-
mulation will depend, in part, upon the relative importance of the change 
in the propensities to invest of the landlord and tenant. 
The other important factor will be the change in the size of the 
total product. If section 5 effects an increase in net retiirn over costs 
there will be an increase in capital even though the propensities to in­
vest remain the same. 
Innovation. From the standpoint of the tenant, section 5 may be 
considered, in Lange's sense^ an innovation in itself. For any given in­
put of factor in the present,'the discounted expected futxire return is in-
crefiised because of the reduction in uncertainty due to tenancy termination. 
Section 5 is also important from the point of view of its effect on 
the adoption of new techniques with long term maturity. If tenants are 
better able to realize the benefits of a new technique it will encotirage 
^scar Lange. A note on innovations. Rev. of Econ. Stat. 25, no. 
1:19-25. 19A3* 
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its adoption. Innovations which produce immediate savings in factors 
and/or an increase in output wo\ild be little affected by section 5. 
Most inventions which cixrrently may become innovations in India, are 
either transferable or matxire in a short period. These consist prin­
cipally of: steel plows and other small machinery, fertilizer, insecti­
cides, crop varieties, improved livestock, and new ciiltural techniques 
such as Japanese paddy cultivation. Still, uncertainty limits the 
acceptance of the innovations necessary for economic growth. 
The habituated, almost ritualistic, production process is subject to 
strong social pressures and a fear of the consequences of failure. One 
of the obstacles to the acceptance of an innovation is group conservatism 
fostered by the village.^  The psychological interdependence of the cul-' 
tivators living together in the village has resulted in the conservative 
tendencies. It has been observed thats 
The story of peasant commiinities. . .is one of the in­
grained conservatism and devotion to the soil to which they 
were vtmbilical. With the religious traditions more deeply 
woven into the texture of their lives than elsewhere, it is 
no surprise that the Indian peassmts have presejrved the ways 
of life formed early in the history of ancient communities.2 
If the secxarity of teniare section reduces the vincertainty involved 
in inputs for innovations which yield benefits over a long period, some 
of the reluctance to accept new techniques may be offset. However, the 
adoption ty cultivators of the new developments in agricultural pro­
duction will also require flexibility in the tentare system. 
B. Nanavati. Fields vs. farms. Indian Jour, of Agr. Econ. 8, 
no. 2i 11-18. Aug. 1953. 
^Unchanging agriculture. Eastern Economist, op.cit.. p. 1017, 
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Rent regulation 
Factor payments. In the introduction of this chapter it was indi­
cated that one of the principal incentives for factors to be induced into 
a particxilar use is the payment to the factor for its services. To the 
extent that the rent regulation fails to induce or allow optimum combin­
ations of factors, products will be produced at excessive cost. If, for 
example, the Tenancy Act creates a return to labor greater than is 
necessary to induce the minimum supply of labor into a particular pro­
duction, given output and supply of other factors, then an excess labor 
will flow into (or stay in) the firms that secure the advantage of legis­
lation. If, on the other hand, the rent maximum set by government repre­
sents a closer approximation to the marginal productivity of landlord and 
tenant resovirces, then an increase in efficiency will result. 
Accurate information as to the actual rents paid in Bombay State is 
not available, much less, data on the marginal productivities of the 
various factors. Fragmentary information seems to indicate that rents be­
fore the Tenancy Act ranged from 1/4- to 3/4- share of the crop with the 
1/2 share predominating in most of the state. The Bombay Statistical 
Atlas states that • "Crop share rents prevail over the greater part of the 
Bombay Province, and the usual proportion i s half t o h alfReferring 
to the Konkan area in which he made a study of Tenancy, Hate found that} 
"Yield or money value of the crop is shared equally between the two, the 
landlord and the tenant."^ And about some areas in the Gujarat Barmeda 
^Bombay Bureau of Econ. and Stat., op.cit.. p. 59. 
%ate, op.cit.. p. 269. 
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said; "The orop share varies from 1/-4 to 3/4 of the produce the inter­
mediate fractions being 1/3, 2/5, 1/2, 3/5 and 2/3• The most usual pro­
portion of share rent is half-share or Adh-Baag, as it is knovm in the 
Gujarat."^ 
The limited field investigation in the three villages for this study-
supports the foregoing. The actual rent paid is subject to many varia­
tions mainly through the division of expenses and extra services. Thus 
the reduction of rents of l/3 which may be implied from the above (l/2 
market rate to 1/6 legal rate) would have to be qualified by the corres­
ponding shifts in the payments of costs where landlords bear less after 
the passage of the Act, In the case of share leases, resident landlords 
customarily contributed part of the manure and half of the seed. In the 
fixed payment lease less of the expenses were borne by landlord and there 
is some evidence that the Act has had the effect of drying up these con­
tributions also,^ 
^Barmeda, op.cit.. p. 150. 
p 
In Jaska before the Act, expenses were shared on a 50-50 basis or 
out of the common heap. Under the present system the tenant bears all 
expenses including the costs of land improvements. The tenant supplies 
all manure. As the rent level declined, some landlords continued to make 
proportionate shsures in the expenses but ceased to participate in the costs 
after the rent level fell below 1/3. 
Landlord participation in expenses in Badlapur was uncommon and 
after the passage of the Act there was no indication of the landlord's 
participation in the costs of production at all. Badlapior, however, was, 
as far as the enquiry coxxld detennine, wholly of fixed-payment type of 
tenancy^ 
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In general, it appears that the rental rate would be higher in the 
absence of the regvilation provision. In some areas, also, there is con­
scious evasion of the section 6 maximum. These evasions are usually 
supported by tenants' ideas of "fairness" or fear that a press for low­
ered rent might yield retaliation from the landlord.^ 
The rent regtilation provision sets a legal maximum under which land­
lord and tenant are free to adjust the payment to their respective 
factors. The payment (whether in the form of a share, in kind, or cash) 
is limited to 1/6 of the total product for the landlord factors. This 
maximum is absolute at 1/6, i.e., irrespective of the level of capital 
that might become attached to the land. If bare, unimproved land were 
capable of securing a rent of 1/6 of the crop, inputs by the landlord for 
improvement could receive no return under the rent regulation provisions. 
If the government has set the rental rate too low there will be a 
tendency for landlords to withdraw factors and for tenants to increase 
factor inputs in their firms. Assuming that tenants are responsible for 
inputs of labor and capital and landlords for land and capital, what are 
the possible consequences? 
A laborer's time may be used for leisure or a nximber of alternative 
productive uses. An enhancement of the return to labor will tend to 
^In Madhbavi there appeared to be very little change made in the 
terms of the lease as a resxilt of the Act. Rents from l/3 to 2/3 and 
various expense-sharing arrangements were substantially the same as be­
fore the passage of the Act. 
Section 12, sub-section 5, permits enhancement of the rent for im­
provement through the calculation of "reasonable rent" \mder section 7. 
However, such "reasonable rents" are always subject to the 1/6 maximum. 
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draw the labor out of leisure and out of alternative employments. Re­
allocation within the firms might come about through increased inputs into 
labor-intensive crops. The effects here would vary with the type of agri­
culture. For example, in the rice tract of the Konkan, there are no very 
important substitutes for rice as a kharif crop, at least in terms of 
being more labor-intensive. The rabi crops, e.g., ragi or jowar, are 
roughly comparable in the nature of their factor combinations. In this 
area, therefore, the proportions of different crops would probably change 
little. In another area, however, some effect may be made on the crop 
pattern. For example, in the Deccan and Gujarat, cotton and wheat are 
substitutes in production. Cotton being the more labor-intensive of the 
two crops, it would tend to be favored if the return to labor were in­
creased relative to that of land. 
It can be expected that the Tenancy Act would tend to induce the 
tenant to devote less time to leisure and/or to make relatively greater 
labor input on leased lands and less on ovmed lands than before the im­
position of the rent maximum because the returns to factors applied to 
rented land are increased relative to owned lands. 
Figure 6 indicated the natiore of inefficiencies resulting from two 
industries allocating their resotirces on the basis of different price 
ratios. If government specifies a new price ratio such as ^ a^a which 
yields relatively higher prices for labor in agriculture than in other 
industries, there will tend to be a stirplus of labor in agriculture. In 
moving the crop share from 1/2 to 5/6 it appears that the rent regulation 
will have a tendency to induce labor to move into agriculture rather than 
into non-agricxiltural industries. 
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The effect on the land factor would depend upon the extent to which 
land is being used for consiunption purposes. Unless land has some direct 
utility to the owner, any payment at all will bring it out of idleness. 
Once the land is in productive use it will tend to move where its pro­
ductivity is the highest, i.e., to the production of the crop 1/6 of which 
yields the highest return. The full marginal product of land need not be 
paid to it but if there are areas nearby where the "wage" of land is its 
marginal product, then there will be a tendency to induce labor to flow 
into the area where the rent control is in effect, i.e., where there is a 
transfer of the "wage" of land to the wage of labor. 
It should be noted that "crop" and not "total yield" was substituted 
at the time the Bill was before the assembly. Gupte, in his legal 
commentary, points out that: "Landlords are not allowed to demand a third 
share in the subsidiary minor crops grown such as vegetables, grass, etc."^ 
A possible consequence of the definition of "crop" may be a tendency for 
tenants to shift more of their resources into minor crops because the 
relative payment for minor crops is greater than that for principal 
crops. 
The rent limitation of the Tenancy Act will have a tendency to in­
duce landlords to cultivate personally^ thus collecting full value of 
%. S. Gupte. Bombay tenancy and agriciiltural lands act. 3rd ed. 
Poona, K. S. Gupte. 1954.. p. 64. 
^Bom..67 of 1948, sec. 2 reads as follows; "To cultivate person­
ally" means to ciiltivate on one' s own account 
i) by one's own labour, or 
ii) by the labour of any mOTiber of one's family, or 
iii) by servants on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop 
share or by hired labour under one's personal supervision on 
the personal supervision of any member of one's family. 
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"implicit" rent. "It seems that this measure /section 6, Bombay Tenancy 
AcJ^ has been adapted to make ovmership of land by absentee landlords as 
uneconomic or xanattractive, and possibly to make the change-over of owner­
ship to tenants as easy, as possible®"^ 
At the same time, tenants will have less inclination to hold land if 
they receive part of the return to land without the need for investment 
or payments of costs of ownership such as taxes. Insofar as land prices 
become reduced because of low rentals and government land price determin­
ation such a reluctance may be offset. 
Uncertainty. To the extent that the Tenancy Act reduced the xincer-
tainty due to changes in the rents and thus increased the value of the 
discounted return to the tenant's factors, tenants might be inclined to 
make greater inputs of labor and capital. If, on the other hand, rents 
were sticky, section 6 will make little effect on -uncertainty. The latter 
appears to be the case in -some regions of Bombay, at leasts. Hate stated 
that ". . .rents are after all customary and conventional",2 and Barmeda 
said: "Ordinarily the predo3ninant share in a village or the particiilar 
share in a survey number remains constant over a long period of years, 
due to custom."^ 
Although tenants were commonly tenants-at-will by virtue of the fre­
quency of one year oral contracts and consequently subject to the 
D. Patel. Indian land problem and legislation. Bombay, N, M. 
Tripathi Ltd. 1954- P* 266. r^ackets ovn^  
Hate, op.cit.. p. 267. 
^Barmeda, op.cit.. p. 152. 
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uncertainty of tenancy termination, it appears that terms of leases were 
highly conventionalized within each village. This was one of the featiares 
of the tenancy arrangements noted in the inquiries made at the villages of 
Jaska, Badlapur, and ftedhbavi. 
The rent regulation provision does not deal with a primary source 
of uncertainty to the tenant, production variability. Inasmuch as rent 
levels tended to remain relatively constant, the effect of section 6 is 
probably unimportant from the standpoint of the discoiint for uncertainty. 
If the rent regulation provision so enlarges the income of the ten­
ant that he is more i/illing to bear uncertainty, the tenant may alter his 
production plans. One of the consequences might be less flexibility in 
the firm and greater specialization. 
Immobility. Common causes of immobility are lack of opportunity (no 
alternatives to which to move), xincertainty, transfer costs, and certain 
sociological barriers. 
The effect upon mobility of section 6 will depend upon a balance of 
forces. The increase of payment to tenant reso\arces of labor and capital 
will tend to "hold these factors in agriculture. At the same time the in­
creased income might provide the needed means with which to effect a move. 
If opportxinities in the non-agricultural industries more than offset the 
increased return in agricultvire some labor may be encouraged to move.l 
Capital in its liquid form has little transfer cost. In the real asset 
form of bxillocks or plows, capital is largely nontransferable to 
industrial uses. 
lln no case, however, could this movement completely offset the basic 
misallocation of resources caused by incorrect factor pricing. 
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The existence of alternative opportunities outside of agriculture or 
uncertainty connected with such outside opportunities is mainly a function 
of policies other than the Tenancy Act. The net effect of the rent regu­
lation provision upon the movement of tenants' factors, particularly 
labor, into non-agricult\iral pursuits appears to be negative. In a prac­
tical sense the movement of land into industry does not arise. Landlords' 
capital will be encouraged to move out of agricult\ire because of its re­
duced return. 
Sociological barriers such as kinship ties tend to reinforce the 
immobility of labor. Preferences for working either in particular loca­
tion or in a particular occupation affect the individual's reaction to 
market prices for his services. New factor combinations are sometimes 
withheld for fear of social reaction in the community. Examples of the 
latter might be the destruction and controlled breeding of cattle, or the 
introduction of a new crop. 
Capital accumulation. Reliable income statistics are not available 
in a form which would give an indication of capital accumulation from 
households and firms. In a large part of the Indian economy, however, 
negative savings exist. One source reported a monthly es^enditure in 
Bombay (for food, fuel and light, rent, clothing, and miscellaneous house­
hold expenses) of approximately Rs. 156 per year per adult equivalent for 
tenants in rxiral areas.^ Another soiirce indicated that the value of 
A. Telang. A report on the siirvey of employment, income and ex­
penditure» Bull, of Bur. of Econ. and Stat. 6, no. 3:1-26. January, 
1953. p. 15, 16. Figure for "cultivators of land wholly or mainly un-
ovmed" • 
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production in agricultxire in western India was approximately Rs. 103 per 
person.1 If these figures are comparable it would mean that either there 
is a net transfer of income from the non-agricultixral sector to agricul­
ture of Rs« 53 or that agriculture is consuming its capital,^ 
The rent regulation provision, to the extent that it is enforced, 
will tend to transfer income from landlords to tenants. Whether a net 
capital acctjmulation will resiolt will depend upon the relative propen­
sities to consume and invest of landlords and tenants. In general, a re­
duction in rent can be eaqjected to drive landlords' capital away from land 
improvements and, if alternative investments are not available, into con­
sumption. Tenants, upon receiving a larger share are in a position to 
enlarge their savings. Such savings could be used for productive assets. 
The most universal opinion is that a substantial portion of the landlords 
did not contrilaite greatly to laM improvements so the Tenancy Act would 
not affect this form of capital acc\mulation. 
In Gujarat and for that matter in India. . .it is vincommon for 
a landlord to invest his capital either for long-term or short-
term improvements. Hor is he fotind to supply stock or implements,^ 
Among the mass of peasants whose yearly indome does not exceed, say, Rs. 
200 per year and whose expenditure on food runs over 75 percent of their 
budget^ it can probably be asstaned that the propensity to consme is 
^India Ministry of Finance. General report on the nationaO. sample 
survey. New Delhi, Ministry of Finance. 1952. p. xxxviii. 
2lt is interesting to note that Gadgil in a survey of fann business 
in 21 villages of Wai taluka in 1937-38 that net profits averaged minus 
Rsa 99. Gadgil, op.cit.. p. 89. 
^Barmeda, op.cit., p. 147. 
^elai^, op.cit,, p. 15o 
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relatively high. If these conditions exist then the Tenancy Act would 
largely transfer consumption from landlords to the tenants and woiald not 
increase capital accumulation. 
Innovation. The introduction of new techniques usually requires new 
combinations of factors. If a new technique requires an increase in cap­
ital it is possible that section 6, for the reasons above, could frus­
trate an innovation.1 The effect of section 6 appears to depend upon 
whether the innovation is factor-saving or output-increasing in the Lange 
terminology and, perhaps more important, the requirements of a closely 
limited factor such as capital. 
If the innovation is labor-using and output increasing# increased 
payment to labor may be consistent with a new equilibrixim of labor-using 
enterprises. An example of such an innovation might be the Japanese 
method of paddy cultivation whi6h requires greater amounts of labor in 
weeding and fertilization than the indigenous method. If tiie innovation 
is land-using and output increasing, increased payment to labor may be in­
consistent with a new equilibrium of land-using enterprises. 
A high return to tenant factors may induce t^aants to undertake new 
methods if they feesl that the innovation might increase profit and they 
do not offset the expected increase in profit with a greater discount for 
uncertainty. The value to the tenant of the maintenance of a habit or 
^An example of sui innovation which would require no greater outlay of 
inputs would be utilization of grass, leaves and manure for compost rather 
than burning as "rab". Rab-burning consists of gathering field and forest 
materials during the winter months and burning the materials in the svin-
hardened fields. Long before cultivation of the field, the ash either 
blows away, or if any remains, is washed away by the monsoon. The result 
is an expendittire of large amounts of labor and raw material for no in­
crease in yield. 
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custom must also be considered in terms of how much of money income he 
may be willing to forego. 
Prohibition of 8ub»division and sub-letting 
One of the principal land problems in the Bombay State is that of 
small, fragmented cultivating tmits. Although the amelioration of this 
problem is mainly the task of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and 
Consolidation of Holdings Act of 1947> the Tenancy Act places a prohibi­
tion on tenants with respect to sub-letting, sub-division and assignment. 
Section 27 states that ^ ub-division, sub-letting or assignment by the ten­
ant of his interest is not valid and is groiwids for termination of the 
tenancy. 
Exact information as to tenant-operated units of fragmented land is 
not available. Some indication of one source of tenaanted land is that in 
the holdings of widows, government servants, teachers, and minors. Most 
of this land is cultivated by tenants. The number of plots of less than 
1 acre of bagait (bagayat or garden) and plots less than 3 acres of 
jirayat (dry) land^ are given in Table 12. In some districts, for example, 
Surat, Broach and Satara, widows, government servants, teachers, and 
minors, account for a substantial amoimt of small units percentagewise 
as well as in absolute terms. Indirectly, this would tend to indicate a 
^Patel, Indian land problem, op.cit., p. 232. The Bombay Government 
in calculating a "standard area"} below which is a fragment, uses the 
following areas: 
1) for bagayat land, 5 gunthas to 1 acre 
2) for ^irayat land, 1 to 4 acres 
3) for kyari (paddy) land, 1 guntha to 1 acre 
4) for warkas (grass) land, 2 to 6 acres. 
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Table 12, Plots of bagayat land xmder 1 acre and dryland xmder 3 acres 




















1. Kaira ... 240,838 14.0 86,0 
2. Panch Mahals 28 0 100 71,349 15.3 84.7 
3. Broach 10 33.3 66.7 209,150 11,4 88.6 
4.. Surat 6,926 40.0 60.0 228,844 13.2 86.8 
5. Thana 20,594 18.5 81.5 15,012 20.0 80.0 
6. B»S»D« 124 9.7 90.3 
7. Ahmednagar 78,700 12.6 87.4 237,272 10.1 89.9 
8. East Kandesh 13,759 9.5 90.5 151,750 11,4 88,6 
9. West Kandesh 33,725 29.9 70.1 32,416 6,9 93.1 
10. Nasik 93,126 10.6 89.4 173,027 12.2 87.8 
11. Poona 140,941 18.8 81.2 464,006 15.8 84.2 
12. Satara 176,151 30.2 69.8 712,388 25.1 74.9 
13. Sholapur 38,248 24.8 75.2 73,456 18.6 81.4 
14. Belgaum 25,711 8.8 91.2 248,672 13.2 86,8 
15. Dharwar 5,776 10.5 89.5 128,250 14.1 85.9 
l6. Kanara 63,630 18.9 81.1 75,076 17.4 82,6 
17. Kolaba 5,352 14.0 86.0 359,800 10.7 89.3 
18, Ahmedabad® 610 — 109,040 — 
19. Bijapur® 1,240 45,018 
20. Ratnagiri® 45,333 mmmmrnm 282,555 mmmmrnm 
®-Bombay Legislative Assembly, Legislative Assembly debates, official 
report. 10 September, 194B. 13:37. 19^8. p. 37. 
bagayat land is garden land. See glossary. 
^Included in Glass I ovmers are widows, government servants, 
teachers and minors. 




small iinit problem in tenant-operated land. Further indication of small 
holding and fragmentation in Bombay is given in Table 4? but these figures 
draw no distinction as to the relative size of owner-operated as against 
tenant-operated holdings or plots. However, as Patel has said, . .the 
phenomenon of fragmentation is not associated with any partic\ilar form of 
land tenure or ownership. . .It is found in areas of tenant farming and in 
those where the proprietor works his own land«"^ Tenant operation of 
small cultivating units appears to be at least of sufficient importance 
to deal with section 27. 
From the standpoint of production there appears to be at least two 
direct advantages to Consolidation, 1) the elimination of boundary bunds 
and other plot demarcations which occupy land that might be available for 
production,^ and 2) the prevention of fragmentation into scattered plots 
which require additional outlays for transportation from one plot to an­
other, A third and no less important factor is that some units of re­
sources such as laborers and bullocks are imperfectly divisible. The 
imperfectly divisible factors give rise to the phenomenon of increasing 
returns to scale. In the case of very small cultivating units if one 
cultivator faming 1 guntha with a pair of bullocks and plow combines with 
his neighbor who operates with equal quantities of factors and their total 
^Ibid.. p. 231. 
%or example bunds 1 yard in width which divide a 1 acre field into 
4-0 single guntha plots would occupy over 6 g\inthas or approximately l/7 
of the area. 
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product is greater than the sum of the two operating individually, in­
creasing returns to scale appear to exist. Much of the hoped-for increases 
in production stem from this scale characteristic. 
Sut)-letting and assignment as specified in section 27 do not 
necessarily involve sub-division but may if the land is sub-let or 
assigned to more than one party. Sub-division, however, refers directly 
to the creation of small units. Such sub-division by a living tenant is 
forbidden. At least 2 qualifications place important limitations on the 
effectiveness of section 27, i.e., 1) this section does not affect the 
rights of permanent tenants and 2) the heirs of a tenant may partition 
and sub-divide the land subject only to the minimum acreage requirements 
set hy the state government. AlthoiJ^h section 27 will have the effect of 
slowing down the rate of sub-division, its qualifications render it in­
operative in reversing the trend* 
Factor payments \mder factor limitations. The criterion of effi­
ciency when resource allocations are subject to factor limitations was 
stated in the introduction as an employment of the resource wherever the 
net addition to total product was greatest. That is, when a gap remains 
between MVP and MC (e.g., at some point such as X2 between MVP and MC in 
Figure 4) because the amoimt of available factor (OXg) is exhausted, re­
sources will be moved into the uses where the gap between MVP and MC is 
largest. This gives the criterion of efficiency when the factor limita­
tion condition exists but the implication is that a gap between MVP and 
MC still remains, i.e., that the employment of greater amounts of the 
resovurce could result in an addition to the total product. 
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Consolidation (or conversely, prevention of fragmentation) thus could 
have the effect of making a greater quantity of resovirces available for 
production, e.g., shifting resources out of extra boundary bunds (waste) 
into paddy production. Consolidation might also have an effect of 
chemging the resource productivities through the "scale effect" referred 
to above. 
Section 27 appears not to be directed at changing the relative 
shares of income to the landlord and tenant factors but rather as a 
deterrent to less productive factor combinations. If, in the sense above, 
greater output results from greatet use of land for productive purposes 
rather than in waste such as borderlat^ds and from greater use of labor 
and capital in productive use rather then in transportation, then the pre­
vention of fragmentation can be an improvement in efficiency, i.e., a 
greater product is produced with the same resources. 
Since section 27 deals only with the prevention of fragmentation and 
not consolidation of already sub-divided or fragmented plots, this pro­
vision is an "improvement" in the sense that it lessens a tendency toward 
inefficiency. 
Capital accwulation. If the improvements in production efficiency 
discussed above create additional product and unless the marginal propen­
sity to consume of the receivers of the increased income is 1, there will 
be a surplus available for capital and the net effect of section 27 will 
be a tendency to increase the supply of capital. 
The productivity of the capital applied to larger, contiguous units 
may also increase so that the total product from a given quantity of 
capital is greater. This greater return is another source of income 
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available for capital. The greater product from the same quantities of 
land and capital, if no increase in labor is made, has the effect of an 
innovation. 
Innovation* The ability to effect certain forms of innovation may 
be improved by larger cultivating units. Particularly in the dry land 
tracts of the Deccan and the Gujarat, tractors, and other forms of mech­
anization, could be employed with increased plot size. 
Consolidation in itself is perhaps best viewed as an innovation from 
the standpoint of, say, a cultivator or a village. Although there may be 
no increase in the total labor, capital, and land employed, the new 
method of applying the labor and capital creates a larger product. 
Section 27 has a favorable effect on innovations in the reverse 
sense of preventing further sub-division and fragmentation of present 
land or land that may be consolidated in the future,^ 
State management 
Government may assxime management of an estate because of neglect by 
the landholder, dispute between the landlord and the tenant or, whenever 
it appears necessary to the government for the full and efficient use of 
the land,^ When state management is declared all legal processes are 
suspended, no sixit can be brought in a civil court against the estate, 
and the holder of the estate is debarred from making any leases, contracts 
^Bombay hopes to complete its consolidation progreoa in about 15 years. 
Bombay Directorate of Publicity. Bombay marches on, egrarian reforms, 
Bombay, Government Central Press. 1951. p. 20. Also sees Bombay Direc­
torate of Publicity, Five-Year Plan for Bombay State, Bombay, Government 
Central Press. 1953. p. 87-39. 
^Bom* 67 of 1948, sec. 4^^, 
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Table 12. Plots of bagayat leind vinder 1 acre and dryland under 3 acres 









owned by of dry 







1. Kaira 240,838 14.0 86.0 
Panch I>lahals 28 0 100 71,349 15.3 84.7 
3. Broach 10 33.3 66.7 209 A50 11.4 88.6 
4. Surat 6,926 40.0 60,0 228,844 13.2 86.8 
5. Thana 20,594 18.5 81.5 15,012 20.0 80.0 
6. B.S.D. 124 9.7 90.3 
7. AJmednagar 78,700 12.6 87.4 231y212 10.1 89.9 
8. East Keindesh 13,759 9.5 90,5 151,750 11.4 88.6 
9. West Kandesh 33,725 29.9 70.1 32,416 6.9 93 a 
10. Nasik 93,126 10.6 89.4 173,027 12.2 87.8 
11, Poona 140,941 18.8 81.2 464,006 15.8 84.2 
12. Satara 176,151 30.2 69 712,388 25.1 74.9 
13. Sholapur 38,248 24.8 75.2 73,456 18.6 81.4 
u. Felgaum 25,711 8.8 91.2 2JS,h'72 13.2 86.8 
13* Dharwar 5^776 10.5 89.5 128,250 14.1 85.9 
16 »• Kanara 63,630 18.9 81.1 75,076 17.4 82.6 
17. Kolaba 5,352 U.O 86.0 359,800 10.7 89.3 
18. Ahmedabad® 610 109,040 ..— 
19. Bijapur® 1,240 45,018 
20. Ratnagiri® 45,333 —— 282,555 ——-
^Bcanbay Legislative Assembly, Legislative Assembly debates, official 
report. 10 September, 19-48. 13:37. 194-8• p. 37. 
^Bagayat land is garden land. See glossary. 
cincluded in Class I owners are widows, government servants, 
teachers and minors. 




Table 13. Estates taken over by government xinder section LMr 
to January, 1954 
Number of estates taken Nimber of estates 
over by government assximed due to 
District® Taken over Terminated Final disputes between 
total landlord-tenant 
1. Banaskantha a 1 7 0 
2. Sabarkantha 2$ 0 25 1 
3. Amreli 3 0 3 1 
4. Baroda 6 1 5 4 
5. Ahmedabad 8 1 7 2 
6. Kaira 1 0 1 0 
7. Broach® 2 0 2 0 
8. Thana 5 0 5 3 
9. Kolaba 5 1 4 1 
10. Belgaiun 3 0 3 3 
11. Bijapur 1 0 1 1 
12. Dharwar 1 1 0 1 
Total 68 5 63 17 
Adapted froms Bombay Revenue Department. Estates taken over by 
government, 1953. ^imeo reporj^ and Revenue Department files to 13 
January, 1954. These data may not be used without express permission of 
the Bombay Government. 
districts not listed had no state-managed estates. 
°Not included in the suimnary but found in files. 
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Table 14.. Fallow lands in 194-3 and 194-9 due to disputes, and lands 
asstuned for management by government under sections 44-
and 65 of the Bombay Tenancy Act as of March, 1951®-
Land fallow Land fallow Land assumed Land assiamed 
as result of as result of for manage­ for manage­
disputes in disputes in ment tinder ment under 
District 19AB^ 1949^ section 65 section 44 
to 1951 to 1951 
(acres) (acres) (acres) (acres) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5^ 
Banaskantha 366 366 366 26,727 
Sabarkantha 10 ... 81,142 
Mehsana ... 
Amreli ... 24,469 
Baroda 160 —— —- 1,869 
Dangs ... ... 
Ahmedabad 70 50 1,000 47,706 
Kaira 5 ... 5 697 
Pach Mahals 7 4 43 ... 
Broach -— 2,112 
Surat ... 281 
Thana 105 105 31 9,457 
B.S.D. ... ... 
Ahmednagar 5,573 3>678 4,164 
E. Khandesh 343 348 24,586 ... 
W, Khandesh 2,098 368 11,011 ... 
Nasik 652 980 122 
Poena 3,4.85 2,433 328 
Sholapur ... 1,997 
N. Satara 214- 206 136 ... 
Kolaba 2,091 877 71 4,108 
BelgaTom 2,902 2,688 145 1,905 
Bijapur 24 24 140 4,413 
Dharwar 22 22 ... — 
Kanara 42 42 35 ... 
Ratnagiri 83 2 ... 
S. Satara 78 78 130 ... 
Kolhapur 26 34 22 — 
^-Bombay Legislative Assembly, Debates, 1S;1542, 1543, op.cit., p.1543. 
^Information on fallow lands since 194-9 was not available. Where 
column (4.) exceeds colxann (3), land has been fallow since 194-9 and where 
colxxran (3) exceeSls colxamn (4-), all the fallow laiid had not been assumed 
by government. 
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or mortgages and from accepting rents or profits. The manager receives 
all the rents and collects revenue due to the government. The manager 
pays aU expenses of management and repairs, pays the rent, the costs of 
certain necessary improvements, and an allowance for the maintenance of 
the holder as determined by the collector. The manager has the power to 
rank and fix interests on 1 labilities, and to dispossess a mortgagee in 
possession. After the manager has liquidated the liabilities of the 
estate, he may sell or grant on lease all or any part of the estate. 
Sections 44 and 65 providing for state management will be dealt with 
briefly because they have been exercised to a very limited extent up to 
the present. Only 63 estates, 25 of which are in a backward area of 
Sabarkantha district, were under government management up to 1954» The 
distribution of managed estates by districts is given in Table 13. 
The determination of ^ fiall and efficient use" of the land is left to 
administrative discretion. In determining f\ill and efficient use, Tarey 
says? 
Ho strict proof is necessary. The ^ tat^ government 
can act on the report submitted to it by the revenue author-
ities^. . .The notification of assxjmption is conclusive: No 
appeal or revision lies against the order of assuming the 
management,2 
In respect to state management, the Act as it is v/orded gives the 
administration wide discretionary powers. By certain standards, for 
example considering available techniques, very little land in Bombay is 
^G. S, Tarey. The Bombay tenancy and agricultural lands act, 2nd 
ed. Erandol, M, D, Kale, 1953. p. 211, 
^Ibid., p, 212, ^rackets o\np 
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used efficiently. The Eastern Economist indicated the very broad powers 
under the Tenancy Act, by stating that: 
The Bombay Tenancy Bill: In investing the Provincial Government 
with authority of such a far-reaching character, it would have been 
thought that the Bill would specify with precision and exactitude 
the purposes and manner in which that authority would be exercised. 
But, this is exactly what the Bill fails to do. As the relevant 
section stands at present, it will be open to the Provincial Gov­
ernment to assume management of estates with the object of act^iir-
ing them subsequently as part and parcel of an undeclared but all 
the same settled and deliberate policy of extinguishing special 
tenures, or large landed estates of any kind. The government will 
also be free to employ powers vested in it under this section to 
acquire estate lands for redistribution among tenants, or landless 
agricultural labourers or any other group of interests.^ 
Factor payments. The effect of state management on relative payments 
to factors is probably small because of the provision of section 45 which 
states that . .the tenant holding lands on lease comprised in the 
estate shall. . .continue to have the same rights and be subject to the 
same obligations. . ." The principal change is the imposition of a gov­
ernment manager. 
To the extent that the landlord performed any management f\inction, 
that is, had any control over resource combinations, it is transferred to 
the government manager. Management decisions were typically very few, 
consisting primarily of whether or hot to follow the customary practice. 
The tenants performed a major share of such decisions. Division of man­
agement depends upon individual leases, but tenancy arrangements involv­
ing cash leases and/or absentee landlords generally leave the whole of 
^The Bombay tenancy bill. The Eastern Economist. 11:351. 19^8. 
p. 351. 
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management with the tenant.^ If state management were widely used, there 
would be additional management factor applied to the land as well as a 
substitution for displaced landlord managers. 
State management is presumably xmdertaken either because of some ten­
ancy dispute or because an insufficient input of management relative to 
other factors existed in the firm or firms of the estate. 
If it can be assumed that management is the limiting factor^ in the 
landlord-tenant finn, then increased efficiency and a greater output can be 
expected as a result of the increased management input, A necessary condi­
tion for state management to be considered efficient from the standpoiat of 
economy would be that the increase in output was greater, in value terms, 
than the manager's salary. Revenue department officials indicated 
^In Badlapur, where fixed-produce rents predominated, the function of 
the landlord in management was negligible. Normal operating decisions were 
made by the tenants who would probably also be responsible for the intro­
duction of innovations. 
In the vi2Llage of Jaska, however, there was, from what cotild be deter­
mined of pre-Act conditions, participation of both landlord and tenant in 
the management. At least some of the leases provided for the landlord's 
selection of crops, although it was usually the tenant who actually maiie 
the decision. Since the Jaska reaction to the Tenancy Act, the landlord 
does not participate in the management. 
The payment of all expenses in the cash leases of Madhbavi was very 
extensive, even to the payment of the land revenue in some oases. The 
cash leases usually leaves the management entirely with the tenant. In 
the case of share rent leases, the landlord woxild participate in deqisions 
which went beyond customary operations. 
^By a limiting or limitational factor is meant a factor of whic^FL 
insufficient quantity is available to the maximizing xxnit to reach a 
combination efficient in tearms of the conditions specified at the 
beginning of the chapter. 
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that only the most serious cases of mismanagement have been subject to 
state management \inder sections 44 and 65. In these cases there is pro­
bably a sufficiently wide range before other factors laecome limitationaCL 
and, in this sense, state assumption of the estate would be efficient. 
The range of available quantities of other inputs is important because un­
less sufficient resources are available with which to combine the state 
manager input, there may result a greater inefficiency from "too much man­
agement", i.e., more management than other factors can accommodate. This 
might be shown in Figure 4 by some management input beyond which 
accoxints for an MC, in excess of MVP, or perhaps even a negative MVPQ^. 
Excess management might arise because of the non-divisibility of the 
state management input. This might explain the tendency of the state to 
take over only relatively large estates, and only those tmder conditions 
of severe mismanagement. If management were the limitational factor and, 
as a consequence, some of the non«management factors such as land were 
underemployed, implementation of section 44 would tend to work to the 
advantage of the tenant. Since mokt rents are historically above 1/6 of 
the crop, the operation of state management would tend to favoir the ten­
ant as against the landlord. The cost of management represents no added 
cost to the tenant, although the tenant receives 5/6 of the benefits of 
the manager's Inputs. The incentive for tenants and landlords to make 
greater factor inputs will depend upon the lease. So long as the addi­
tional input of the party to the lease yields a return above its cost 
measured, say, in terms of its alternative opportunity, there will be in­
centive to make the increased input. The manager is permitted to make 
improvements subject to approval of the collector. 
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Section 53 states, . .the manager after the liquidation scheme. . « 
shall have power to sell or grant on lease all or any part of the estate 
under the management." Sale and lease at government determined rates can 
thus be effected by state management, 
1) The government can assume management if it feels that the estate 
is not being operated efficiently 
2) The government can liquidate the obligations of the estate 
3) After the claims are paid, the manager^ may sell or grant a 
lease on the estate. 
Since it is also within the power of the Govermnent, through the Agri~ 
cultural Lands Tribunal or Mamlatdor to determine the "reasonable price" 
for the land, the price is also determined. This law, operating outside 
the Civil Courts, could effect a land redistribution power over landlord 
held estates. 
Uncertainty. Since the tenant receives the same terms after the 
asstanption of management by the state, the uncertainty of tenure would re­
main unchanged except in the cases of assumption due to landlord—tenant 
disputes, i.e., the first cause under section From Table 13 it can 
be seen that about 1/4 of the government-managed estates were assumed be­
cause of disputes. The xancertainty of tenants with respect to tenure 
would probably be reduced in these cases. 
If the government should begin large scale assianption of land manage­
ment, there woTild tend to be an increase in the -uncertainty of landlords 
^For sale or lease for more than ten years the manager must receive 
permission of the collector whose decision is final. 
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with respect to the ownership of their estates. It wovild produce a dis­
inclination to invest for fear of having the benefits cut off. On the 
other hand, there may be cases where state msuiagement could reduce uncer­
tainty of returns to their land factor, e.g., where tenants are in a 
superior bargaining position: 
Cases are not wanting where landlords are harassed by their 
tenants; where landlords are not paid anything at all by the ten~ 
antsJ where they avoid payment on one pretext or the other. The 
management will be taken up in such cases so that all causes of 
disturbance of the peace or for harassment of any section of the 
peoples are removed.^ 
Unless the assumption of management by the state becomes more wide­
spread than at present, it is unlikely that sections 44 to 62 will affect 
the tincertainty of either landlords or tenants to any great extent. 
Capital accumulation. If, Tinder the conditions given above, the 
state management does result in an increase in total product greater than 
the cost of the manager without increases in the other factors or using 
unemployed factors, there will be additional income available for cap­
ital in the leasing firm. Whether the quantity of capital in the whole 
econorEQr is increased will depend upon the relative productivity of the 
time spent by the manager on the state-managed estate or in some other 
employment. If an increased total return does result from the assump­
tion of management by government and the propensity to invest is greater 
than 0, there will be an increase in total capital. 
Information is not available which would indicate the effect of 
state management on production. The effect of state management on 
^upte, op.cit.. p. 216. 
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capital accxuHUlation will probably be small because 1) most of the state 
managers are Mamlatdars who act as managers of government estates as only 
one of their duties, 2) the Act leaves the teneints with most of their 
original rights and responsibilities which include retention of their man­
agement function and 3) government managed estates are very few in 
number. 
Innovations. "Under the Court of Wards Rules, 1908, generally a 
person qualified by character, merit, industry and knowledge is appointed 
a manager."^ If the last-mentioned characteristic is true, there will be 
a tendency to increase the adoption of new techniques. Innovations which 
require mutual consent of landlord and tenant are not likely to be forth­
coming when the tenancy is in dispute. Government management imdertaken 
for the first cause of section -44-, i.e., disputes between landlord and 
tenant, wotild tend to increase the adoption of new techniques. 
The State is authorized to assume management for land which lies 
idle for two consecutive years. The 2-year minimum fallow period does 
not imply that all land must be ctiltivated and, if in the eyes of the 
state, it wo\ild not be profitable to bring the land into crop there is no 
requirement in the law that the land must be assximed. 
Cxiltivable land that continues to lie idle probably has received 
little of the attention required for the innovations currently available. 
Implementation of section 65 might be one way of removing some of the 
obstacles to adoption of innovation that arise out of tenancy arrange­
ments, e.g., the state management might settle a dispute about the 
^Ibld.. p. 229. 
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relative shares of costs and returns involved in the adoption of an 
innovation. Under such conditions the possibility for innovation, at 
least, is improved. 
As in the case with the other conditions which induce a movement to­
ward the economic objective, innovations, thus far, have been affected 
very little by the state management provision because of its limited 
implementation. 
Tenant purchase. ownership, and transfer restrictions 
Several sections of the Tenancy Act are concerned with the transfer 
and ownership of land. The effect of these sections is to favor the ten­
ant, particularly the tenant-in-possession, in the ownership of land and 
encourage the ownership of land by agriculturists. The analysis which 
follows is made in terms of sections 32, 63 and 64,. 
Factor payments^ " To the end of 1950, 9,706 protected tenants had 
purchased lands as a result of the enfariS®nent of the Tenancy Act. Their 
pxirchases amounted to ^3,0B9-'27-^ acres.^ These figures, even if correctly 
collected by the Revenue Deparianent, wotald represent only recorded trans­
fers. No estimates are available as to the number of unrecorded trans­
fers although some evidence in the village of Ja^a, Badlapur and 
Madhbavi appears to support the general belief that such transfers exist 
in significant numbers. Because of the discrepancies in Table 15 "the 
exact ratio of government-settled transfers to t3?ansfers by mutual 
^Bombay Legislative Assembly. Legislative Assembly debates, offi­
cial report. 21 Aiigust, 1951. 19: 216. 1951. p. 216. These figures 
include only protected tenant purchase under section 32 and do not repre­
sent all transfers from superior-right holders to inferior-right holders 
as in Table 15. 
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Table 15. Lands sold to tenants $Jid condition of sale, 1949®-
Lands sold Lands valued Lands sold Number of cases and 
to tenants" by Revenue by mutual reasons for tenant fail-
Officers consent^ ure to purchase 










Panch Mahals 1,330 
Broach 397 
Surat 1,100 
















5,161 23 cases: 
1,313 35 cases: 
427 19 cases; 
1,084 116 cases: 
80 tenant refusal 
4,258 141 cases: finance 
None 
8,340 1,263 cases: 481 finance, 
777 landlord did not 





E. Khandesh 1,763 172 1,611 80 cases: finance 
W. Khandesh 5,514 27 4,884 15 cases: finance 
Nasik 6,280 325 5,360 593 cases: finance 
Poona 6,560 12 6,548 83 cases: finance 
N. Satara 4,018 10 4,018 None 
Sholapur 5,953 142 5,812 185 cases: finance and 
tenant refusal 
Kolaba 3,398 81 3,318 12 cases: finance 
Belgaiam 8,420 259 8,161 10 cases: finance 
Bijapur 13,801 471 10,920 136 cases: fineince 
Dharwar 10,450 113 16,659 803 cases: finance 
Kanara 730 51 675 8 cases: finance 
Ratnagiri 925 11 925 None 
S. Satara 4,752 1,302 4,371 2,941 cases: finance 
and tenant refusal 
Kolhapur 1,337 64 1,273 59 cases: finance 
^Source: Bombay Legislative Assembly. Legislative Assembly 
debates, official report. 22 August 1951. 19:374. 1951. p. 374. 
^Acreage figiires roxanded to nearest acre. Discrepancies between the 
figures in the first coliiran and the sum of the second and third columns 
are unaccovmted for by the original soxu^ce. 
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consent cannot be derived but if the data can be assumed to show general 
relationships it appears that most of the recorded transfers resulted 
from agreement between landlord and tenant rather than government pricing. 
These transfers should perhaps not be considered entirely volxantary, how­
ever, because the rent regulation and other restrictions reduce the in­
come from land axid thus tend to cause a reduction of the value of land as 
a factor of production. The direct effect, therefore, of sub-section 3 
of section 32 which provides for price determination by the Tribunal, is 
relatively tinimportant because of the infrequency of its use. Knowledge 
of this provision by landlords and tenants probably exerts a downward 
pressure on prices arrived at by bargaining, however. 
In Jaska, for example, an enquiry was made on the value of land be­
fore the Act. The figure agreed upon by the group^ of tenants was about 
Rs. 300 per acre for good cotton-wheat land. Two tenants gave the 
prices of lands which they had purchased since the passage of the Tenancy 
Act as Rs. 175 and 150 per acre. Vftien asked why they did not become 
owners when the price of land fell, the tenants indicated that land prices 
would be set lower in the future and that government would make them 
owners anyway. 
Section 43 limits the right of the protected tenant to personal 
cultivation of the land which he has purchased. The land may not be 
sold, given away, exchanged, leased, mortgaged or assigned. These 
^he tenants in Jaska refused to be interviewed individually so were 
interviewed at group meetings. This compromise was necessary because of 
distrust of the tenants both of the intejrviewer and other tenants, and 
reflected the distxirbance in landlord-tenant relations at the time of the 
enquiry. 
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reductions will tend to reduce the value of the real estate to the pro­
tected tenant hence the price which he is willing to offer for the land. 
Where the landlord initiates a land sale he must do so only at a 
price deteiroined by the Tribunal and then make offers only to prospective 
buyers in a special priority. For example, suppose party A is the tenant 
on the land and party B is a person cultivating land adjacent to that be~ 
ing sold. The Tribunal sets the price at Rs. 300 per acre. Party B may 
value the land at Rs. 500 per acre but tuiless party A forgoes the oppor­
tunity to purchase the land at the Tribunal's price, party B will not be 
able to purchase the land regardless of how valuable he may feel it to be. 
The allocation of the land factor therefore depends not upon the appraisal 
of its value by competitive bidders but upon 1) the price set by the Tri­
bunal and 2) the rank of buyers in the priority. Under section 64., 
therefore, there is no assurance that the land will be combined with labor 
and capital in the most efficient manner with respect to different agri­
cultural firms. Should the land become adaptable to some other non-agri-
cultToral use and the landlord cannot, or does not wish to, utilize the 
land himself tinder section 34-> the land or the use of it cannot be trans­
ferred to a non-agricTolturist because of the restriction of section 63, 
except under certain very limited cases. 
It may be noted from Table 15 that a frequent cause of tenants* in­
ability to secure land is lack of adequate finance. It is of small im­
portance to the protected tenant under section 32 that a provision in the 
Act allows purchase of the land which a protected tenant cultivates if it 
is not possible to secure the necessary finance. The Act itself appears 
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to place at least two obstacles in the securing of finance; l) the limi­
tations on mortgage as in sections 43 and 63 and 2) the conditions of pay­
ment of section 32 which specify that the protected tenant must complete 
the payment in ten or less installments and in not more than fifteen years 
and fxirther that: 
. . .until the deposit of the entire amount is made in a lump 
sum or until the deposit of the last of the installments is 
made, the liability of the protected tenant to pay the rent 
due in respect of the land shall continue and shall not be 
affected.^ 
Therefore it appears that the main obstacle to tenant purchase is 
finance and the permissive proviso of section 32 is not what most affects 
the ability of protected tenants to sectire land. As time goes on and the 
dependence of government-determined land prices on historical market 
prices for land diminishes, it may be possible to so price land that the 
tenants can easily make pxirchases. This, of course, involves the abandon­
ment of pricing in accordance with productivity and would necessarily in­
volve Government in the problems of misallocation of resources. Referring 
to the Tenancy Act, Dantwala pointed out the difficulty of finance as 
"another major defect in the legislation. . ." He stated fxirther that: 
There is no provision for financing the tenant for the purchase 
of the land. The Revenue Minister admitted that though the 
provision for such piirchases had been there for the last 4 years 
hardly any lands 2iad been purchased under it by the tenants. 
In conclusion it may be said that the intentions of the 
legislation appear to be much higher than -the achievement is 
ever likely to reach. Whether that is consciously so devised 
or not, is anybody's guess.^ 
^Bom. 67 of 194^8, sec. 32. 
L. Dantwala. Bombay tenancy promise and performance. Economic 
Weekly. 4:899. 1952. p. 899. 
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Uncertainty. The landlord in anticipation of making improvements 
must, l3y virtue of section 64., consider the possibility of Government 
evaluation of improvements. Section 32 entitles the protected tenant at 
any time to force a sale (subject to the acreage restrictions) at a gov-
ernmentodetermined price. Inputs of capital in land for improvements are 
thereby subject to additional soxirces of imcertainty and the resiilt is a 
greater discounting of their value hy landlords. This appears to be con­
sistent with the withdrawal of capital for improvements by landlords 
attributed to the Tenancy Act in the villages of Jaska and Badlapur and, 
to a lesser extent, Madhbavi* 
Immobility. Land purchased by a protected tenant xinder section 32 
cannot be transferred by sale, gift, exchanges, lease, mortgage or 
assignment except by sanction of state government. This restriction tfy 
section A3 necessitates that the tenant remain on the land. To leave the 
land would involve the sacrifice of the purchase price. The Collector may 
summarily evict anyone who takes possession of the land. 
Through the priority stated in section 64. the tenant in possession 
is given preference to purchase at the government-set price. The differ­
ence between what the tenant woiild be willing to pay and the regulated 
price would be a "buyer's surplus". Other buyers, regardless of their 
willingness or ability to pay higher prices would be unable to do so un­
less other classes of buyers with higher priorities forego their oppor-
txmity to piirchase. 
Sections 43 and 64. represent two obstacles to the free movement of 
land between uses. Iyengar has commented about similar restrictions in 
the Hyderabad Tenancy Laws "The Planning Commission do not suggest any 
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restrictions on sales of agricultural land. It would be much better to 
allow free play of competitive conditions, and help raising the level of 
enterprise among cultivating peasants."^ 
Capital accumulation* The two means for capital accumulation indi­
cated in the beginning of this chapter, i.e., increased efficiency and 
restriction of consumption, are both affected by the sections of the Act 
dealing with transfers- The effect on efficiency has already been dis­
cussed above in connection with factor payments and it was seen how the 
priorities and government pricing might affect the allocation of resources. 
Certain provisions also may affect the inducement to invest. 
One of the main sotirces of loans to the cultivator is the money­
lender. ^ The market for the smaller village moneylender is almost ex­
clusively in the loxial agriculture. Although the moneylender ®nployed 
many press\ires to obtain repayment of a loan, a mortgage on land was one 
of the principal securities. But section 63 provides that no mortgage of 
land or interest may be made in favor of a person who is not an agricul-
tTirist. Furthermore, according to section A3, land pxirchased by a pro­
tected tenant cannot be transferred by mortgage. If there is little 
securable property other than land, interest rates are held to a low 
Is. K. Iyengar, op.cit.. p. 36. 
^According to the All-India Credit Svirvey over 70 percent of the 
cultivator's supply of short-term agricxiltural credit is taken from 
various tj^es of moneylenders. Reserve Bank of India. All-India rural 
credit survey. Vol. 2. Bombay, Reserve Bank of India. 195A- p. 167, 
168. 
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level,^ and other investment opportunities are not readily available, 
there will be a tendency to drive investment ^i^irpluses into cons\amption. 
In view of the limited extent of se curable property other than land 
available for mortgage, section 63 and section 43, represent obstacles to 
capital accTomulation especially by persons whose principal or only market 
for capital is in agriculttire. 
Innovation. The protected tenant is limited in his right to pxirchase 
lands to fifty acres of arable land. This maximum does not recognize any 
differential between Konkan paddy land and the light, jirayat land on the 
fringe of the Deccan trap. Section 36, however, does permit the Govern­
ment to lower the maximum in respect to any area by notification. There 
appears to be no precise reason why this level was selected. The 50-acre 
limit is large enough in the paddy areas, in the Konkan, for example, 
where the average holding is about 4 1/4 acres so that size of the hold­
ing will not be an obstacle to innovation. Even in the most of the arid 
regions of the Gujarat and Karnatak, fifty acres is considerably above the 
present average holding as may be seen from Table 4« The limit on pro­
tected tenant purchase, section 32, and landlord withdrawal, section 34» 
are large enough to cause no serious limitation on the introduction of 
innovations. There is no limit to the acreage a, tenant may cultivate 
^he loss in security may not be offset by a high rate of interest 
because of the Bombay Moneylenders Act of 1946, section 25 of which reads 
as follows . .the maximum rate of interest shall not exceed 6 percent 
per anniim in the case of secured loans and 9 percent per annum in the 
case of unsecured loans." Bom. 31 of 1947. As reprodiKsed ins India 
Ministiy of Agriculttire, Agricultxxral legislation. Vol. 1, op.cit.. 
p. 36. 
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except for the difficvilty of acquiring it,^ and no limit on personal culti­
vation by landlords except for the difficulty of withdrawing it. 
Compensation 
One of the principal purposes of section 5 above was to provide the 
tenant with adequate incentive to make productive inputs the benefits of 
which were returned over m long period of time. It was seen in the dis­
cussion of section 5 also that tenure variability differed between areas 
and between the different landlords and tenants. Furthermore, the expir­
ation of the benefits of inputs in different uses varied from a few months 
for some crops to decades for some land improvements. For ordinary ten­
ants, security of tenure was for 10 yearsj for benefits of inputs in some 
uses this period would be inadequate, for others, more than necessary. For 
many protected tenants secxu'ity of tenure extended for only one year. Fur­
thermore, on the basis of section 5» tenants were required to remain on the 
land in order to recoup the fxall value of their inputs j viewed ante 
this immobility resulted in a disco\int of the expected value of the input 
by the tenant. From an over-sG.1 point of view of efficiency it meant im­
mobility of resources and the loss in productivity resulting in having 
factors in less than their highest use. 
"^A protected tenant whose name stands entered as an owner in the 
record of rights on the first day of January 1952 in respect of any land 
fifty acres or more in jiryat or twelve and half acres or more of irri­
gated land in eirea in addition to the land held by him on lease as a pro­
tected tenant shall not be entitled to any rights or privileges conferred 
on a protected tenant by the provisions of section 32 or 34-." Bom. 67 of 
19^ 48, sec. 38. 
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Section -41 which deals with compensation for the tmesqjired value of 
an improvement made by a protected tenant, and section 19 which provides 
for compensation in respect to trees planted by an ordinary tenant are 
also involved in the incentive of tenants to make inputs the benefits frcan 
which they would be severed upon termination of the tenancy. 
Section 23 will also be discussed under the heading of compensation. 
This section provides for government construction of protective bunds^ if 
it appears to the state government that land held by a tenant is being 
neglected. The costs are recoverable from the tenant or the landlord who 
in turn is entitled under sub~section 2 to recover the cost or share 
thereof from the other party. 
Factor payments. According to section 19 a tenant is entitled to the 
produce of trees,^ planted by him during the tenancy and is entitled to 
compensation for the trees on termination of the tenancy. Dwing the ten­
ancy the landlord receives a "reasonable rent" in cash, the argument for 
a cash rent being as follows: 
. . .the landlord must get the same rent, i.e., reasonable rent 
which he would ^ve got if the land had been used for growing 
food crops. . 
^"Bunds protecting any lands are all those raised bxmds or movinds of 
earth constructed or nattirally existing in or around the land held by the 
tenant as a protection to the land against inundation by floods, rain 
water, etc." Gupte, op.cit.. p. 127. 
^Trees of importance that are planted and cultivated in Bombay ares 
plantain, mango, guava, orange, fig, pcanegranate, and papaya. There is a 
wide difference in the length of maturity of the fmits, e.g., the meuigo 
begins to bear in the fifth year and lasts for generations whereas the 
papaya yields in the first year but is seldom kept over three years. 
Revenue Minister's speech in Bombay Legislative Co\incil on 8th 
October 194-8 in Gupte, o£,ci;|^., p. 120, (Original source not available.) 
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The rent camnot be fibred in crop-share because in such a case 
until the trees grow and begin to produce fruit, the landlord 
will get nothing. He will get his share only in other crops, 
that is w!^ in such cases the rent is fixed in cash and not in 
kind.^ 
The effect of the rent fixing provision is to remove the landlord 
from any interest or gain from planting of trees on the land. The same 
source quoted above states that, . .the growing of trees requires 
large initial expenditure and it takes a long time before they yield 
fruit."2 If such is the case, it appears that it might be desirable for 
crop-share leases to be employed so that the risks of production and the 
interest costs of the maturing trees might be shared. F\irthermore to set 
the cash rent on the basis of the land's productivity in one crop such as 
wheat or rice is to ignore its pecttliar adaptability to trees and to tend 
to hold land from its highest use. If the land is particiilarly suited for 
the growth of trees, e.g., plantains on light soil, it should be possible 
for the tenant to pay a higher rent and still make a higher retxarn to his 
own factors. 
For ordinary tenants the only provision for payment of the xoneaipired 
value of long-term inputs is in respect to trees in section 19. Pro­
vision for compensating for inputs in other uses is not made. The tenant 
wishing to plant trees may do so with the knowledge that if his tenancy is 
terminated against his will he may apply to the Mamlatdar for an evalu­
ation of the compensation.^ The compensation is based on the value of 
^Ibid.. p. 120. 
%bid., p. 119. 
3Bom. 67 of 194S, sec. 70. 
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the trees themselves and not upon the labor atid expenses incurred by the 
tenant in their production. 
An important qtialification of section 19 is that if the tenancy is 
voloontarily surrendered, the tenant cannot claim compensation for trees 
planted by him. During the ten year minimum lease period an ordinary ten­
ant may lose possession of the land only ty voluntary surrender or evic­
tion under section 14. Under section 19, therefore, the only way in which 
the tenant can receive compensation is to be evicted for non-payment of 
rent, misuse of land, sub-dividing or sub-letting the land, or using it 
for a non-agricultural purpose. The ordinary tenant is also eligible for 
compensation if the landlord assumes the land for personal cxiltivation at 
the end of the ten-year period. Thus the qualification of paragraph two 
of the compensation provision virtually nulifies its usefulness from the 
standpoint of eaqpectations of the tenant. 
Section 23 applies to the construction of protective bunds. Costs 
incurred by the tenant in the maintenance or construction of bunds are 
recoverable from the landlord according to his liability under local usage 
and custom. This section, however, does not provide for the payment of 
compensation to the tenant for the unexpired value of his interest in the 
bunds upon termination of the tenancy. Insofar as the tenant may expect 
to remain on the land permanently, as in the case of a permanent tenant, 
he will have incentive to make inputs of labor and capital for bunding in 
accordance with the increase in his marginal return. If, however, his ten­
ancy is to be terminated before the fiill expected value of his labor and 
capital in bunding have expired^he will apply less of these factors. 
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Costs recoverable on the basis of local custom and usage may not give 
the tenant adequate incentive to construct the bunds. If, for example, 
local usage requires that the tenant pay three-fourths of the costs and 
the tenant estimates that he will receive only one-half the benefits, he 
will not be willing to constmct as many bunds as he would if he were to 
receive three-fourths of the benefits or pay only one-half of the costs. 
Section 23 also provides for government construction of bxmds pro­
tecting any land held by a tenant and that the costs are recoverabl.e from 
the person in possession of the land. The law is not clear as to whether 
this can mean off-site protection^ 
A protected tenant may receive compensation for a land improvement if 
his tenancy is terminated. Although section 41 applies to all types of 
improvements^ and not trees alone, it covers only protected tenants. 
Section 41 permits the tenant to make inputs in improvements with the 
knowledge that even if his tenancy is terminated the value of his input 
will be recovered and thus the section provides incentive to make inputs 
from which benefits "mature in the long-run. 
Within the firm the protected tenant will tend to divert more of his 
resources into long-term uses such as erosion-protection practices, ro­
tation crops, bunds, and tree-planting, and out of short teim uses. 
Section 41 provides no additional incentive for landlords to make inputs 
of capital for improvements except where such inputs may be complementary 
with tenant inputs, e.g., tree seedlings and tenant's tree-planting labor. 
Neither is there a deterrent to the landlord inputs since he retains the 
%or definitions of improvements see sec. 41 in Chapter 3. 
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benefits of his Inputs remaining in the improvement. The landlord know­
ing that he cannot take advantage of the remaining benefits of tenant in­
puts will have less incentive to evict the tenant. 
Uncertainty. As in the case of section 5, the compensation provisions 
do not affect \mcertainty with respect to prices and variability in pro­
duction, The compensation features are intended to reduce uncertainty 
surromding the benefits of factors which mature over a long period and 
are subject to severance if the tenancy is terminated. The compensation 
provisions, sections 19 and 41> do not provide for costs of transferring 
resources from one employment to another nor do they lessen the effects 
of iincertainty of alternative employment. The cost of transference and xm-
certainty of alternative employment woiild discoxint the value of other em­
ployments for the tenant's resources but would not, however, affect value 
of inputs made in long term uses in the present tenancy. Therefore, it 
appears that compensation provisions, \uiless subject to restrictions as 
are sections 19 and 41, can provide the same reduction of vmcertainty from 
tenancy termination as can the security of tenure provision, section 5, in 
respect to long-term inputs. 
Section 34 decreases the effectiveness of the security of temare pro­
vision for protected tenants. With the relatively unimportant exception 
of trees, the compensation provisions do not apply to ordinary tenants. 
Therefore, in respect to the \ancertainty surrounding inputs of long-tenn 
maturity, the compensation provisions for protected tenants are intended 
to do what the security of tenure provisions do for the ordinary tenants. 
This alone raises the question of the usefulness of the distinction of 
"permanent", "protected", and "ordinary" tenant. Dantwala states! 
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The first step in tenancy reform shoxild be to recognize 
only one type of tenancy with occupancy rights akin to the 
Protected Tenancy with Bombay legislation. . .In the matter 
of other provisions such as those for reasonable rent, secur­
ity of tenure, etc,, there should be no differentiation.^ 
Compensation does not reduce tincertainty of the length of tenancy as 
such, whereas a fixed tenancy period, as in section % does. Compensation, 
however, does reduce the lancertainty of the return to factor inputs the 
benefits of which extend over time and so is equivalent to security of 
teaaure in respect to factor combinations. If some other objective, such 
as holding the maximxam number of people in agriculture, is one of the pur­
poses of the Act, then the security of tenure provisions might be better 
adapted. However, it appears that the purpose of the security o^ teniire 
provision was not to hold people in agriculture but rather provide incen­
tive for cxiitlvators to make inputs from which the benefits matxire over a 
long period of time. Compensation appears to provide the same incentive 
to make inputs as section 5« 
Mobility* Once a factor of production is contributed ty the tenant 
with respect to a particular plot of land, the tenant must either remain 
on the land or receive compensation if he is to recover the value of his 
input. 
If the tenant does not have to remain on the land in order to re­
cover the benefits of past inputs, one obstacle to his mobility is re­
moved. So long as the tenant finds that the return to all the resources 
he owns, i.e., labor and capital, is higher in their present use than the 
^M. L. Dantwala. The basic approach to land reforms. Indian Jour, 
of Agr. Econ. 8, no. 1:95-99. March 1953. p- 98. 
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return he could secure from his transferrable resources plus the compensa­
tion he could receive for the unexpired value of his non-transferrable re-
sovirces in some other use, he will remain. If the retiorn to these re­
sources is higher elsewhere, he will leave. 
Mobility is perhaps the principal advantage of compensation over 
security of tenure as in section 5, whereas inter-finn and inter-industry 
movements would be left tinrestricted by the compensation provisions. 
Intra-firm resource movements toward employment in long-term uses would 
tend to be much the same for the compensation provisions as for the secur­
ity of tenure sections. 
Capital accximulation. If tenants are assured of receiving the un­
expired value of their capital inputs which have become inseparable with 
the land, the returns to the capital inputs will be less heavily dis­
counted for the uncertainty due to tenancy termination. And if the cost 
of the capital, say, in terms consumption goods foregone, remains the same, 
the tenants will have the incentive to make greater capital inputs. A 
larger portion of tenants' net income will then be spent on investment and 
less on consumption. It appears that the effect of sections 19 and 41 
will be to induce tenant investment. Since the problem of recovery of 
investment for improvements does not arise in the case of landlords, the 
effect of these sections appears to be neutral with respect to landlord 
investment. 
Innovation. Innovations of the type which yield benefits over a long 
period would tend to be more readily adopted if the tenant receives com­
pensation for une3<pired benefits when the tenancy is terminated. The 
principal difficulty in compensation for factors employed in an innovation 
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lies in the assessment of their value. The effect of the innovation is to 
make the productivity of factor inputs uncertain. Estimates for compensa­
tion would need to be made of the increased productivity of each of the 
resources and adjustments made in their values. 
The present system of compensation for an improvement under section 
<41 appears to be based on a productivity principle rather than a cost of 
production principle for, as Gupte states, ". , .the tenant will not be 
paid for what he himself has spent.Instead, the "amount by which the 
value of the land is increased" and "the present condition of the improve-
ment"2 are taken into consideration in the valuation thereby stressing the 
productivity of the factor inputs at the time of compensation rather than 
their original cost-
The Objective of Distributive Equitability 
Chapter 3 indicated a second objective of the Tenancy Act, equit­
ability in the distribution of income» This, the second part of the ana­
lysis, deals with the manner in which the provisions of the Tenancy Act 
affect the equitability objective. The separation in the analysis of the 
problem of economic efficiency and growth from the problem of the distri­
bution of income does not imply their independence. However, the norm of 
a proper distribution does extend beyond prescriptions arising out of 
purely economic analysis and therefore will be dealt with separately, 
^upte, op.cit.. p. 212. 
^Bom. 67 of I94B, sec. 41-
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Alternative means to ad.iust the distribution of income 
Income to an individual may be derived from returns to factors of 
production or direct transfers such as gifts, inheritances, and subsidies. 
The size of an individual's income, therefore, depends upon 1) the 
quantity of productive factors ovned, 2) the ret\irn to the factors, and 
3) direct transfers. Thus, if government wishes to alter the personal 
distribution of income, it may do so by: 
1) Control of the quantity and type of resources an individual may 
own.l 
2) Specification or other adjustment in the payment to the resource. 
3) Direct taxation or subsidization. 
Although the three foregoing methods are means of affecting the dis­
tribution of income, their effects on efficiency may differ. The second 
means, adjustment of factor payments, has already been discussed with 
2 
respect to efficiency. 
^By ownership is meant ar^ valuable property in the resource. Gov­
ernment may change the property of the individual by changing his rights 
in use or transfer. 
^One definition of an equitable distribution of income is the dis­
tribution which res\ilts when each factor receives its marginal value pro­
duct, From the standpoint of the second objective of the Tenancy Act, 
however, this definition does not appear very usefxil since it merely 
accepts whatever distribution results after factor payments are made and 
does not subject the distribution of income to variation by the respon­
sible authority. Such a definition of equitability then becomes a speci­
fication of the status quo. From the standpoint of the second objective 
then, in Schickele's words, "it is no longer possible to accept the com­
placent assumption that the norm of optimum 'factorsa' distribution can 
serve at the same time as the norm of optimum personal income distri­
bution." Rainer Schidcele. Optimum income distribution as a goal of 
public policy. Am. Jour, of Scon, and Soc. 3, no, 3:4.54.-4.78. April 
195A'* P* 4-7 
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•nie effects upon efficiency of changing the ownership of resources 
are more difficult to ascertain. The differences in expectations of var­
ious individuals alone would accotint for variation. Threats of continued 
changes in resotirce ownership would increase imc^tainty* Ownership it­
self, however, does not prescribe conditions necessary for allocative 
efficiency. Whether ownership vests in one person, or ten, or in govern-
maat, the sane marginal condition© for efficiency would apply. 
Direct transfers of income through tax and subsidy, if applied 
equally to the returns from all factors, would make a proportional chsmge 
in the payment to each factor tiiereby leaving the factor combinations un­
changed as between productive uses. Substitution of leisure for labor 
would tend to be affected by tax or subsidy so leisure would also have to 
be subject to the same rate of taxation as productive use of a laborer's 
tin^. 
A program whidi seeks to maximize its attainment of two or more 
goals will at least exploit all areas of complementarity. If two alter­
native means are equally effective for \he attainment of equitability but 
one results in a smaller loss, no loss, or an increase of efficiency it 
will be preferred. If, therefore, it appears that change in the owner­
ship of resources or a direct tax and subsidy method is as an effective 
means of producing an equitable distribution as an adjustment of factor 
payments and yet does not require a sacrifice in efficiency, theca the two 
foiiaer methods may be preferred as part of an over-all program. Applied 
to the distributive equitability aspects of the Tenancy Act, this would 
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mean that provisions which alter the ownership of resoiirces or direct 
taxes and subsidies would be preferable to provisions affecting factor 
payments. 
Peasant proprietorship 
One of the stated objectives of the Tenancy Act is that of peasant 
proprietorship. The aspects of peasant proprietorship which deal with 
incentive are covered under factor payments and uncertainty. If, for 
reasons, say, of small size of the cultivating unit, peasant proprietor­
ship results in a less productive agricultxire than a system of tenancy, 
then the objective of equitability may accotmt for the encouragement of 
peasant proprietorship. The comptilsory sale of land to protected tenants 
at government-determined prices may be viewed as a form of redistribution 
of ownership of resoiarces discussed above. Since the incentive aspects of 
peasant proprietorship are covered in the economic objective and resource 
ownership aspects iinder distributive equitability, no separate objective 
is necessary for peasant proprietorship. On the means-ends scale, 
peasant proprietorship is of a lower order than the economic and distri­
butive equitability objectives, the former being a means to obtain the 
latter. 
Landlord-tenant income and the effects of the distribution 
Underlying the distributive equitability aspects of the Tenancy Act 
is the assumption that landlords as a class are in a more favorable 
position incomewise than tenants. This assumption can be illustrated by 
the Revenue Minister's statement at the time of the third reading of tJie 
Bill: 
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It is no doubt true that the incomes of the landlords 
who have not been cultivating their lands personally and who 
merely live on rents will be reduced and reduced properly. 
If they have been receiving rent in the past which can be 
called unconscionably high, no amount of time during which 
they have recovered them could make the practice proper and 
it becomes all the more necessary that immediate steps 
should be taken to reduce th«n to an equitable level. . • 
The tenants have been put down in every way as a result of 
the powerSy legal and illegal, which the landlords possessed 
in the past due to the favotirs they received from the ruling 
dass and on account of those repressions, the social position 
of the tenants has been the lowest possible.^ 
Speaking further about the relative position of landlords and tenants, 
and using as illustration the conditions of tenancy in Ratnagiri District, 
the Revenue Minister saids 
This is the result of the economic conditions which are 
obtaining at present in the matter of lands which they culti­
vate and it is also a result of the powers which the landlords 
possess in the management of those lands.^ 
Not all landlords, however, are wealthy. Table 10 indicates that 
slightly over one-lmlf of the absentee landlords in Bombay held less than 
5 acres of land. Although land holdings are not a perfect indication of 
income position, many of these small landholders do have small incomes. 
Similarly, not all tenants belong to the low income group. In Jaska, for 
example, two tenants indicated savings of Rs. 25,000 and 20,000 respec­
tively, with no debt. Relatively prosperous tenants were also found in 
Badlapur and Madhbavi. 
Taken as a group, however, landlords probably are in a higher income 
category than tenants. Some landlords such as the Thakurs of the Gujarat 
^M. Desai, Speech, op.cit.. p. 87. 
^Ibid.. p. 88. 
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held, €uid still hold, very large estates. In contrast is a mass of lou 
income tenants. Income statistics which might reveal the extent of these 
disparities are not available.^ The general appearance of homes, clothing, 
and diet of families in the villages of Jaska, Badlaptur and Madhbavi 
indicated the superior income position of the landlord groups compared 
to tenants. With recognition of the exceptions, it appears that the 
assumption that landlords are in a superior income position compared to 
tenants is not unrealistic. 
The criterion of distributive eouitability 
The Tenancy Act satisfies the condition of distributive equitability 
if it tends to move the distribution of income toward equality. 
Analysis of provisions of the Act 
Rent regulation. Jacol^ specified the regulation of rentals as one 
of the two principal means by which the distribution of income is affected 
in agrarian reform program. By reduciiig the rental pajonent made by ten­
ants the distribution of income can be shifted from landlords to tenants. 
^A study Desai and Madiman of the village of Lambhvel in Kaira in 
1950 revealed the relatively low income position of tenants. As a mea­
sure of their capital position, the tenants, who accounted for 4.7 percent 
of the agricultural families, owned only 25 percent of the buffaloes and 
21 percent of the bullocks. N. K. Desai and S. G. Madiman. Probl^s in 
capital accumulation by the tenant in the ryotwari area of Kaira dis­
trict, 1950. Indian Jour, of Econ. 132, no, 126:352-358, 1951, p. 356, 
2"Agrarian reform measures generally aim at or resialt in redistri­
bution of income throTigh one or both of the following methods: (a) re­
distribution of land. , .b) reduction of rentals." Jacoby, op.cit., 
p. 56. 
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Section 6 of the Tenancy Act sets the maximum legal rent at 1/6 of the 
crop® It was indicated earlier that unregulated share rents frequently 
were one-half of the crop. The difference between the legal rent and the 
unregtalated rent thus represents the income transfer from tenants to land­
lords. Using the figures from Table 17 as an illustration, it might be 
supposed that the Rs. 168,214., 154 Paid by tenants represented the legal 
1/6 rent. Under, s^, a half-share system the rent thus would have been 
Rs. 504,642,4.62, The transfer of income from landlords to tenants thus 
shown becomes Rs. 117,749,908 or an average of over Rs. 155 per tenant. 
Such a figure, even if based on relia.ble data, would not show the re­
duction in landlord contribution toward production costs so the final in­
come transfer would be less than Rs. 155. The actual income transfer 
appears to be incalculable. Information is not available which would in­
dicate all the changes in lease types, adjustments in leases, evasions of 
the law, and other factors which affect the distribution of income. 
The redistribution effect results primarily because of the change in 
payment to the fixed factors such as land and labor. The Tenancy Act in 
sub-section 3 of section 6 permits the landlord to reduce proportionally 
his contribution to the cost of cultivation thereby relieving the land­
lord of bearing operating costs from which he would not receive propor­
tionate benefit. 
The rent regulation applies to all tenancies, drawing no distinction 
between high income or low income leuidlords and tenants. Insofar as the 
assvimption of the superior income position of landlords is correct, there 
will be an equalizing effect between landlords as a class and tenants as 
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a class* As such, the rent regulation is limited to equalizing between 
landlords and tenants and cannot alter the distribution of income within 
the classes. 
Since section 6 deals with factor payments, the use of this provision 
as a means for income redistribution may, within a range, require a sub^-
stitution for efficiency. 
Security of tenxire. Since the tenant is conferred rights of tenure 
in the land which he cultivates by virtue of section 5, he acquires a 
valuable property. The limitation on eviction by the landlord is a re­
striction on the landlord's property.^ This saleable property which re­
sults from section 5 represents a redistribution of income from landlords 
to tenants. Unlike the rent regulation provision, however, section 5 does 
not fall on all landlords and tenants equally. The right of purchase in 
section 32 does not apply to ordinary tenants. 
Section 5 is further unlike the rent regulation in that it is more 
in the nature of a transfer of property rather than an alteration of 
factor payments. 
Tenant purchase. ownership, and transfer restrictions. Under 
section 32 the protected tenant can force the landlord to sell to him at 
a government-determined price. The "reasonable" price will be below the 
market pricej otherwise, it woiild be unnecessary for the tenant to use 
the Tenancy Act. In the short rxin, where the outlay for land represents 
^Gupte, op.cit.. p. 58. "There is nothing in Sec. 5 (2) to prevent 
the landlord, if he needs possession of the land immediately from the 
tenant, to offer him valuable consideration for consentirxg to surrender 
his tenancy rights. . 
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a fixed cost, the effect of the provision on the distribution of income is 
most nearly of the first category on page 192. Government, in effect, 
transfers part of the property to the tenant by way of the lowered price. 
In the very long run, when the p\irchase of land enters into variable 
costs, section 32 might be viewed as an adjustment in factor payments, 
i.e., the second category on page 192. 
Section 32, in the short run, thus has the effect of a transfer of 
ownership from landlords to tenants. Insofar as the assumption that 
landlords as a class are better off than tenants, this provision will tend 
to move the distribution toward equality. 
As a means to achieve distributive equitability through peasant 
proprietorship, section 32 seeks to induce tenant purchase by lowering 
land prices. The result will depend upon whether the "Jaska effect", 
i.e., where the tenants felt that the other provisions of the Act made ten­
ancy more profitable than ovmership, or tenants' expectations of the ad­
vantages of ownership tends to dominate. 
The indirect effect of enhancing the tenants* bargaining position 
may tend to lower sale prices. As was discussed under the economic ob­
jective, however, the number of land transfers uiider section 32 appears 
to be comparatively small. Therefore, the actual direct effect is 
relatively "unimportant. 
The order of priority of sale under section 64 has the effect of 
creating a valuable property to those in a preferred position in the prior­
ity and placing additional restriction upon the landlord wishing to sell. 
Section 64 has the effect of transferring property from landlords to ten­
ants or other persons high on the order of priority. 
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Size of holding. The size of holding restrictions of sections 32 and 
34. apply to both landlord and tenant. Although the Act does not specify 
the size of holding directly, it does contain provisions which specify the 
range within which the Act is operative. Thus a protected tenant may force 
the sale of land which he operates if his landlord's holding exceeds 50 
acres but he may not employ section 32 if his (the tenant's) holdings 
exceed 50 acres. 
Insofar as income is a function of the size of holding the acreage 
limit will tend to favor both low income tenants and low income landlords. 
In this way it operates for equality in the distribution of income more 
directly than the foregoing measures. The size of holding clauses in 
section 32 do not recognize differences in the productivity of land, how­
ever. A 50-acre tract of paddy land in the Konkan would be a very large 
holding whereas 50 acres of jirayat in the dry area of the Gujarat would 
scarcely provide subsistence. 
State management. The effect upon the distribution of income of 
government management depends primarily upon the manner in vAiich the pro­
gram is administered. Potentially the management provisions are very 
strong ina^uch as any estate which is not being operated in accordance 
with "full and efficient use" may be assumed by government. After 
liquidation is complete the manager may sell or grant on lease any or all 
of the estate.^ In this manner, it would be possible to redistribute in­
come by altering the ownership pattern. As indicated in an earlier 
^Bom. Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Rules, op.cit.. p. 6. These 
administrative rules limit sale to cases where there is no other means 
of meeting management costs and other liquidation costs. 
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section of this chapter, very limited use has been made of the government 
management provisions. 
Other Objectives 
Chapter 3 introduced the possibility of other objectives which may 
not have bfeen explicit in the statements preceding the passage of the 
Tenancy Act. One such objective siiggested was that of the maintenance of 
political preeminence by the Congress Party. 
Even if the political objective could be established, the testing of 
the Tenancy Act with respect to its effect upon political power appears 
to be very difficult. An end-result test would be the proportion of seats 
held by the Congress in the Legislative Assembly, But the seats would be 
determined by the entire program of the government, not upon one enact­
ment alone. Therefore, the effect of the Tenancy Act upon the voters is 
confounded with the other phases of government's program. As part of the 
over-all program of the Congress, however, the Tenancy Act appears not to 
have done great damage to the party position. Congress now occupies 268 
out of the 316 seats of the Legislative Assembly, whereas during the peak 
of the Gandhian revolution in 194-6, the Congress held 125 of 175 seats. 
The other alternative for testing the political popularity of the 
Tenancy Act would be a "grass-roots" poll. The principal problem with 
this test, other thaJQ the physical difficulties of secviring the data, 
would be that of attaching the proper weights to the replies of indivi­
duals since there appears to be little reason for supposing that the 
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opinions represent the respective voting strength of individuals. The 
limited enquiry in the villages of Jaska, Badlapur, and Madhbavi with 
respect to political opinion indicated the difficulty of secxiring useful 
responses. 
From the standpoint of the Tenancy Act, however, one political eaqjer-
iment in the Gujarat appears significant in its failure. With opposition 
to the Tenancy Act their raison d'etre, the Gujarat Khedut Sangh 
(Gujarat Farmer's Union) was organized in 194-9 under the presidency of 
Pragji Khandubhai Desai. The Khedut Sangh at first attempted to operate 
as a pressure group appealing directly to Congress. Said Shri Desai: 
"I am making it quite clear at this stage that the aim of Gujarat Farmer's 
Union is not political,"^ In 1951, however, at the Gujarat Lok Parishad 
(Gujarat People's Conference) the Gujarat Lok Paksha (Gujarat People's 
Party) was formed. Its principal objective was to oppose the Congress 
Party in respect to land policy. 
In September, 194-9, the Khedut Sangh prepared a memorandum which 
was submitted to the working committee of the Congress in which they 
stated; 
Xour memorialists strongly feel that if the Act remains 
long on the statute book it will work miin of the middle class 
agricxilttiral population v/ithout doing corresponding good to 
the tenants whom it is intended to benefit. , 
P^. K. Desai. Statement of Gujarat Khedut Sangh (in Gujarti, 
translated from published leaflet). Jalalpur, Suratj Gujarat Khedut 
Sangh. 1949. p. 3. 
^Gujarat Khedut Sangh. Memorandum on the Bombay Tenancy and Agri­
cultural Lands Act. Navsari, Gujarat Khedut Sangh. 1949. p. 3. 
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Your memorialists respectfully submit that there was 
absolutely no necessity for an Act like the above in the 
ryotwari districts of Bombay Presidencgr.^ 
The Khedut Sangh took particular issue with the sections of the 
Act concerning security of tenure, remission and regulation of rents, 
tenancy termination, building sites, and transfer. They recorajnended 
that Congress repeal or substantially modify the Act. 
The Khedut Sangh declared that it represented not a few large land­
holders but a mass of small landholders. The memorandum above stated 
that: "The object of your Memorialists is to safeguard the rights of the 
small landholders. The Memorialists have no truck with zamindars, 
Jagirdars and the like."^ 
In spite of its declared appeal to the masses the Khedut Sangh was 
unable to alter the Tenancy Act. The Gujarat Lok Paksha currently 
(1953-54) has no seats in the Assembly although a cooperating party,^ 
the Krishikar Lok Paksha, has one seat. 
In Bombay, Congress remains the dominant party by a large majority. 
With respect to policies from which the benefits materialize over a long 
period such a majority is an advantage. Some substitution in favor of 
economic or equitability objectives is possible Qnd still retain a Con­
gress government. 
^Ibid.. p. 5. 
^Ibid., p. 4. 
^In the manifesto of the Gujarat Lok Parishad they stated cooper­
ation with the Krishikar Lok Paksha. Gujarat Lok Paksha. Manifesto of 
the Gujarat People's Conference (in Gujarati, translated from published 
leaflet). Ahmedabad, Gujarat Lok Paksha. 1951. p. 5. 
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CHAPTER 5! SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the program of economic development for India, as outlined in the 
First Five-Year Plan, land reform occupies a key position. It is intended 
that the land reform enactments of the various states of the Union should 
provide the institutional framework for increased efficiency and econozoic 
growth. And although the Plan gives top priority to economic development, 
importance is attached also to the reduction in disparities in income* 
Orientation of the Problem, Purpose fiuad Approach of the Study 
In order to move toimrd the objectives of efficiency, growth and 
equitability in the distribution of income, the states have instituted 
land reform measures including the abolition of overlord tenures, consol­
idation and prevention of fragmentation of land holdings, reclamation and 
sigriculttiral development, and tenancy. In India, land refom is the res­
ponsibility of the individual states and the wide variation in tenure con­
ditions resulting from historical differences in growth of the tenure 
system and wide variations in physical conditions have brought about a 
multiplicity of land reform measures. The study of any of these measvires 
in €iny one state must be made in this context if it is to be realistic 
from the standpoint of the over-all objectives of the Indian land reform 
program. 
With a recognition of its place in the over-all land reform program, 
the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act of 194S was analyzed in 
terms of its objectives. The purposes of this study are to l) test 
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conceptually the principal provisions of the Act in terms of their ability 
to satisfy the conditions necessary for a movement toward specified ob­
jectives and 2) provide hypotheses, concerning the effect of the Act with 
respect to its objectives, which may be tested empirically as information 
becomes available and 3) suggest such improvements in the Act as become 
apparent in the conceptual tests in the first purpose. 
As part of the evolution of tenure in general the tenancy situation 
was influenced by several factors: 1) the decline of the economic pro­
tection of the village and the subjection of the cultivator to a market 
econon^ causing custom and tradition to work against rather than for the 
cultivators, 2) the revenue systeta which, until the latter part of the 
British rxile, has important effects for two reasons, a) its burden and 
b) the variety of rights in land accrniing therefrom, and 3) the reforms 
in tenure which began to develop in the final years of the British era. 
The tenure system in Bombay prior to the series of overlord tenure 
abolitions was two-thirds ryotwari. The land policy of this state en­
visions a completely ryotwari tenure system as soon as the tenure abo­
lition measures can be implemented. 
In contrast to zamindari tenure, tenancy tmder the ryotwari tenure, 
from a legal view, is quite simple. Relationships are governed by agree­
ment with the superior right holder (occupancy right holder in the case 
of first order tenants and superior tenants in the case of sub-tenants). 
Tenancy laws regulate the terms of agreement by setting the limits of 
action. The tenancy relationship is determined, firstly, by the agree­
ment, secondly, by custom and local usage and only finally by laws and 
ordinaaices. 
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The tenancy sitiiation as it existed in 19-4^ was an outgrowth of many 
technical, economic and institutional factors. Basic to problems in ten­
ancy were the more general problems of low income due largely to heavy 
population press\ire and the limited quantities and slow accumiulation of 
capital. The relatively low productivity of the labor factor resxalted 
in wide disparities in income between owners of scarce capital and land 
and those who contributed only labor in the leasing agreement. Low in­
come cultivators regressed on the agricultural ladder because of debts 
incurred to cover cost of production and consumption. Holdings and ten­
ancies became smaller throxigh sub-division and sub-letting. Where there 
was severe conpetition and a rapid turnover of tenants, uncertainty 
tended to cause tenants to refrain from making resource inputs in uses 
where the benefits matured over a lojig period. Factor limitations also 
reduced inputs for improvements. CustcaDft and tradition were obstacles to 
the adoption of new tedmlques as well as to flexibility in leasing 
arrangements. 
The problems attrilwited to the tenancy system included, but extended 
beyond, iim leasing arrangements themselves. From the limited available 
information it appears that from 40 to 50 percent of the cultivators in 
Bombay were tenants at the time of the passe^e of the Act, Lease types 
included crop share, fixed produce, cash and service rents. Rents ranged 
from 1/4 to 3/4 of th© crop. Shares of expenses varied between lease 
types, between landlord types and between areas according to local custom. 
Bombay represented a wide diversity in tenancy conditions auad, consequently, 
the Tenancy Act was required to apply to the problems of tenancy trader 
widely varied circumstances. 
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The objectives of the Tenancy Act were developed from statements in 
the Preamble of the Act, Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill, 
Legislative Assembly debates and the Congress Party declarations and pro­
grams. From these sources the over~all objectives of economic efficiency, 
and economic growth and distributive equitability were derived. The con­
ditions for economic efficiency were grouped tinder 1) factor payments, 
2) tincertainty, and 3) mobility. Economic growth required the additional 
conditions of capital accxamulation and innovation. The criterion for equi­
tability was a movement toward equality in the income distribution. A 
third possible objective, though not eaqjlicitly suggested in the sources 
reviewed, is that of political power. This third possible objective is 
speculated mainly for its importance as a substitute for the other 
objectives. 
With the tenancy sit\iation as stated above and the objectives toward 
which the la\anakers hoped to move, the Tenancy Act was enacted as the 
means. The means may be stated in terms of the principal provisions, 
viz., security of tenure, rent regulation, prohibition on sub-letting, 
ownership and transfer restrictions, state management and compensation. 
In the analysis these provisions were set against the conditions necessary 
to move toward the objectives. 
The procedure followed in the analysis of the provisions of the Act 
was, first, to specify the criteria or conditions that would be required 
of the provisions of the Act in order to permit a movement toward an objec­
tive. This was done from the viewpoint that a reform enactment as a 
means is essentially restrictive rather than positive as, for example, a 
development project. The objective of economic develojaoent is dependent 
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upon efficiency in production and growth. The phases of production 
efficiency vdth which the Tenancy Act is concerned are factor payments, 
uncertain-ty and mobility. Two necessary conditions of growth are capital 
acctimulation and the adoption of innovations. Such matters as the lack 
of alternative «nployment opportunities and the low level of literacy in 
agriciilture, although important in their effects on the tenancy prottLem, 
are viewed as being outside the scope of a tenancy law. Similarly, 
efficiency in consumption and marketing of products are accepted as out­
side the scope of a tenancy law. 
The second explicit objective is concerned with equitability in the 
distribution of income. With the reservation that it may be changed be­
fore it is attained, the standard of an equitable distribution is a 
movement toward equality. The provisions of the Act were analyzed in 
terms of their effect on 1) the distribution of ownership of resources, 
2) the payment to resotirces, and 3) the forms of direct transf^ of 
income. 
The possibility of a tiiird objective was also considered. One 
motivation fcxr passing this land reform enactment might have been the 
maintenance of political power by the Congress Party. If the f^lure 
of the Gujarat Khedut Sangh in opposing the Tenancy Act is an indication 
of the political importance of the Act to Congress, then it appears that 
the Act has not changed the political position of the Congress. 
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Ejected Consequences of the Act 
The provisions of the Tenancy Act were analyzed in terms of their 
ability to satisfy the conditions of efficiency, growth and distributive 
equitability. Each provision was tested conceptually by utilizing the 
findings of other studies, information supplied by the Revenue Depart~ 
ment, and observations in the villages of Jaska, Badlapur and Madhbavl. 
A summary of the results of these conceptual tests follows under the 
heading of the various provisions. 
Security of tenure 
Section 5 provides that a tenant may not be evicted before an expir­
ation of 10 years, except under certain conditions. The landlord may 
recover the land at the end of the period but unless he does, the ten­
ancy is automatically renewed for another 10 years. 
Because tenants are more assured of receiving the retvirns from the 
inputs which become attached to the land, they will tend to make a smaller 
discovmt for uncertainty. As a consequence, tenants will have a tendency 
to increase inputs of the resoiirces from which the benefits materialize 
over more than one production period. Section 5 is not intended for re­
covery of the value of inputs of single-season dxiration so the quantity 
of tenant inputs of resotirces in single-season uses would be affected 
only as they substitute for long long-term uses. 
At the end of each 10-year period there is little restriction on the 
recovery of the land by the landlord. At the beginning of each 10-year 
period the tenant can anticipate another 10 years on the land with a high 
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degree of certainty. Thus tenants are subject to wave-like sec\irity, with 
peaks at the beginning and troughs at the end of successive periods. 
The security of tenure provision does not apply equally to ordinary 
ahd protected tenants. Because of landlord recovery for personal culti­
vation from protected tenants under section 34-# the protected tenants re­
ceive little security from section 5* Therefore, from the standpoint of a 
fixed assxirance of tenure, the ordinary tenant is more "protected" than a 
protected tenant. 
Mobility of resoxirces may be reduced by section 5 in two ways. First, 
the tenant acquires the right of possession of the land for 10 years. He 
must remain on the land if he is to recover the return to long-term in­
puts which he might make. Second, the landlord who recovers land from a 
tenant must utilize the land for the purpose for which the land was re­
covered for at least 12 years, thus iamobilizing the landlord's resotirces. 
Because of the increased assurance of obtaining the retxirn frcsn his 
investment, the security of tenure provision should be reflected in an 
increase in the marginal efficiency of the tenant's capital. The reduced 
ability of the landlord to change tenants and thus obtain the type of re­
sources that would maximize the landlord's income, will, on the other 
hand, have a tendency to reduce the i&arginal efficiency of the landlord's 
capital. The net effect upon capital accrraaolation will depend upon the 
relative propensities to invest of landlords and tenants. 
Most innovations currently available in Indian agricxilture call for 
inputs which are either transferable or yield returns in a short period. 
The tenant, therefore, will not find it difficult to obtain the return 
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from his inputs in various innovations, and the effect of section 5 on the 
adoption of innovations by tenants is probably small. 
It is possible for a tenant to terminate his tenancy voluntarily. 
Furthermore, there is nothing in the Act to prevent the landlord from in­
ducing the tenant, with "valuable consideration", to surrender the tenancy. 
If the landlord makes such a payment to the tenant, the Act has created a 
valuable property for the tenant equal to the bribe required to induce him 
to move. This transfer of property tends to result in a redistribution of 
income in favor of tenants and will satisfy the condition of distributive 
equitability only insofar as landlords are rich and tenants are poor. 
Rent regulation 
Under section 6 of the Act the maximum rent payable is 1/6 of the 
crop. 
The maximum rent set by government appears to be considerably below 
the market rate (common share rentals were 1/2 share). Because tenants 
receive a higher retxu'n for their inputs (and assuming the supply curve 
for their factors slopes forward) the effect of section 6 will be to in­
duce tenants to make greater inputs of labor and capital in the firm, 
drawing these factors out of alternative employments and out of leisure 
and/or consxjmption. One result of government regulation of the factor 
prices may be inefficient production reflected by a supply of labor in 
agricTalt\are greater than what is necessary to produce the output speci­
fied by the market. 
If the market rate, say, 1/2 share of the crop, did represent the 
value of land in production and rentals are reduced by the Act to 1/6 of 
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the crop, landlords will be induced to cultivate personally in order to 
recover implicit rent. Tenants will have less incentive to own land since 
they receive part of the benefits of land by way of the rent regulation 
without bearing the costs involved in land ownership. 
Rents were historically subject to little change so the direct 
effect on uncertainty of the maximuin rent regulation is probably not of 
great importance. However some secondary effect on the allocation of re-
soxirces might result if the tenant, through an improved income position, 
becomes more willing to bear uncertainty. Production plans might be 
altered, for example, by a reduction of flexibility between enterprises. 
Mobility of tenant factors depends upon whether the increased pay­
ment to the labor factor will hold tenants in agriculture or whether the 
increased income to labor will provide them with the means to effect a 
move. Other things remaining unchanged, the increased payment to labor 
through the rent regulation will tend to hold labor in agricxilture. In 
the short riin at least, many of the real forms of capital are not trans­
ferable to other employments. Sociological factors also tend to create 
work preferences for local or traditional occupations. In view of these 
considerations, it appears that tenant factors will remain in agriciil-
ture. In a significant portion of the leasing arrangements landlords 
contributed little capital, and the mobility of land is perhaps important 
in only a few areas as between agriculture and non-agricultviral industry. 
Thus the rent regulation will deter the flow out of agricultxire into 
industry. 
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Since the rent regiilation will tend to transfer income from landlords 
to tenants, landlords vdll be inclined to shift their capital to alter­
native eo^loyments or leistnre. Tenants, with increased capacity to save, 
are in a bett^ position to invest, but probably will not do so in view 
of their relatively hig|i marginal propensity to con8\]me. It appears that 
the rent regulation will have the effect of tremsferring consun^tion from 
landlords to tenants and will not result in an Increase of capital accu­
mulation. 
If the innovation is labor-iising suid output-increasing, the increased 
payment to labor resulting from rent regulation may be the means for 
directing greater supplies of labor into the labor-using enterprises and 
thus will be consistent wi"tii an efficient resoucrce allocation. If the 
innovation is land-using and output-increasing, increased payment to 
labor may be inconsistent with the increased requirements for land and 
will resiilt in excessive quantities of labor in firms using the innova­
tion. 
The rent regvilation applies to all tenancies, drawing no distinction 
between high income or low income landlords and tenants. Insofar as the 
assumption of the superior income position of landlords is correct, there 
will be an equalizing effect between landlords as a class and tenants as 
a class. As such, the rent regulation is limited in its ability to move 
toward the objective of distributive equitability. Section 6 can redis­
tribute income between the landlord class and the tenant class but cannot 
alter the distribution of incc»&e within the respective classes. 
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Rrohlbition on sub-letting 
As part of the program to prevent fragmentation of land into small, 
separated parcels, the Tenancy Act in section 27 forbids the sub^letting 
or assignment of the tenant's interest in the land. Fragmentated culti­
vating units may limit the ability of the firm to attain an efficient re-
Source combination because certain other factors are indivisible, e.g., 
bullocks or machinery. Furthermore, fragmentation increases the cost of 
production by requiring the transportation of the productive factors be­
tween scattered plots. Section 27 appears to be directed at these frag­
mentation problems and not at a change in the relative shares of income 
to the landlord and tenant factors. Apparently the effect vd.th respect 
to a movement toward the economic objective is positive. 
However, the effectiveness of section 27 is limited by two quali­
fications. Section 27 does not apply to a special group of tenants known 
as permanent tenants whose rights are almost as extensive as the rights of 
an owner. A still more serious qualification is that heirs are per­
mitted to partition the tenancy down to the minimum of one standard area, 
so that inter-generation sub-letting is permitted. 
Transfer restrictions 
Land imrchased by the tenant under section 32 cannot be sold, given 
away, mortgaged, leased, exchanged or assigned. With these restrictions 
on the use of the land the value of the property to the tenant purchaser 
is correspondingly reduced. Land sold by the landlord must be sold at 
Tribunal-determined prices. Generally, these prices will be below mar­
ket prices, ^cause all land sold by the landlord must be sold according 
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to a priority of p\irchasera at govermaent-determined prices, land values 
will tend to be reduced. 
Usuler section 32, the protected tenant may at ai^ time enforce a 
sale from the landlord. If the tenant finds the agreed price iinsatis-
factory he may request the government to determine a "fair" price which 
will probably be below the market price. The landlord is thus subject to 
greater uncertainty with respect to the returns from his long-term inputs 
that would be cut off by tenant purchase. This increase in xmcertainty 
may reduce the incentive for landlords to make improvements. This reason 
for teminating inputs for improvements was given by several landlords in 
the villages investigated. 
Sections 43 and 64- will have a tendency to reduce the mobility of 
tenant resources. From the restrictions listed above, it is seen that 
the tenant must remain on the land he purchases or sacrifice the purchase 
price. No other parties may occupy the land because they may be evicted 
by the Collector. Mobility is further restricted Ti:^ section 64. which 
holds the tenant in possession on the land and holds out other buyers re­
gardless of their willingness or ability to pay higher prices. 
Information collected by the government affirmed that the principal 
reason for tenants* failure to purchase lands was inadequate finance. 
Since sections 4^3 and 63 place further restrictions on the ability of 
prospective purchasers to mortgage the land, these sections result in 
further obstacles to the ability of tenants to make pixrchases. Despite 
the obstacles to the financing of land purchases by tenants, there is a 
tendency to redistribute income in favor of tenants by lowering the pxar-
chase prices of land to tenants. 
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State management 
Under the provisions of section LA the state may assume management of 
an estate on the grounds of inefficient management. 
The effect upon factor payments, uncertainty and mobility depends 
upon the nature of memagement. There appears to be no inherent charac­
teristic of state management as such to be better or worse than private 
management. Contribution by state managers to management is siaia.1 because 
most decisions are left in the hands of tenants. Managers act in the 
capacity of administrators of the estates rather than agricultural man­
agers, The manager is usually the Mamlatdar vdao does not take personal 
part in the management. 
Up to the present the state management provision has been exercised 
to a very limited extent so that it is yet relatively unimportant. Be­
cause management of estates may be assixmed at any time the goverxanent 
feels that the land is not being used efficiently, section 44- is poten­
tially a very strong measure and might become very important from the 
standpoint of some political parties other than Congress. 
Compensation 
Compensation for trees planted by the tenant is provided for in 
section 19 and compensation for improvements made by protected tenants is 
provided for in section 41. Since section 34- virtually nullifies the 
sectority of tenure for the protected tenant, section 41 is intended to do 
for protected tenants what the security of tenure provision does not 
ordinary tenants with respect to inputs of long-term maturity. 
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Since tenants may be aosxared of recovery of the unexpired value of 
their inputs, compensation will tend to reduce uncertainty coianected with 
inputs with long-tem maturity. Reeoiurce allocations will tend to be 
shifted in favor of more long-term uses. Compensation provisions will 
provide incentive to the tenant to make inputs for improvements and crops 
that mature over several seasons. With a reduced disco\int for uncertainty, 
the marginal efficiency of capital in the leasing firm will tend to in­
crease* Consequently, tenants will have a greater iz^ucaaoent to invest* 
In contrast to the security of tenxire provision, section 5, a measure 
which provides for compensation for -ttis expected retoorns from all unex­
pired inputs would remove the necessity for the tenant to remain on the 
land in order to derive the benefits of past inputs. Thus a compensation 
measure properly administered is capable of increasing mobility. 
The present compensation provisions (of the Tenancy Act), however, 
are limited in usefulness because of 2 qualifications. First, section 19 
does not apply if the tenant gives up the tenancy voluntarily, there­
fore, a paradox arises in that a tenant will receive compensation only if 
he fails to pay his rent, abuses the land, sub-lets the land, or uses the 
land for a non-agricultural purpose. Second, section 41; which deals with 
compensation for improvements, applies only to protected tenants* 
Recommendations 
The lack of information prevents the application of conclusive tests 
as to the actual working of the Act. However, upon the basis of the 
ability of the provisions to satisfy the conditions for efficiency, growth 
and distribution, it is perhaps possible to make certain tentative 
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recoimnenda'tions if the change appears to induce a movenxent toward one ob­
jective without a diminution of another objective. 
The following are recommendations resiilting from the conceptual ana­
lysis» Their applicability will depend upon the qualifications and reser­
vations as indicated in the analysis. 
The rent regulation was seen to have two effects, 1) on the allocation 
of resources and 2) on the distribution of income. It was suggested that 
the distribution of income may be effected either by changing the owner­
ship of resources or changing the payment to factors. But altering the 
payments to factors may affect the allocation of resources unfavorably. 
Therefore, it appears that the distribution of income might be adjusted 
with less undesirable effects to efficiency if ownership of the resources 
is transferred rather than a change made in the payment to the factors. 
Furthermore, the rent regulation, by altering the payment to a factor, 
adjusts the distribution of income only between the landlord and tenant 
classes, and not between the rich and the poor. Therefore, section 6 will 
cause a movement toward a more equal distribution of income among indi­
viduals only insofar as landlords are rich and tenants are poor. Although 
the average income of landlords is probably higher than the average income 
of tenants, it is perhaps true also that their income distributions over­
lap over a significant range. 
In view of the considerations above it may be recommended that rent 
regulation be abandoned except to offset the effects of imperfect compe­
tition in lease bargaining. 
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It may be further recommended that if a better distribution of income 
is desired that it be effected either 1) through the transfer of resources 
or 2) direct transfer of income. The ownership of some resovirces, e.g., 
labor, cannot be easily transferred. In such cases direct transfer of in­
come may be made, e.g., through the income tax. The transfer of resources 
may have an \infavorable effect on expectations if carried out too often, 
and therefore shoiild be utilized as a once-for-all measure. 
It appears that the usefulness which the distinction between ordinary 
and protected tenant may have had at the time of the passage of the Act no 
longer exists. It is, therefore, recommended that only one class of ten­
ant be used in the Act. This being done, all tenants could be entitled to 
a compensation provision similar to that of the present section 41• With 
all tenants assured of compensation for all inputs the value of which had 
not expired at the time of tenancy termination, tenants woxild be provided 
with an incentive to make inputs the benefits of which matiire over a long 
period. This would also elimanate the need for the fixed-tenure pro­
vision, section 5, and would reduce the obstacle to resource transfers. 
There is no obvious reason vhy the evaluation for compensation should pose 
problems more difficult than those involved in the current evaluations of 
reasonable rent and prices of land. 
It is recommended that the provision which prevents the sub-division 
and sub-letting of land be strengthened to make it effective. To do this 
it is recommended that the proviso of the 1952 Amendment be so changed as 
to prevent the partition and sub-division of the leased land at the time 
of the death of the tenant.^ 
^Legislative Assembly Bill No. 31 of 1952. Bombay Legislative 
Assembly debates, report. 22:2369-2374-. August, 1952. p. 2342. 
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According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 1952 Amend­
ment,^ the reason for the second part of the amendment which allows the 
tenant to mortgage his interest in favor of government or a cooperative 
society in order to secxire a tagai loan. It is recommended that this 
clause remain tmchanged. 
S\iggestions for Fut\are Study 
Almost a decade has passed since India's Independence. In the light 
of experience gained in the first 7 years of the land reform program 
appraisal can be made of the effectiveness of the various meas\ires in 
accomplishing the objectives for which they were intended. Research, 
guided by the basic objectives of the reform program, is needed to indi­
cate the necessary changes to meet unsolved problems and adapt legislation 
to meet changing conditions. 
With respect to a complete test of the effect of the Tenancy Act this 
study has dealt with the conceptual phases—first, the Tenancy Act in 
terms of the emergence of the tenancy sit\aation in Bombay out of the ten­
ure development in India and the role of the Tenancy Act in the economic 
development and, second, the analysis of the Tenancy Act in terms of its 
stated objectives. Although tentative recommendations were made with 
respect to the Act in terms of certain conditions necessary for a movement 
toward the objectives, the conclusions of the conceptual analysis are 
really the bases of hypotheses for empirical tests of the working of the 
Act, The following suggestions are submitted as hypotheses relevant to 
the sections of the Act analyzed, which may be confirmed or rejected as 
^Ibid. 
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infoinnation becomes available from observable consequences of the operation 
of the Act. 
1) Although the security of tenure provision has a tendency to in­
duce tenants to make greater inputs for improvements it has the tendency 
to cause wave-like security and cause the inputs to be immobile. Two 
possibilities concerning the security of tenure provision are that a) ten­
ants will be inclined to shift their resources toward uses that require 
longer periods to mature, e.g., soil conservation and slow maturing crops, 
but b) tenants will be less inclined to make volimtary moves to industry 
and other agricultural firms where their productivity might be higher. 
2) The question of whether the rent regulation section meets the 
condition of efficiency thus enabling a movement toward the objective 
appears to depend upon the relative merits of goverjiment pricing to off­
set the effects of imperfect competition and the demerits of changing the 
price ratios from that set by the market. The increase in payment of 
labor from 1/2 to 5/6 of the crop suggests a probable source of ineffi­
ciency, It is suggested that the rent regulation provision will tend to 
induce (or hold) more labor into agriculture than can be used efficiently. 
3) Since state management is imposed only in cases of severe and 
obvious cases of inefficiency or where serious management limitations 
exist it appears that after the state assumes the management, output in 
firms will increase for the given resources employed in the estate at the 
time of management. 
4) Because of the reduction in rental payments and the possibility 
of a protected tenant forcing sale of the land which he cultivates. 
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landlords will be less inclined to make inputs on land cialtivated by pro­
tected tenants than that cultivated by ordinary tenants. 
It is STOggested that tenants will not make increases in land pur­
chases because of a greater return through rentiixg than ownership \anless 
land prices are also reduced so that the ratio of legal rent to land price 
is equal to or greater than the ratio prior to the enactment. 
One of the principal obstacles to purchase is finance. Because land 
may not be mortgaged and because tenants must make rental payments con­
currently to the payment of the purchase price, little, if any, increase 
in purchases by tenants may be expected. 
5) The pressures to reduce the size of cultivating unit are, with 
the exception of section 27, outside the scope of control of the Tenancy 
Act. The size of the cultivating iinit will continue to reduce to the 
legal minimum, and through subterfuge, go below the legal minimvmi. 
6) Protected tenants aware of the compensation feature will tend to 
increase inputs of resoxirces of long-term maturity, and tenants that are 
compensated for the imexpired value of long-term improvements are more in­
clined to move to alternative employments than ordinary tenants whose 
recovery of return for inputs is contingent upon remaining on the land. 
7) The effects of the Act fall upon landlords and tenants as 
tenurial classes not upon income classes and therefore the movement to­
ward the objective is limited to the extent that landlords as a class are 
wealthier than tenants. The initial effects of the rent regulation will 
tend to cause the distribution of income to move toward equality. 
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In order to test the tentative hypotheses above or other relationships 
of interest that might arise from the conceptual analysis, much more in­
formation is necessary than is currently available. In the present state 
of knowledge two types of information are required: 1) basic, aggrega­
tive data and 2) the more specialized information dealing with certain 
specific relationships. The former type may be characterized as census-
type data and the latter as that secured by more intensive studies employ­
ing sampling techniques. 
General information is required in order to estimate the relative 
strength of certain effects of the Act. For example, at the time of the 
Act no reliable information was available even to determine the extent of 
tenancy. As a beginning, therefore, information is required to show the 
ownership pattern and the amounts and types of tenancy. Such information 
should be available through the Revenue Depar-tanent in the records that, 
theoretically, are maintained in the village.^ This information is not 
collected on a continuing basis, so much of the information of the vill­
age is not available. 
More adequate information on the income position of landlords and 
tenants is also required. Some income data were collected by the 
National Sample SiJUPvey, and Telang^ indicated current efforts of the 
Bombay Bureau of Economics and Statistics to make studies of the income 
positions of various agricxiltiorists. 
^For example ownership pattern can be foimd in the Record of Rights 
and type of tenancy (mode) in Village Form. VII. Anderson, Manual, 
op.cit. 
^M. A, Telang. Information conveyed to the writer in personal inter­
view at the Bombay Bureau of Economics and Statistics, Bombay, India. 
January 1954-. 
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Perhaps more important are the requirements of the more specialized 
information. First, are the needs for the determination of the producti­
vity of at least certain general categories of factors such as land, labor 
and capital. Some information may be forthcoming, for example, from the 
budget studies hy Driver at Poona.^ 
Crucial also to much of the analysis siiggested above is knowledge of 
the nature of the supply functions for the various factors of production 
and the forces that affect these supply functions. For example, there is 
a possibility of a backward sloping supply curve for labor if incomes are 
raised rapidly to a high level and tastes of the workers are not chemged 
to include more goods and services instead of leisure. 
Information is also needed on the amount and type of capital and the 
means of finance. The recent study by the Reserve Bank of India^ can per­
haps supply some of the required information. 
Finally, a particularly difficult type of study is suggested by the 
possibility of imperfection in the factor markets in agricxiltrxre. The 
degree of control over the price of, say, land in the village by a land­
lord, although important from the standpoint of welfare policy would be 
very difficult to measure. 
Studies of the effectiveness of the Tenancy Act are being undertaken 
by the Indian Society of Agriciiltural Economics at Bombay and the Gokhale 
^P. N. Driver. Information conveyed to the writer in personal inter­
view at the Agricultiiral College at Poona, India. February, 1954« 
^Reserve Bank of India. All-India credit survey. Bombay, Reserve 
Bank of India. 1954-
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Institute at Poona in cooperation vdth the Central Government. These 
studies will attempt to indicate the effects of the Bombay Tenancy Act 
by field investigations in the Gujarat, Maharastra and the Karnatak, 
a27 
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l/l6 of a rupee. 
Garden land. 
Spiked Biillet. 
A half crop share type of leasing arrangement. 
Narrow embankment, usually of earth, surrounding a plot 
of land for the purfKsse of retaining water. 
A surcharge collected above rental payment. 
Principal revenue officer in the district. 
The dry region of central Bombay State east of the 
coastal range of mountains. 
Sub-division of the state. 
A pulse, chick pea. 
The region of northern Bombay State. 
l/40th of an acre. 
A surcharge collected above rental payment. 
Non-irrigated or dry land. 
Great millet. 
The southern region of Bombay State. 
Monsoon crop (Ju^-September). 
Land owner. 
The tropical rain forest region west of the coastal 
range in central B<»Bbay State. 
Land with ^banknents or paddy land. 
The linguistic region of central Bombay State which 
Includes both the Deccan and the Konkan. 
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Mamlatdar Principal revenue officer in the taluka. 
Maund A weight loeasure equal to 82.3 pounds. 
Paddy Unpolished rice, the plot vhere the rice is grovm, or 
the whole crop (straw and grain). 
Pandaayat Literally, consmittee-of-five, but usually the body of 
village administration of any number* 
Rabi Winter crop (September-February) . 
Ragi A millet. 
Rupee Indian moz^tary standard equal to approximately $0.21. 
Ryot Cultivator of the land. 
Sowkar Moneylender, 
Tagai Government loan. 
Tallati Village accountant and revenue officer. 
Taluka Sub-division of the district. 
TUT A pulse, pigeon pea. 






Inquiries on the Bombay Tenancy Act in the Villages 
Jaska, Badlapur ais^ Mac&l^vi 
The object of the inquiry on tenan<qr in three widely diverse agri­
cultural regions of Bombay State was not to gather complete information 
on the Tenancy Act but to dis<K5ver probl^s that might be missed by re­
liance on secondary sources or speculation alone. The inquiries in the 
vill^es also helped to indicate the nature of difficulties in obtaining 
information that subsequent surveys would enco\mter. 
There was insufficient time to collect data in a quantity that could 
reveal significant information either about the tenancy structure in the 
state or about the implementation of the Act. These visits to the vill­
age were primarily fear t^e purpose of revealing problems wad not drawing 
inferences about the whole state. 
In selecting the three villages, the following factors were taken 
into consideration. 1) The village should he at least somewhat typical 
of the taluka and, to a lesser extent, district in which the village is 
located; 2) each of tjie villages should represent a different type of 
agriculture, tenure and tenancy? 3) the villages should differ with 
respect to the ^jxixl^asntation of the Tenancy Act so that problems with 
the Act azui wit^ut the Act could be studied. 
Village recozHis were esrantined to deterzolrae the exrtent and type of 
tenancy, type of owner, size of village cultivating iinits, land transfers 
and ottoer basic village information. A list of landlords and tenants was 
also selected by size of holding or cultivating tmit and relative income. 
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i.e., high, medium or low, as suggested by the tallati. At the time of 
securing the village data the tallatis were interviewed in terms of the 
questions in the landlord and tenant schedules. Interviews of the tallati 
and one or two of the headmen of each major community in the village pro­
vided a workable outline of conditions in the smaller villages. 
When village information had been obtained, interviews were arranged 
with tenants and landlords. Althougii the village information provided an 
over-all picture of the prevailing leasing systems in the village, inter­
views with tenants and landlords provided information on the individual's 
reactions to his leasing agreement and the tenancy legislation. These 
inteJrviews also helped to indicate the nature of replies and difficulties 
in securing information, e.g., complicated or hypothetical questions are 
of limited value, and farm records are largely non-existent so inter­
temporal comparisons are very difficult to make. 
The 3 villages are widely separated geographically with Jaska in the 
north (Gujarat), Badlaprur in the center (Konkan) and Madhbavi in the south 
(Karnatak). Jaska is located in Phanduka, the southwesternmost taluka 
of Ahmedabad district. Badlapur is in Thana district, east of Bombay City. 
Madhbavi is located in north central Bijapur district, in Bijapur taluka. 
There is no irrigation in the village of Jaska. The crops, princi­
pally wheat, cotton, jowar, bajri, reply upon the monsoon to provide the 
required 20 to 25-inch rainfall for the year's production. The village of 
Madhbavi is also in a dry land tract. With less than a 20-inch annual 
average rainfall Madhbavi is frequently subject to famine. Dryland 
methods of cultivation are employed even on the small acreage of paddy 
grown, principal crops are rabijowar, rabi bajri and rabi cotton. 
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Badlapur is subject to rainfall exceeding 100 inches per year. Padcly 
is virtxially the only crop grovm, with the exception of a few vegatables. 
No rabi crops are grown. 
The tenures were as varied as the pi^rsical conditions. Jaska was 
characterized by a large number of absentee owners holding a relatively 
small area and a few in village landlords holding the bulk of the land. 
Full tenants ciiltivated approximately 1/6 of the land, and part owners 
leased another 1/12. Before the r«at conasutation in late 1953 all leases 
were of crop share type, 
Badlapur's tenancies were almost entirely of the fixed^payment pro~ 
duce rent with a very eanaai number of cash leases for land on which peuidy 
was not grown. Approximately 1/4 of the land in the village was under 
tenant cultivation. About 1/6 of the 1,C^ acres held by landlords 
(holders renting out at least part of their land) were owned by absentee 
landlords. 
Crop share rents predominate in Madhbavi accounting for over 75 per­
cent of the tenant~ca)ltivated land. About 2,1(X) of 1^ 9^000 acres of 
cultivated land in the village are tenant oiltivated. Cash and crop 
shares are also fovmd in the village. Approximately 1/5 of tha 441 land-
holders in the village were absentee landholdws. 
The reaction to the Tenancy Act varied from indifference in Madhbavi 
to a violent response in Ja^a in whicih tenants were withholding the pay­
ment of rents. Generally, Badlapur vas conforming to the provisions of 
the Te^taacy Act. However^ evasions and circumventions of the Act were 
















Ahmedabad 152,802 86,184 20, 533 106,717 41.1 
Kaira 118,536 244,043 109, 590 353,633 74.9 
Broach 21,881 29,531 18, 752 48,283 68.8 
Panch Mahala 58,065 50,354 18, 932 69,286 54.4 
Surat 91,483 77,434 9, 594 $7,028 48.8 
W, Khandesh 51,357 20,567 10, 636 31,203 37.8 
E. Khandesh 122,763 39,330 20, 631 59,961 32.8 
Nasik 13,840 68,238 33, 952 102,190 88.1 
Ahmednagar 152,802 86,184 20, 533 106,717 a.i 
Sholapur 84,004 45,469 15, 088 60,557 41.9 
Poona 150,974 123,115 38, 070 161,185 51.6 
Satara 234,446 197,241 67, 239 264,480 53.0 
Belgaxim 112,889 77,874 17, 564 95,438 45.8 
Bijaptir 120,894 64,128 20, 579 84,707 41.2 
Dha3rwar 58,090 43,561 12, 568 56,129 49.1 
Thana 65,311 67,100 22, 698 89,798 57.9 
B.S.D^ 1,308 1,191 10 1,201 47.9 
Kolaba 82,425 98,815 14, 164 112,979 57.8 
Ratnagiri 299,915 222,709 31, 957 254,666 45.9 
Kanara 17,653 57,594 5, 931 63,525 78.3 
Total Bombay 
Province 2,011,438 1,700,662 509,021 2,209,683 47.6 
^•Adapted from Barmeda, op.cit.. p, 123. 
^Pre-merger Bombay does not include Mehsana, Banas Kantha, Baroda, 
Sabar Kantha, Kolhapur, Bangs and Amreli. 
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Table 17, Type of cultivator, acreages cultivated 





Number of tenants 
















14. East Khandesh 
15* West Khandesh 
16. Nasik 
17. Poona 






















































































































































1,668,340 499,234 2 ,167,574 5,236,706 
(Continued) 
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Table 17. (Continued) 
Acreage® 
District cultivated Acreaere^ciiltivated by tenants Total 
Number by owner Protected Ordinary- Tenants acreage ^ 
ctiltivators tenants tenants 
1. 688, U9 149,501 41,921 191,422 879,571 
2. 637,54-9 72,275 27,826 100,101 737,650 
3. 1,373,334 328,196 125,145 453,341 1,826,675 
373,224 151,330 30,448 181,778 555,002 
5. 856,017 234,128 55,945 290,073 1,146,090 
6. 24,000 24,000 
7. 453,803 526,084 92,209 618,293 1,072,096 
8. 152,237 382,945 97,550 480,495 632,732 
9. 756,169 264,865 11,679 276,544 1,032,713 
10. 584,462 213,311 87,621 300,932 885,394 
11. 1,012,777 487,012 58,871 545,883 1,558,660 
12. 274,698 256,941 31,852 288,793 563,491 
13. 2,056,047 350,414 242,647 593,061 2,649,108 
1,491,596 195,438 164,848 360,286 1,851,882 
15. 1,311,509 159,935 96,726 256,661 1,568,170 
16. 1,704,026 298,419 222,132 520,551 2,224,577 
17. 1,487,519 304,314 522,916 827,230 2,314,749 
18. 904,743 264,508 156,309 420,817 1,325,560 
19. 1,822,939 617,875 281,526 899,401 2,722,340 
20. 155,865 190,811 29,302 220,113 375,978 
21. 718,899 432,787 28,557 461,344 1,180,243 
22. 977,582 289,075 211,175 500,250 1,477,832 
23. 585,551 274,178 49,955 324,133 909,684 
24. 1,638,021 643,604 262,753 906,357 2,544., 378 
25. 1,962,392 742,380 330,886 1,073,266 3,035,658 
26. 1,284,880 578,012 222,225 800,237 2,085,117 
27. 95,234 97,349 28,944 126,293 221,527 
28. 2,388 1,692 80 1,772 4,160 
Total 25,385,610 8,507,379 3,512,048 12,019,427 37,405,037 
(Continued) 
figures in acres. 
Table 17. (Continued) 
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District Rents paid Rents paid Total 
Number by protected by ordinary rents 













































































































Total 125,909,393 42,304,761 168,214,154 
^•Adapted froms Bombay Revenue Department, Revenue Department file 
no. 8515/4.9II, oE.cit, These data may not be used without express 
permission of the Bombay Government. 
^Figures in rupees. 
